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THE IMPACT OF FOUNDERS' MILITARY BACKGROUND ON ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE

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INTRODUCTION

The use of the word Latin word for **culture**, *'cultura'*, in the meaning close to the one it has nowadays, is a relatively new one, dating back only to the 15th century. As a topic of research, culture has its roots in the first anthropologists of the second half of the 19th century, who studied tribes in the Amazon jungles. They tried to both formalise its definition, and research it scientifically, applying to it Comte's adaptation to social sciences of Hume's ideas about **empiricism** and **positivism**, which itself dates to the middle of the 19th century. The application of positivism to **social sciences** was refined by Durkheim by the late 19th century in his seminal works "The Rules of Sociological Method" and "Suicide" (1895, 1897), and many more thereafter.

From **anthropology**, the concept of culture made its way to other **social sciences** through agents such as Kluckhohn and his colleagues (Kluckhohn and Kelly 1945, Kluckhohn and Leighton 1946), and later on to **organisational sciences**, where it became, and still is, a prominent topic of research within organisational behaviour studies as part of management sciences.

This research is focused on **organisational culture**, as part of **organisational behaviour**, and the processes that shape and influence it. Organisational culture, as will be elaborated upon later on in this research, can be regarded and treated both as a functional managerial tool to shape and navigate an organisation in a desired direction, and as an interpretive tool for depicting and analysing organisations.

In that historical perspective, the already classic management book "In Search of Excellence" by Peters and Waterman (1982), in which the authors reflect on the subject of how important culture is in the context of organisations, seems as fresh as a rose. They suggest that organisations with 'strong culture' perform better than others[1]. Although this current research tries to set aside a normative consideration of organisational culture, Peters and Waterman's is an example of how organisational culture is considered by some as an indicator and a tool towards organisations' success.

Many scholars relate to the dynamic influence of cultures on organisations, some tag it 'organisational culture', some 'corporate culture', with identical meaning. To name a just a few: Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner (1997) Deal & Kennedy (2000); Peters & Waterman

[1] Ironically, as Morgan (2006) notes, by the 90's already many of these companies exalted by Peters and Waterman were struggling, trapped by their own excellence, some even went out of busines.

(2004). Schein (2004) argues that culture helps explain some of the more seemingly incomprehensible, and irrational, aspects of what goes on in groups and organisations. Hampden-Turner (1990) alleges that the organisational culture defines the professional behaviour and motivates the people. It influences the way a company processes information, its internal relations, and its values. Geert Hofstede, Hofstede, & Michael Minkov (2010) assert that culture strongly influences the planning and control processes in organisations, while Kotrba *et al.* (2012) in an exhaustive and elaborated research established a clear positive connection between organisational culture traits consistency[2] and predicting market-to-book ratios and sales growth.

Sackmann (1991) illustrates the contributions of individuals in building culture, which is based on social interaction. Schneider (1994) claims that culture has an important influence on how an organisation makes decisions, changes, and strives to succeed, and emphasizes the impact which culture has on managers' perceptions.

Deal & Kennedy (2000) elucidate one practical purpose of studying culture: *"Culture, even roughly defined has a very strong influence on a company's behaviour over time. And that influence is predictable. CEOs and senior managers can read a culture for early warning signals of people out of synch with the aims of their business. Investment analysts can turn to culture for greater accuracy in forecasting. Even executives in search of new opportunities would do well to match-make their personality to that of a company."* (p. 129). When a company passes some threshold of size *"…the process of bureaucratization begins to take hold; At this point, the original culture and the values that underpin it are often seriously threatened and may require retooling if they are to survive the transition to a large-company environment. Thus, most companies over the first entrepreneurial rush towards stability and success should pause to look hard at their cultures. They may not get another chance."* (p. 160-161). One purpose, amongst others, of the study in this thesis is to look more deeply into the influence of founders and their background to help enhancing the predictability of companies' behaviour.

Sackmann (2007, Ch. 2) provides in her book an overview of the contemporary knowledge, with regard to the link between corporate culture and performance. Based on the review of studies that investigate culture and performance there seems to be a growing empirical evidence of a culture–performance link. The effect on organisational effectiveness and performance is both direct (e.g. employees' motivation) and indirect (e.g. communication.) It

[2] They use the term "consistency" to avoid the ambiguous interpretation of "strength".

is worthwhile to mention that it difficult to compare this link between companies mainly due to the diversity among the studies in many aspects, e.g. terminology (what is a "strong" culture? what is "success"?), environment, foci of business, method of the studies and more. Nevertheless, there is a great interest in investigating the culture–performance link, as demonstrated by the multitude of studies, because un-covering such an elusive, maybe non-existent, link is close to hitting a managerial jackpot.

THE RESEARCH FIELD AND PROBLEM STATEMENT

On a personal note, my personal interest in this field comes from many years of military service, followed by many more years of working as an entrepreneur in newly established businesses, and as a consultant and employee in some companies. I have noticed I feel more 'comfortable' and easier to integrate in companies founded and manged by ex-IAF (Israel-Air-Force) personnel, and as an entrepreneur – the easiness with venture capital sources led by ex-personnel; I was triggered into trying to decipher this observation. This led to my interest in **Organisational Behaviour**, and especially in **Organisational Culture**, how it develops, and the influence founders have on the path an entrepreneurship takes.

Hence, this research lays in the fields **Organisational Behaviour**, which tries to describe and understand how people in organisations act, which itself lays within the broader field of **Organisational Studies**.

In the field of Organisational Behaviour there is a consensus that founders have profound influence on the organisations they establish, for example, establishing work methods, creating organisational rites and organisational myths, that may endure through the development and expansion of the organisation, and influence explicitly and implicitly, organisational behaviour and structure. **Organisational Culture** (**OC**), being one of the insights into the organisations that the Organisational Behaviour strives to research and describe – namely the human behaviour in organisations and its effects, is of great interest. This interest is fuelled by many reasons – as descriptive, interpretational tool OC helps achieving 'thick' description of processes (Geertz 1973a, chap. I), interactions, explicit and implicit behaviour both within organisations, and in the interaction between organisations and their environment. As a functional tool OC might be used to arrange, design, direct, and lead changes in organisations that are based on deeper layers of behaviour than mere managerial directive; these changes tend to assimilate deeper into the organisation and last longer as practices, routines and rituals (cf. Schein 1983, Deal and Kennedy 2000).

Continuing this line, there are some useful models that describe the processes and mechanisms which reflect the effect of founders' backgrounds on the organisations that they create (cf. Schein (1983, 1991a, 2004), Martin (1992, 2002a), Deal and Kennedy (2000), Morgan (2006), Ogbonna and Harris (2001), and many more), and it is a well-supported claim that founders' cognition, perception, values, working habits and methods are influenced by numerous primary and secondary agents; for example, Edgar H. Schein (1983) maintains that *"(founders) typically … already have strong assumptions about the nature of the world, the role their organization will play in that world, the nature of human nature, truth, relationships, time, and space."* So, the processes are recognised and elaborated, however, there is only limited research specifically focusing on the effect of founders' background, on the organisations to support this theoretical framework.

RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The main question I raise is how does the founders' military service influence organisational culture? I argue that service personnel who might later on become entrepreneurs carry a 'watermark' that remains from their service's time that carries over culture and identity, and that it contributes to forming the imprints that these entrepreneurs subsequently leave on the culture in the organisations they found. The purpose of this study is to investigate and look for evidence of the imprints that the retirees inherit to their enterprises.

This study examines founders' narratives and their businesses' characteristics in order to discover if links between diversity in military culture and diversity in organisational cultures exist. The research tries to find possible specific narratives that are common between service-personnel of the same command but different between commands; and evaluate their possible influence on the adoption of military culture and identity based on previous studies (c.f. McAdams *et al.* (2001), Lahav (2011), Wright (2015), Meredith *et al.*(2017).)

AIM OF THE RESEARCH

The purpose of the study is to explore founders' military service background's influence on companies' organisational culture. This study argues that service personnel, who later on become entrepreneurs, bring with them remains of cultural imprint that from their service's culture, and that it might be recognised in organisational culture of the organisations that they subsequently found. The purpose of this study is to examine this argument, and look for evidence of these imprints that retirees carry over to their enterprises. Furthermore, evidence

might be found that serving in a particular military commands (navy, infantry, intelligence, etc.) will manifest itself by distinctive traces in the current entrepreneurship organisational culture. Moreover, this research will strive to look for potential causes for this cultural inheritance.

For that purpose, this research will compare organisational culture of young start-up companies, and try, on one hand, to point out similarities between organisational culture in companies founded by veterans of the same military command, and on the other hand, to find differences between companies founded by veterans from different commands.

As a background data: in Israel the number of new businesses annually is a little more than 50,000, with growth rate of approximately 4% annually; of these approximately a persistent 90% survive the first year of operation, and only about 35% survive 10 years of operation (the latter rate is in a decline trend.)

Also, in this study I will try to characterize, at least to some extent, particular organisational culture traits of different military command, and see whether it relates in some way with the current organisational culture. Furthermore, this research will try to follow the process conscripts go through in the various commands, and try to find some explanations to the existence, or lack thereof, of such cultural relation.

SIGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY

Israel is one of the most entrepreneurially oriented countries, sometimes dubbed as the “start-up nation". In Israel one prominent aspect in this arena is military service – even military units use success stories to draw the best conscripts to their ranks. Conscripts have interest in knowing what service will provide them with better tools, and a better chance for business success[3]. Investors are interested in getting as much knowledge about founders as possible, as this is considered a crucial point for investment decisions. Founders themselves may have an interest in recognizing their weaknesses and strength and use them wisely in the process of setting up a new company.

From research point of view - the extent founders' background influence (which goes further back than work experience) has on their firms is not appreciated to its full extent, and was not extensively studied; examples of such a studies regarding family background, education,

[3] Note that, the meaning of ‘success’, which is also an ambiguous cultural value, will not be questioned as part of the research.

military service, and demography diversity can be found (Williams *et al.* 2000, Randel and Jaussi 2003, Shao and Webber 2006, Wadhwa *et al.* 2009, Ding 2011, Benmelech and Frydman 2013). This research enriches this knowledge, with insights that were not studied extensively earlier.

Moreover, In the Israeli context, conscripts go through pre-military drafting screening process (e.g. voluntary unit versus compulsory draft), and a socialisation when entering the service and through their entire service, each in its military unit. This provides that military personnel from different commands and professions might be differently characterised in dimensions of education, technical skills, leadership, conduct under pressure, tendency to team work etc.

Thus, contribution to the knowledge of the influence of military service can be of value to conscripts, to venture funds and angels, to the military, and to the founders, who may be more conscious to the cards they were dealt, and may be take proactive steps to avoid some bad habits carried over from their service.

The Israeli armed forces – IDF (Israel Defence Force) totals about 185,000 personnel, with most of the Jewish and Druze population subject to compulsory drafting at the age of 18, for a military service of 32 months for men and 24 months for women. The size of the armed forces in Israel, relative to the population, is an outlier compared to European countries; being more than 2% versus an average of 0.5%. As the majority of the population relevant for this research has a military service back ground it is of more relevance to explore the commonalities and differences between veterans of different commands, rather than to compare military background, or lack of it, as can be seen in some related studies such as Benmelech and Frydman (2013).

According to the census provided by the Israeli Bureau of Statistics (Weissman and Schwartz 2014, 2015), more than 48,000 new businesses were established in Israel yearly in 2014 (46,000 in 2013). Of the new business 60% have no employees at all, and 31% employ 4 employees or less, and the most popular type of new business venture started yearly in Israel is in the category of Professional, scientific and technical activities (category M of the UN classifications). Since most of the surveyed companies belong to this category, with minimal or no employees, they fall inside the most typifying categorisation of a new business in Israel, and thus, the results of this research are of interest to a significant portion of the entrepreneurial community.

A more general incentive for studying culture, stems from Garteh Morgan's (2006, p. 248) view on organisations, arises from the same purpose of studying organisations in general, in his words: *"Like the reflecting globe in Escher's lithograph, they allow members of the organization to see themselves within the context of their on-going activity. The figures and pictures that an organization produces […] are really projections of the organization's own sense of identity, interests, and concerns. They reflect its understanding of itself. […] if one really wants to understand one's environment one must begin by understanding oneself."* This is similar to Edgar H. Schein's view of 'levels of culture' (Schein 1990, 2004, chap. 2). Thus, if there is any connecting line, preferably a reciprocal one, between military culture, through service personnel social identity (which, in a nut shell, is interested in the case when individuals prefer a group identity over their own), through organisational culture, to even companies' characteristics, let alone performance, it is of course of enormous business value.

And finally, in the words of the prominent researcher Joanne Martin (2002): *"…offering an understanding of a culture, or cultures, is a worthy goal in its own right."*

THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

This research is based on four main pillars, each of which has a dedicated elaboration in the body of the work:

- Organisational culture,
- Military Culture and its diversity,
- The influence of founders' background on the firms they establish,
- Total Organisation theory,

With two supportive major sociological theories at its foundations

- Social Identity Theory,
- Legitimacy

The theme behind this research is that military background of founders affects the organisational culture in organisations they establish. Thus, the literature review establishes the relevant background knowledge. It starts with an exposition of organisational culture, its foundations, the theories it originates from, the way it is created, evolves and develops and the ways by which it may be studied, measured and compared. The following reference sequence mentions some of the prominent researchers in a timeline order, and will be elaborated upon in the literature review section (c.f. Geertz (1973b), Weick (1979), Pettigrew (1979), Douglas (1982), Schein (1983, 1990, 1991b, 2004), Czarniawska-Joerges (1992),

Czarniawska (2014), Hofstade (1998), Hofstede *et al.* (2010), Denison (1992, 2007), Martin (1991, 2002a, 2004).) Next it looks at the special case of **Military Culture** with two main objectives: one is to demonstrate its similarity to other organisations' culture, including the diversity and existence of sub-cultures[4] within the armed forces, and the second is to find evidence for specific influence of the military culture on servicemen. From that perspective the military service might be viewed as a special and unique case of (work) experience (c.f. Moskos (1970, 1976, 1977, 1981, 2005), Altman (1989), Altman and Baruch (1998), Winslow (2000), Breznitz (2002), Mastroianni (2006), Snider (2002), Winslow *et al.* (2006), Levy (2005, 2007), Mckee (2008), Meredith *et al.* (2017).)

In addition to the literature regarding organisational culture such as Schein's (Schein 2004), I review the literature and research regarding the influence founders has on their organisations and theories that attempt to explain the processes that underlie it, mainly '**Upper Echelon**' theory, which takes a broader look on management level characteristics and how it reflected in the organisation (c.f. Hambrick and Mason (1984), Hambrick (2007).

Social Identity Theory, is reviewed (c.f. Tajfel *et al.* (1971), Tajfel (1974, 1978), Ellemers *et al.* (2002), Ellemers and Haslam (2012).) being closely intertwined with culture, as culture is one of the sources contributing to social identity. On the other hand, social identity may be viewed differently in different cultures; this is noticeable, for example, in multi-national companies (Feitosa *et al.* 2012). In fact, it seems that sometimes, despite the difference in concepts, social identity is even used interchangeably with culture when related to organisationsIdentity Theory which is a somewhat different theory is also reviewed for completeness. A particular review of **'Organisational Identity'** is given with some demonstration of military identity (c.f. Ashforth and Mael (1989, 1996), Dutton and Dukerich (1991), Dutton *et al.* (1994), Czarniawska (1997), Hatch and Schultz (2002), Sveningsson and Alvesson (2003), Ashforth *et al.* (2008), Cornelissen and others (2002, 2005, Cornelissen *et al.* 2007), Morgan (2006).)

This study argues that, through socialisation processes, founders are influenced by numerous primary (e.g. home, family) and secondary agents (e.g. education institutes, peers at work), one of them being a re-socialisation process they go through in their military service. This study tries to isolate, among all the influences, clues to substantiate its connection to founders' military service. This is done using narrative research, which practically in a nutshell, looks at a sequence of biographical events, as told first hand by founders, and try to locate

[4] Unique diversified culture of sub-groups within an organisation.

events of significance in their life stories. The biographical part of interest is just prior to drafting to the military, the military service period, and up to the time of establishing an entrepreneurship. Additionally, the founders describe the entrepreneurship in a more conversational manner, and this this relays information about organisational culture. This is part is both for facts about the organisation, and hints about the connection to the military service.

The retrospective nature of narrative approach captures in a single body of data events and activities of founders, along the time-line of their biography, both in the military service and the entrepreneurial stage; this helps in following the process of organising a new company and the links to different military backgrounds.

The theoretical background for that influence might be ascribed to processes such as the *'conversion'* type of adaptation similar to those that exist in **total institutions** (c.f. Goffman (1957, 1961), Zurcher (1963), Karmel (1972), Ashforth and Mael (1989).) These processes have a potential to reshape a conscript character, reflecting an adaptation to the organisational culture of the total institution and adoption of the organisational identity, e.g. institutional lingo that is peculiar to a specific command used to explain and express events, and is applied also by founders in the founded companies' daily activity. To cover these prospects the theory of **'Total Institution'** is reviewed as having the potential capability to re-socialise military service-personnel, and imprint military culture and identity in them.

Another topic of relevance is **'Legitimacy'**, which will be elaborated upon in paragraph 1.6.1, as reflected in the context of institutions and organisations. In the process of forming a new organisation legitimacy is needed to create a foundation for almost every aspect of the organisation, from fund raising to workers recruitment, and market education. In the process of entrepreneurship, when stakeholders do not yet have good knowledge of each other, tagging oneself as belonging to a certain group, helps achieve legitimacy as a credit. Thus, legitimacy is another post-service motivation to be associated with a prestigious organisation such a military unit. The need for legitimacy might work independently of the deeper aspects of re-socialisation; however, it is based on the founders' belief in the prestigiousness of their military service unit, which in turn also leans on total institution and identity theories. Therefore, the theories concerning legitimacy are also reviewed, giving background on its origins and its relevance to the organisational framework.

Summing it all up – it is justified to expect that there are evidences that military service watermarks servicemen to have a set of values, in the sense of Schein's (1990) analysis of culture levels[5].Servicemen, that might later on become entrepreneurs, carry with them this set of values and it influences the way they imprint the culture in organisations they found.

For clarification, here are some examples of cultural traits that may be observed and some deeper levels that might espouse them:

- Success (**basic underlying assumption**): what is the meaning of success, of being successful?
- The time scale for measuring success or failure (**value**): what is the temporal perspective that is considered enough to make that judgement?
- Growth strategy (**artefact**): M&A vs. IPO vs. organic growth and the underlining assumptions behind it: what is conceived as achievement? what is considered a success (**assumption**)?
- Development process (**artefact**): linear vs. spiral development and the underlining desire for order or lack of it – the ability to contain chaos (**value**).
- Power distance (**artefact**): these are reflected by the organisational structure and hierarchy, and the decision-making processes and these are underlined by **values** such as: liberalism, equality, fraternity, and **underlying assumption** all are created equal, and every worker can be a source of innovation in an organisation.

As can be inferred from the outline up to this point, this research uses the interpretive paradigm (Burrell and Morgan 1979a, 1979b), as It tends to be, as will be evidenced in the work herein, interpretive and subjective. Usually such a paradigm is best served by qualitative research method, or triangulation of methods, however, this study started with a quantitative methodology venue, triangulated with supportive qualitative methods; it was learned during the research, and will be elaborated upon in the body of work, that this quantitative approach proved inapplicable for this study's purposes, and was replaced at some point along the research with a qualitative method – narrative research, a switch that will be explained shortly.

[5] Schein defines three levels of culture: *"(a) observable artefacts, (b) values, and (c) basic underlying assumptions"*. This topic is elaborated upon in paragraph 1.2.

RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHOD

This study examines founders' narratives and their businesses' characteristics in order to discover whether links between diverse military backgrounds, and cultures they create, are to be found, and if so, what are they, and what might be the causes of that link: is it a reflection of the total institution mitigation type that results in resocialisation, and the adoption of military identity, or a conscious search for legitimacy?

About 60 founders were approached, and 20 interviewed (consent ratio of about 1:3). The companies chosen for research are relatively young companies, a few years old. The main reason for that, is that as companies mature the fingerprint of the founders get weaker (cf. Schein 1990); new personnel is hired, customers have influence, regulation and authorities impose certain conduct, public relations that get involved, competitors that play their tricks, etc., influence the behaviour of companies. Thus, when looking at more seasoned companies, it becomes harder to distinguish the founders' influence among the others, it is occulted by other influences, to the point it is very hard to substantiate its existence.

Hence, the dimensions of comparison between the studied cases are organisational culture and identity aspects, as explicitly expressed, as well as implicit features reflected in the founders-managers conduct, values and beliefs. Additionally, as mentioned earlier, it is of interest to learn the possible social processes, with emphasis on differences amongst them that led to the current state of the businesses.

As mentioned earlier, following Burrell and Morgan (1979a, p. 227), interpretive paradigm is followed, *"Attempting to understand and explain the social world primarily from the point of view of the actors directly involved in the social process"*. This paradigm is more focused on depicting and explaining the status-quo, social order, and actual (vs. potential) aspects of society. This research is more of the interpretive orientation; it analyses comparatively organisations' cultures, and looks for clues for how it is moulded to become as it is. Specifically, it looks at the influence founders' demography might have on it.

To summarise, the research method selected is narrative research of the qualitative approach, and the reasons for this selection are elaborated herein below.

SELECTION OF RESEARCH METHOD

The research question seems suited for a comparative analysis, based on quantitative research. However, the organisations under investigation are variously sized, most of them so

small (less than 5 employees), that using quantitative survey-based methods, and applying standard cultural models, such as those used by Hofstede *et al.* (2010), are not applicable. Moreover, even if acquiring cultural aspects were possible, one cannot gain retrospective information on the founders that may shed light on how and why they adopted aspects from their military service; it is outside the scope of this research.

Few studies of very small organisations were performed; some small organisations have been studied comparatively with large ones and some researchers have used qualitative or mixed-methods to assess the culture (Carr 2000, Watson and Gryna 2001, Gray *et al.* 2003, Gudmundson *et al.* 2003, Cumberland and Herd 2011). In those studies, mixed methods were used when the sample size was ample for acceptable level of confidence.

Following that line, which holds strong sense, I decided to use qualitative approach. Within the field of qualitative methods I find narrative research to be the most suitable for this research, because it captures at the same time both the functional and interpretive aspects of the research question, (cf. Bruner (1991, 2004), Czarniawska (1997, 2000, 2004), Clandinin and Connelly (2004)). Clandinin and Connelly (2004) elaborate further, stating that *"narrative is an intuitive way of coming to terms with life, because life is filled with narrative fragments. It is the way we gather experience and the way we convey that experience. It is both descriptive and explanatory"*. Bruner (1991, 2004), too, has produced seminal work, using narratives to study organisations, which he argued are the tools used by the mind as instruments for constructing reality; Czarniawska (1997) uses narratives as metaphors for organisations, however, this research is more interested in the founders' narrative rather than interpret organisational metaphores. The research focus of small companies till now has been mostly on the founders, partly because their dominance in small companies is often more pronounced.

However, it is understood that as a tool for analysing organisational culture narrative research has its limitations: some superficial deeper values aspects are captured in the interviewees' professional biography as part of describing the foundations and daily conduct of the founded company, but they are limited by time and the cooperation of the interviewees.

So, the bottom line is that narrative research approach is suitable because one can get simultaneously a view of the companies' culture, and a glimpse into the sociological process the founders went through in their service. In this way similar grand-narratives can be looked for to help understand the founders' actions through their biographies.

RESEARCH DESIGN

Data was gathered by semi-structured interviews with founders (see the interview line-up in annex A). Basically each encounter was divided into two parts: in the first one the interviewees were requested to freely describe their resume and narrative, going as far back as possible in time, to high school and youth organisations, education, military service experience and post-military work experience, the current entrepreneurship that they are engaged in now (and previous ones), and their regard of what they conceive as significant to them as entrepreneurs. Interviewees were guided to focus on the more relevant parts in their biographies time-lines, and on the relevant topics, by asking guiding questions in a conversational manner.

In the second part semi-structures interviews were used, trying to overcome the inherent limitations of narrative research in analysing organisational culture. Interviewees were asked about the organisation, its establishment, how it is managed etc. A typical encounter was about 2 hours, with some up to 4 hours.

A total of 20 companies' founders were chosen from 3 military commands:

- Air-Force – 8 companies
- Navy – 9 Companies
- Signal Corps – 3 Companies

Selection criteria were a significant service in the army of the founder, entrepreneurship that is of interest, and of course willingness to cooperate with the research. Contacts so have been achieved using personal contacts, and using LinkedIn platform.

This is the distribution of the interviewees' demography, and some companies' information:

Company size	1-9 employees	10-49 employees	50-500 employees
	16	2	2

Military rank	Majors	captains	Lieutenant
	7	12	1

Years of service	5-9 years	10 years or more
	18	2

Age	20-29 years	30-39 years	40-49 years	50-59 years
	3	5	8	4

Education	PhD	MSc/MBA	BSc/BA/LLB
	4	12	4

DATA ANALYSIS

The collected data comprises of interviews with entrepreneurs that hold, or held, officer's position in the companies, usually that of a CEO. The interviews were transcribed, and the text analysed in addition to notes taken during the interviews and re-listening. Data Analysis consists of several stages: 1) collecting facts about organisational culture, 2) looking for explicit and implicit connection to the military service from the biographical facts, from professional lingo and overt references of the interviewees, and 3) looking in for narratives in the biographical text. Analysis was aided by ATLAS.ti software.

STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

The thesis starts with a literature review covering the following major topics:

- Organisational culture and its value in organisations as a functional and a descriptive tool are discussed, and also organisational culture in the context of military units. A broad spectrum of views including sociological, anthropological, psychological, and organisational behaviour views are given.
- The role of founders in the moulding of organisational culture, which is presumed to be a means of transferring the military culture to the newly established organisations founded by military veterans is detailed.
- Grand theories that lay the basis for how military culture is adapted by conscripts (total institution theory, social identity theory, and organisational identity theory) are reviewed in the context of this study. Additional related supportive theories are also reviewed (e.g. legitimacy theory), and used to less extent.
- Theories that might explain the implicit and/or explicit employment or dis-employment of military culture by veterans (legitimacy theory, and, again, total institution theory) are reviewed.
- As a supportive data the structure of the Israeli armed forces' structure is depicted in large, and some relevant business demography of Israeli economy is given.

  In addition, relevant applicable research methodologies are reviewed, and the selection of narrative research as the research methodology is explained.

Following the research question and research design descriptions the research results are detailed. The results are portrayed from several aspects for each of the military force population that was sampled (Air-Force, Navy, and Signal-Corps) from two venues: 1) the

organisational culture of the companies established by the veterans, and some organisational culture traits of the military units, 2) common narratives shared by veterans of the same military branch.

After discussing each population as a stand-alone sample, we compare the findings for each population and discuss the differences and similarities, and what might have been the processes that had led to these ends.

1. LITERATURE REVIEW

1.1. INTRODUCTION

The topics covered in the literature review are based on six main pillars:

- Organisational culture,
- The culture of military units and its diversity,
- The influence of founders' backgrounds on the firms they establish,
- Identity Theory,
- Total Organisation theory,
- Legitimacy Theory

The theme behind this research is that founders' backgrounds, and specifically military backgrounds, affect the organisational culture in organisations established by these founders. Thus, in this review I would like to establish the relevant background knowledge. I start with an exposition of organisational culture, its foundations, the theories it originates from, the way it is created, evolves and develops and the ways in which it might be studied, measured and compared. Next, I look at the special case of military culture with two main objectives: one is to demonstrate its similarity to other organisations' cultures, including its diversity and the existence of sub-cultures within the armed forces, and the other is to find evidence for the specific influence of military culture on servicemen. From that perspective, military service might be viewed as a special and unique form of (work) experience. Going back to organisational culture, I will look for indications of the influence founders have on their organisations and theories that attempt to explain the processes that underlie it.

It is argued that founders' cognition is influenced by numerous primary (e.g. family) and secondary (e.g. education, work) agents; I will try to isolate clues to substantiate the idea that this is connected to their military service, among all the other influences. The theoretical background for that influence might be ascribed to processes similar to those that exist in total institutions. These processes have the potential to reshape a conscript's character, reflecting an adaptation to the organisational culture of the total institution and adoption of the organisational identity. To cover these potential processes, the theories of 'total institution', 'identity', and 'social identity' will be reviewed, with particular reference to 'organisational identity'.

Another topic of relevance is 'legitimacy' – in the process of forming a new organisation, legitimacy is needed to create a foundation for almost every aspect of the organisation from fund raising to worker recruitment and market education. Thus, legitimacy is another *post-service* motivation to be associated with a prestigious organisation such as a military unit. The need for legitimacy might work independently of the deeper aspects of re-socialisation; however, it is based on the founders' belief in the prestige of their military service unit, which in turn also relies on total institution and identity theories. Therefore, the theory of legitimacy will also be reviewed.

To sum up – I argue that there is evidence that military service provides servicemen with a set of values. Servicemen that might later on become entrepreneurs carry this set of values with them and this influences the way they imprint this culture on the organisations they set up. The purpose of this study is to look for links between diversity in military culture and diversity in organisational culture through the founders' military service, and the possible reasons for this phenomenon.

1.2. ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE

This part of the review is dedicated to an exposition of the concept of organisational culture, its importance as a managerial tool as well as the scholarly trends and disputes regarding the right approach to organisational culture research within the academic community, which will lay the foundation for a discussion regarding the research approach that is to be reviewed later on.

The roots of organisational culture may be traced back to the general discussion of "culture" under the scrutiny of several disciplines such as psychology, sociology and anthropology. Organisational culture is usually considered a part of organisational behaviour science (cf. Hellriegel and Slocum 2008, John R. Schermerhorn *et al.* 2010), its ubiquitous presence is already taken for granted, and it forms the basis for discussions over e.g. its influence on organisational ethics and performance, employees' motivation, organisational innovation etc. Before I delve into presenting organisational culture from several perspectives (anthropological/sociological, managerial and psychological) each represented by at least one notable researcher, let us start with a quick summary of some very concise definitions of culture from several point of views that demonstrate its elusiveness (these definitions were made by Bodley which traces them back to Kluckhohn and Tylor):

Table 1 - Culture characterisation from different points of view (from a lecture by H. Bodley based on his book (Bodley 1994))

The point of view	Concise culture characterisation
Topical	Culture consists of everything on a list of topics, or categories, such as social organisation, religion, or economy
Historical	Culture is a social heritage, or tradition, that is passed on to future generations
Behavioural	Culture is shared, learned human behaviour; a way of life
Normative	Culture is ideals, values, or rules for living
Functional	Culture is the way humans solve problems of adapting to the environment or living together
Mental	Culture is a complex of ideas, or learned habits, that inhibit impulses and distinguish people from animals
Structural	Culture consists of patterned and interrelated ideas, symbols, or behaviours
Symbolic	Culture is based on arbitrarily assigned meanings that are shared by a society

The variety of definitions resembles the old Indian simile of the blind and the elephant (see also Czarniawska-Joerges' (1992, chap. 4) reference to the elephant metaphor):



Figure 1 - Culture characterisation from different points of view

Attempts to define culture have been made by many, and this effort is rooted long way back mainly by anthropologists, but also the in the work of historians such as Maine (1861, chap. 5) who researched the origins of law without explicitly refereeing to culture, but hinting to it using the term 'society', linguistic and culture researchers such as Whitney (1873, p. 341) who summarised culture on a broad aspect simply as the art of life:

"…all the elements of culture - as the arts of life, art, science, language, religion, philosophy - have been wrought out by slow and painful effectors, in the conflict between the soul and mind on the one hand, and external nature on the other…"

Anthropologists of the same period such as Tylor (1873) and Morgan (1877), equalled culture to civilization:

> *"CULTURE or Civilization, taken in its wide ethnographic sense, is that complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society." (Tylor 1873, p. 19, on the science of culture)*

And were interested in the processes that shaped it:

> *"Differences in the culture of the same period in the Eastern and Western hemispheres undoubtedly existed in consequence of the unequal endowments of the continents…" (Morgan 1877, p. 16)*

Tylor's research, which focused mainly on the culture of tribes in the Amazon jungles, tried to use scientific tools in culture research, and introduced the French philosopher Comte's important adaptation of Hume's **positivism** to social sciences (Comte 1848, chap. II, 1851, chap. I, 1858, Book VI, chap. I), to anthropological research. Comte's work was refined by the end of the 19th century by the seminal work of Émile Durkheim, who developed its adaptation to sociological sciences (Durkheim 1895). Actually, Durkheim's definition of the term 'Social' is quite close to what can be perceived as culture, comparable, for example, to Schein's more contemporary conception.

Tylor, Morgan and others were followed later on by other notable anthropologists, such as Kluckhohn (cf. Kluckhohn and Kelly 1945, Kluckhohn and Leighton 1946), who studied culture of the Navaho Indian tribes. The work of the early anthropologists, studying culture in general, paved the way and laid the foundations to the contemporary research of organisational culture. The work of prominent more contemporary anthropologists is still rooted and can traced back to the forefathers of the discipline. Harris developed the theory of **"Cultural**

Materialism" which is *"…based on the simple premise that human social life is a response to the practical problems of earthly existence"* (Harris 1979); the similarity to the above quotation of Morgan is clearly noticeable, and probably influenced by ideas of Karl Marx; *"My own view is that a culture is the socially learned ways of living found in human societies and that it embraces all aspects of social life , including both thought and behavior."* (Harris 1999). Bodley (1994), in the same vein of Tylor, also gives a more contemporary definition of culture, from the anthropology point of view, as follows:

"Human culture includes all the social things that people think, make, and do that are not in themselves biologically inherited. Human biology provides us with the physical abilities and psychological propensities that make culture possible, such as the ability to speak and to manipulate symbols with our minds and objects with our hands."

Seminal work has been done to further and better define methodologies for describing, measuring, comparing and differentiating organisations' "culture" from several points of view and arising from various profound theories. The subject of culture is mainly studied by applying the theories and methodologies of psychology, sociology and anthropology.

A major influence on the body of knowledge of "organisational culture", whose influence on the subject is still notable, was made by the above mentioned anthropologist Clyde Kluckhohn (Kluckhohn and Leighton 1946), who usefully defined culture as:

"…the set of habitual and traditional ways of thinking, feeling, and reacting that are characteristic of the ways a particular society meets its problems at a particular point in time."

His definition encompasses several points of view. The work of Kluckhohn and Kelly (1945), who studied culture in general (mainly of Indian tribes), may be found in the foundations of many studies regarding organisational culture (for example: Geertz, 1973b; Geert Hofstede, 2011; Sackmann, n.d.; Schein, 1990, 2004; Schwartz & Davis, 1981; Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner, 1997). Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1973) classified the way cultures influence their members' values and provide instructions on how to live their lives. They refine five basic questions about the influence of culture (these may be compared to what other more modern researchers refer to as dimensions):

- What is the character of *human nature*?
- What is the relation of humankind to *nature*?
- What is the orientation toward *time*?

- What is the orientation toward *activity*?
- What is the relationship of *people* to each other?

According to Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, there are three possible responses, or attitudes, for each question:

Table 2 - Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck dimensions[6]

Range of Values / Dimension	Response 1	Response 2	Response 3
Human nature	Basically good	Mixture of good and evil	Basically evil
Relationship between humans and nature	Humans dominate	Harmony between the two	Nature dominates
Time orientation	Future-oriented	Present-oriented	Past-oriented
Activity orientation	"Doing": stress on action	"Growing": stress on spiritual growth	"Being": stress on who you are
Relationships between people	Individual	Group-oriented	Collateral

Every combination of answers to the above questions typifies a culture.

Roughly speaking, culture studies may be categorized as being related to either a functional or an interpretational position (Bar-Haim and Loew 1994). The concept of the interpretation of cultures in anthropology is primarily associated with the work of Geertz (1973a). Geertz followed Kluckhohn's work, while criticizing it as being muddled, and suggested an **interpretive** approach. Geertz claimed that culture is *"a historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic form by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and attitudes towards life"* (Geertz 1973a, p. 89), and is *"the fabric of meaning in terms of which human beings interpret their experience and guide their action"* (Geertz 1973a, p. 145).

[6] Note that there is no correlation between the answers in each column.

Geertz coined the term 'thick description' which is a richly detailed account of a single culture, enabling one to see an entire culture in a single, sharply focused description. The thick description is based on information from multiple informants and other qualitative sources of information (e.g. interviews and conversations.) This was later developed by other researchers such as Weick (1979) and Morgan (2006), who argued that since organisational situations and problems might be interpreted in many different ways, each view produces a distinctive insight that may contribute to understanding the organisation and provide a broader range of discernment and action opportunities. Kunda (2006), in one of the remarks in his book, notes that he also takes an interpretive approach. In this view, culture is located in the symbolic expression of the various interrelated systems of meaning created and maintained by a group, which may be identified, understood and interpreted by qualitative research. Kunda takes the position of a "fly on the wall" and suggests interpretations and observations of organisational situations such as rites and rituals. To demonstrate the complexity of the subject one may note that an opposite view is presented by another by Czarniawska-Joerges, another prominent researcher in the field, (1992, chap. 7), who claims that the culture of an organisation is *not* its rituals and ceremonies, but its way of life.

The **functional** aspect, on the other hand, looks at culture as a tool that communities use to solve their problems; hence it serves the community rather than defines it. This aspect is developed, for example, by Schein (1990, 1991, 2004) as will be elaborated shortly. An effort was made to combine the disciplines of functionality and interpretivism. Schultz and Hatch (1996), for example, following earlier researchers' arguments that the different paradigms are not incommensurable, suggested an interplay between the paradigms, in order to achieving the benefit of both aspects. They identified three implications of interplay between the functionality and interpretive paradigms: generality/contextuality, functional clarity/interpretive ambiguity of the cultural essence, and culture stability (convergent processes)/instability (divergent processes). According to their suggested interplay strategy, instead of treating these as paradoxes that should be resolved, recognising their interdependence might be valuable to researchers to maintain their tensions and thereby reach a more subtle and complex appreciation of organisational culture.

Schwartz and Davis (1981), who come from **industrial engineering and business management backgrounds**, took Kluckhohn's view to the corporate level, stating that a corporation's culture, as with other cultures, is reflected in attitudes and values, the management style, and

the problem-solving behaviour of its people. In that aspect they did a similar job to Peters and Waterman's (1982) popular book on the search for excellence, focusing on a narrower aspect of organisational culture.

Davis (1984), who was probably one of the first researchers (together with Deal and Kennedy) to use the term **"corporate culture"** in the early 1970's, refined his own previous definition of corporate culture, which is functionalist in nature, proposing that it is *"...the pattern of shared beliefs and values that give the members of an institution meaning, and provide them with the rules for behaviour in their organizations."* Davis divides these beliefs into "guidance beliefs" which are the foundation of the corporate strategy, and "daily beliefs" which are corollaries, more manifested and guide the daily behaviour. He is a supporter of the belief that a corporation's culture should be supportive of the corporation's strategy and tasks. Like other researchers who depict culture as layers, Davis believes that beliefs and values are only manifestations of a culture, and not the culture itself. Davis also discusses the concept of daily culture and some methodologies of exposing corporate culture through qualitative studies (i.e. surveys). Davis also takes a step forward and discusses the influence of culture on the organisation's success. Specifically, he views M&A's success as dependent upon culture, and debates the need for culture to fit the organisation's strategy.

Deal and Kennedy (2000)[7], coming from different backgrounds (Deal in education, Kennedy in business) also holding a **functionalist** point of view, quote Marvin Bower, the former managing director of McKinsey, for the informal definition of culture as *"the way we do business around here."* They go somewhat against what they call the MBA's scientific management methodologies. According to them, it is people that make business work, thus we need to know how culture ties people together. According to Deal and Kennedy, a major issue in human behaviour is tolerating uncertainty. Deal and Kennedy make a distinction between **"strong"** and **"weak"** culture. Companies with a strong culture remove a great degree of that uncertainty because they provide structure and standards along with a value system in which to operate. They claim that companies guided by strong shared values tend to reflect those values in the design of their formal organisation; this is because the values and beliefs which are at the core of the culture affect the kind of information that is taken most seriously for decision-making purposes. As discussed later on, they point out that

[7] First published in 1982

individual people within an organisation have a strong influence on the shaping of standards and beliefs in the organisation; these people are the interest of this work.

Deal & Kennedy suggest a model of culture typified by four different characters of organisation, which is based on how quickly the company and its employees receive feedback regarding success after they have done something, and the degree of risk associated with the company's activities (see Figure 2).



Figure 2 - Deal and Kennedy's culture model

On the feedback and reward axis - if feedback is immediate, it will quickly correct any ineffective behaviour and hence lead to a consistent culture (those who cannot survive will quickly find that out and either leave or be sacked). If the feedback takes longer to arrive, then mistakes are left uncorrected, but it also lets people look further into the future.

On the risk axis - where the risk is low, people might be willing to take risks up to their acceptable limit. Where the risk is high it needs to be managed or accepted. High risk companies are more likely to include people who enjoy the thrill of taking a gamble. Uncertainty and risk are things that some people hate and some people thrive on.

The four culture types are defined as follows:

- "Work-hard, play-hard" - this culture has quick feedback/reward and low risk, success comes from persistence, and quick action leads to quick feedback. Examples of this type are manufacturing and sales organisations – real estate, computers and software companies, car distributors etc.
- "Tough-guy/macho" - this culture has quick feedback/reward and high risk, feedback is instantaneous, and the focus is on the present rather than long term endurance. Examples

of this type would be show business, cosmetics, police forces, surgeons, sports, advertising, venture capital funds, etc.

- "Process" - this culture has slow feedback/reward and low risk. The lack of feedback encourages employees to focus on how they do something instead of what they do. When the shape of things is more important than content, bureaucracies (and other ways of maintaining the status quo) are developed and formed. The focus in a bureaucratic organisation is on survival; all flanks should be covered. Representative examples of this type are banks, insurance companies and many bureaucratic organisations (actually almost any headquarters of a large-scale organisation).
- "Bet-your-company" - this culture has slow feedback/reward and high risk. The long view is taken, but then much work is put into making sure all potential risks are covered and taken care of. A diet of high risk and slow feedback makes this a slow-drip water torture. Examples of this type are aircraft manufacturers, oil companies, pharmaceuticals, armies (in the general aspect, the combat units themselves are more of the "Macho" type.)

The examples are of course stereotypical; these are birds eye views of culture and they do not capture the nuances of organisational culture, they rather represent the trends of industry, and as with the other models they demonstrate that culture is not everything in business – not all banks are created alike although they all tend to be bureaucratic. As mentioned in the last example, different cultures may reside side by side in the same company; as long as there is a strong company culture that is stronger than these local sub-cultures they can survive side by side, and the company benefits from this diversity.

Schein (1990, 2004), coming from the **psychology discipline**, defined culture as the way in which a group of people solves problems and reconciles dilemmas, and compared culture to the DNA of the group. Schein (1985) distinguished three levels of depth in cultures, beginning with the most superficial: artefacts such as stories, rituals, dress, and décor; values (attitudes that can be articulated with relative ease); and basic assumptions (that are usually tacit and difficult to determine because they are taken for granted).

Schein suggested a general/generic model for analysing an organisational culture. This model is based on the functional approach to organisational culture, which, as mentioned earlier, considers organisational culture as a defined system that serves the organisation. Schein suggested that once norms, beliefs and assumptions are created, leaders and powerful members embed them in group activity, thus leaders have great influence on the

organisational culture; his arguments are very much relevant to this work. From a methodological point of view, Schein believed the best method for gaining an in-depth understanding of a culture is to enter a discussion with cultural members, using the interview goals and techniques of a clinical psychologist. Schein argued that within an organisation, if a researcher attains in-depth understanding, it can be discovered whether most members of the collectivity share the same assumptions and values, an issue that interests culture researchers such as Geertz (1973a) in a more broader view, not focused on organisations but collectives in general, and from a normative point of view. Schein opposes assigning moral values to culture, such as good (the right kind) or bad culture (the wrong kind), or effective culture.

According to Schein, researchers' claims that they are evaluating, changing and improving culture is dangerous and actually only refers to superficial views of culture. It is interesting to note that Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1997) support this point of view and ascribe it to an American way of thinking and as being part of MBA teaching that tries to professionalise management, is dominated by a numerical approach, and judges culture (among other management attributes) as part of making management more scientific. Schein argues that culture formation is based on sociology theory, and as such the anthropological models are best suited to describe culture as they contemplate deeper under-the- surface levels, which is what is called for since culture is the deepest, often unconscious part of a group, and is less observable than other traits. From this point of view, most of the concepts regarding culture can be thought of as manifestations of it, but they are not the essence of what we mean by culture. From my particular point of view, it also implies that cultural processes are long term in nature, and this should influence the way I build the sample group for the research, making sure the organisations selected are not too young and unstable. Regarding dimensional models of culture, such as Deal and Kennedy's model detailed above, Schein claims that they are limited because particular dimensions have different weights in different organisations; in some organisations they may be central to the paradigm while they are peripheral in others.

Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1998) follow Schein, maintaining that organisational culture is shaped not only by technologies and markets, but also by the cultural preferences of leaders and employees. They identify three aspects of organisational structure as especially important in determining corporate culture: 1) the relationship between employees and their organisation, 2) the hierarchical system of authority, and 3) the general views of employees

about the organisation's destiny, purpose and goals and their place in it. This enables one to define types of corporate culture, which vary considerably in how they think and learn; how they change; and how they motivate, reward and resolve conflicts.

Following Max Weber's three types of rationality (Weber 1922, chap. 3): bureaucracy, market, and religious charism (Weber used the term *'legitimate domination'*), and the work of Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck (1973), who based their typology of cultures on values, and coming from the discipline of **anthropology**, which strived to define culture in the first place, Douglas (1982, 2007, 1992) , applied her **Grid/Group cultural model** to organisations as a framework to deal with cultural diversity, (later on in the early 90's she changed its title to "Cultural Theory"). The theme behind this theory, following Weber in a nutshell, is that seeking a rational 'order' in society leads generally to one of the three society typical structures, each having its own foundation or source for legitimacy; Douglas applies this rational to organisations.

It should be noted that this model takes the point of view of the individual towards the group, while the point of view of the organisation is better presented by Smircich (1983) who compares several organisational themes from both organisational and anthropological theory.

In Douglas' model, the group dimension measures how much of people's lives is controlled by the group they live in, and the grid dimension measures regulation - the amount of control the group's members accept. In some aspects it echoes Goffman's 'Total Institution' theory (Goffman 1961), which preceded it by 20 years, and is elaborated later on in this chapter, Douglas' model categorises culture into four quadrants define by the grid and group levels (see Figure 3.)



Figure 3 - Grid/Group quadrants (taken from Jenkins-Smith (2012))

- The “Hierarchy” quadrant is occupied by societies in which all roles are ascribed (for example by gender or family pertinence), and behaviour is governed by positional rules (e.g. criminal organisations, feudal communities).
- The “Egalitarianism” quadrant contains communities that also feature a strongly bounded group. No ranking or grading rules apply for the relations between the group members (e.g. a community of hippies or dissidents.)
- The “Individualism” quadrant features groups that are motivated by internal competition. Individuals are only concerned with private benefit. Group commitment is weak here by definition.
- The “Fatalism” quadrant is occupied by individuals without any group membership. For example, professional sports and show business may belong here.

Hofstede *et al.* (2010, p. 91, 189), whose dimensional methodology will be discussed shortly, noted the resemblance between grid/group taxonomy and his own cultural dimensions. Hofstede identified the ‘group’ with individualism, in the sense that a high group represents the collectivist end of the scale, while the ‘grid’ is similar to uncertainty avoidance dimensions which takes forms such as rules, laws, religion etc. which help mitigate uncertainties.

Despite the seemingly natural tendency of organisational culture to be handled qualitatively, as mentioned by Denison (1996), the effort to more meticulously compare cultures calls for quantitative methods that make data collection and processing easier and faster on the one hand, and simplify the presentation of results on the other. Thus, over time, many organisational culture comparative studies have emerged along with quantitative scales for values that seem to correctly represent aspects of culture. This seeming paradox may be explained by the argument that these studies only select an "intermediate" level of culture, such as values and cultural traits, about which one can generalize. This approach does not deny the existence of deeper level assumptions unique to a culture or the more surface-level practices, artefacts and symbols which may have a highly situational meaning, and does not purport to investigate it.

Hence, to make culture more measurable and comparable, some dimensional models were suggested by various researchers (cf. Cameron and Freeman 1991, O’Reilly *et al.* 1991b, Sackmann 1991, Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner 1998, Ashkanasy *et al.* 2000, Hofstede *et al.* 2010) (this can also be observed as far back as the early work of Kluckhohn), each defining and defending his or her point of view. This is also motivated by the comparative proclivity of

this course of study. When quantitative culture emerjed it was initially met with rejection and criticism, which to some extent continues to date. Some of it is specific in its criticism, for example refuting Hofstede's work (Baskerville 2003, Jones 2007, Muhammad and Shaiq 2011), and some of it more general in nature, not approving of quantitative methodology as a concept. However, this paradigm has now been accepted by many others as a legitimate method (cf. Martin 2002a, Sackmann 2007), and discussions have shifted to the content and number of dimensions, and the possibility of doing research that combines traditional qualitative and newer quantitative methods (this will be further discussed later in the thesis.) Hofstede *et al.* (1990, 2010) and Hofstede (1998) developed one of the most renowned quantitative methodologies and applied it on cross-national, cross-organisational and inter-organisational levels. Geert Hofstede's (Hofstede 2011) shorthand definition of culture takes us to the more concurrent hi-tech realm (on the border of sci-fi) maintaining that *"Culture is the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from others*", emphasizing that culture is always a collective phenomenon. The collective might be a nation, a tribe, a religion, an academic discipline, a profession, a gender etc. Hofstede suggests a six-dimension model for classifying cultures and looks at various culture-classifying models suggested along the timeline of cultural research (cf. Hall, Parsons and Shil, Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck, Douglas), arguing that all of them (either one- or multi-dimensional classifications) represent subjective reflective attempts to put order into a complex reality. In his opinion each of them is biased by the subjective choices of its authors, because as he points out: researchers are also human beings. From his point of view their mixing of levels of analysis (individual-group-culture) is a severe methodological weakness.

Hofstede suggests a model that initially when presented in the early 80's included 4 dimensions; two more dimensions were added consecutively during 20 more years of research. Hofstede's current 6 dimensions are summarised below, with an interpretation taken from Professor H. Michael Boyd's presentation (note that some older reviewed literature does not include the full current model):

- Power Distance - related to the different solutions to the basic problem of human inequality. It is the extent to which the less powerful members of organisations and institutions (like the core family) accept and expect that power is distributed unequally.
- Uncertainty Avoidance - related to the level of stress in a society in the face of an unknown future. It ultimately refers to man's search for truth. It indicates to what extent a culture

programs its members to feel either uncomfortable or comfortable in unstructured situations.

- Individualism versus Collectivism - related to the integration of individuals into primary groups; that is the degree to which individuals are integrated into groups.
- Masculinity versus Femininity - related to the division of emotional roles between women and men. It refers to the distribution of roles between the genders. The assertive pole is called 'masculine' and the modest, caring pole 'feminine'.
- Long Term versus Short Term Orientation - related to the choice of focus for people's efforts: the future or the present and past.
- Indulgence versus Restraint - related to the gratification versus control of basic human desires related to enjoying life. It focuses on the aspects related to "happiness".

In another model, Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1998) adopt the concepts of Kluckhohn & Strodtbeck (1973). They maintain that social interaction, at least in the sense of meaningful communication, presumes common ways of processing information among the interacting people. Thus, they define culture as being *"man-made, confirmed by others, conventionalised and passed on for younger people or newcomers to learn. It provides people with a meaningful context in which to meet, to think about themselves and face the outer world."* A culture is relatively stable when the norms reflect the shared meanings of the groups' prominent values. When this is not the case, there will most likely be a destabilising tension.

They define a multi-dimension cultural characteristic as follows:

- Universalism vs. Particularism (rules vs. relationships)
- Communitarianism and Collectivism vs. Individualism (group vs. the individual)
- Neutral vs. Emotional (the range of feelings expressed)
- Diffuse vs. Specific (the range of involvement)
- Achievement vs. ascription (how status is accorded)

Additionally, they use two more dimensions borrowed from Kluckhohn:

- Man-nature relationship
- Time orientation

Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner also define a two-dimensional model based on the axes: equality versus hierarchy, and orientation to person versus orientation to task. Using these dimensions, they typify four "ideal" organisational cultures where each of these quadrants is

characterised by a set of preferences in each of the single dimensions mentioned above. The four ideal types can be described as follows:

- "Family" – which is authority and power oriented, where power and status are attributed naturally to leaders in person not to achievements,
- "Eiffel Tower" – highly structured pyramidal bureaucratic organisations with well-defined roles and tasks,
- "Guided Missile" – a task-oriented culture, egalitarian, where status is achieved by performance and the contribution to the group,
- "Incubator" – which is both personal and egalitarian with no formal structure at all, where self-expression and self-fulfilment dominate the scene.

Those four types of organisational cultures vary considerably in the relationships between employees, how they regard authority, how they think and learn, how susceptible they are to change, how they motivate and reward, and how they resolve conflicts (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner 1998).

Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner distinguish their model from other models, the most notable of which are Hofstede's dimensions. They describe these as being descriptive and static in nature, while their model proposes a dynamic adaptation as seemingly opposing values are integrated and reconciled in a never-ending feedback loop. This process involves understanding the advantages of each cultural preference and leveraging it by having the right priorities and giving precedence to attitude when necessary. As part of their model they suggest ways to reconcile the polarisation of attitudes, and how to make useful communication between cultures when realising the differences. The notion of reconciliation was first suggested by Hampden-Turner (1990b) a few years earlier as a counterpoint to the dichotomist models which dominated, probably stemming from an interest in understanding east Asian methods of management which are based on oriental culture (e.g. Tai-Chi, Yin-Yang etc.) that accept controversies more easily then western cultures.

Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner also argue for the influence organisational *structure* has on its associated culture, while other researchers (e.g. Schein) argue that structure is one of the artefacts of culture. They single out the most influential ones as being:

- The general relationship between employees and their organisation.
- The vertical or hierarchical system of authority defining superiors and subordinates.

- The general views of employees about the organisation's destiny, purpose and goals and their places in this.

Although most researchers fiercely defend their choice of modelling, it can be observed that there is some similarity, at least in the reasoning behind the selection of dimension models. For example, Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner's time orientation dimension and Hofstede's long term versus short term orientation dimension, though each draw from different roots, basically have similar significance. From a mathematical point of view, as suggested by Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1998, Appendix 2), culture may be arguably metaphorically regarded as a mathematical space, as cultural dimensions are the basis of the cultural space that spans that space, as seen in the models of Hofstede (1998) and others. The broadness of the culture concept makes it viable that all these models can live quite peacefully together, while each emphasizes some aspects of culture leaving room enough to adjacent sets of dimensions, all being valid and justified and carrying significance. As mentioned earlier, Hofstede and Altman and Baruch (Altman and Baruch 1998), while comparing the Grid/Group theory to other methods, also note this commonality. Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner elaborate the methodology of establishing the basis, the number of dimensions, their relative importance, and how they are checked and proven to be unique using statistical methods. They show that if the data base is large enough, deduction can be used to prove the orthogonality of the basis of the cultural dimensions.[8]

An example of research using the dimensional approach, which is somewhat similar to this study, can be found (Chatman and Jehn 1994). It studied the variability of culture between companies within the same industry; using an Organizational Culture Profile (OCP, O'Reilly *et al.* 1991a) they showed that culture (in the realm of OCP space) generally varies more across than within industries. From the point of view of our research, it might have been beneficial to look for complimentary characteristics, for example – that companies founded by veterans of the same army command would show less variability in culture than generally expected, but this requires research of a much larger scale to cover all the possible biases.

[8] Note that, as Hofstede et al. (2010) mention, most of Trompenaars' work was not published in peer-reviewed domains; although this is undoubtedly a part of the rivalry between Hofstede's and Trompenaars' research and consulting groups – this particular remark is correct.

This “dimensionalist” approach and the associated research methods and methodologies, which are shared by many researchers, are criticised by many other researchers as inappropriate for a study of culture. Some of the criticism is focused on Hofstede specifically, but as a concept this criticism is relevant to all the "dimensionists" (see for example Jones, 2007; Muhammad & Shaiq, 2011; Schein, 1991a). Of these, perhaps the most important one relates to the methodology, and it is the argument that a survey is not an appropriate instrument for accurately determining and measuring cultural disparity by values. This is because when a survey is prepared, the a-priori norms and beliefs of the survey creators affect the question phrasing and hence bias the results. Moreover, concepts that are outside the scope of the survey creators are not reflected in the questionnaires and are therefore not represented in the results (Schwartz 2002).

Returning now to organisational culture research, up until now the reviewed literature has been focused mostly on sociology and anthropology (although Schein was actually a psychologist.) However, there is also the psychological aspect, though it is mainly connected methodically with the concept of organisational climate. Gray (1998) summarises some of the important aspects of the psychological viewpoint. Psychological studies take the point of view of the organisation’s members. They relate the connection between the organisation and its members to the psychological contract, defined by Rousseau (1995) as *“an individual’s belief regarding the terms and conditions of a reciprocal exchange agreement between the focal person and another party”* (Robinson and Rousseau, 1994). A psychological contract emerges when one party believes that a promise of a future return has been made (e.g. pay for performance), a contribution has been made (e.g. some form of exchange) and thus, an obligation has been created to provide future benefits. This is comprised of a belief that some form of promise has been made and that the terms and conditions of the contract have been accepted by both parties. The collective stand point of the organisations’ members towards this contract, its conditions, the process of elaborating it, its outcomes etc. is what creates the organisational climate.

Another psychological point of view is presented by the work of O’Reilly *et al.* (1991), which was developed later on into the Organisational Culture Profile model and technique for analysis. The foundation of this approach lies in the search for indications of ‘strong’ culture (Martin 2002a, p. 243) examining the relationship between the organisation’s culture and the personal values of its members. The main purpose of this approach is to locate dissonance

and give advice on ways to reach consensus. It is used largely as a tool for surveying job satisfaction and fitness.

As a summary of the review offered in this section it is worth pointing out the work of Martin (2002a), which (although some of the new research reviewed here outdates it), concisely captures and sums up critically the body of knowledge in the field of organisational culture at that point in time, the fundamental principles behind it, and the associated research methodologies and disputes. Martin's works may be viewed in my opinion as a 'meta structure' or *'ars inquisitionibus*' – the art of research into organisational research (in the same sense as 'ars poetica') - though on the declarative level Martin refrains from this point of view (Martin 1991). Martin (2002b) summarizes the profound dispute between researchers who choose to study a single cultural context in great detail and depth with a sample size of one, versus researchers who prefer to study many cultures, at the cost of understanding less about each one. These disputes lead later on to controversies on methodologies and the relative merits of quantitative and qualitative methods for studying cultures in organisations and sometimes the profound dispute is disguised as a methodological one. This substantial difference in research strategy impedes, in her opinion, the progress of research as researchers of different disciplines doubt other researchers' results.

Martin discusses several dilemmas as a starting point for her discussion:

- Why do cultural researchers disagree so vehemently with each other?

  Martin maintains that three theories of culture dominate organisational culture research; these she calls the integration, differentiation and fragmentation perspectives. Most organisational culture research has used only one, or at most two, of these perspectives in a single study. Historically, advocates of these three cultural theories have either been antagonistic to or ignored each other's work. Although there is little about which these theoretical perspectives agree, each has generated an impressive body of empirical support, suggesting that none of these three perspectives can be easily dismissed.

  Martin divides the dispute regarding organisational culture research into five questions:

  - Is culture an objective or subjective phenomenon?
  - Should a culture be understood from an insider's or an outsider's point of view?
  - Are generalisations drawn from a cultural study possible and desirable or should cultural understanding be context specific?

- Must a broad variety of cultural manifestations be studied or can a narrow focus offer sufficient insight into the whole?
- Is depth of interpretation the most important indicator of a study's quality or can this criterion be sacrificed to increase the numbers of cultures studied?

- What is culture and what is not culture?

  Martin sums up a variety of organisational culture definitions, each stressing a point of view which is important in the eyes of the beholder. Most definitions of organisational culture focus on what is shared, while some combine harmony with stressing the conflicts between opposing points of view rather than that which is shared (integration vs. differentiation vs. fragmentation). Martin also discusses the postmodern movement's influence on organisational culture research as it challenges truths claimed by positivists and organisational theorists, but also offers a new view of the self that is relevant to cultural work.

- Which theoretical perspectives should be used to study culture?

  As mentioned above, Martin classifies the perspectives into three groups (this topic is also elaborated upon by Frost *et al.* (1991) and Martin (2004)):

  - The integration perspective focuses on those manifestations of a culture that have mutually consistent interpretations (also referred to as "strong" by some researchers, cf. Peters and Waterman (1982) and Deal and Kennedy (2000)).
  - The differentiation perspective focuses on cultural manifestations that have inconsistent interpretations. From the differentiation perspective, consensus exists within an organisation only at lower levels of analysis (subcultures.) Subcultures may exist in harmony, independently, or in conflict with each other (cf. Sackmann (1992)).
  - The fragmentation perspective suggests that a culture's manifestations are neither clearly consistent nor clearly inconsistent. Rather, consensus is transient and issue-specific.

Martin argues in favour of combining all three perspectives when doing organisational cultural research.

- Whose interests are served by this research study?
- Martin counts three types of interests of particular relevance to cultural studies:
  - Managerial interests, which are the most common and recognisable, and focus on the manipulation and control of employees.

- Critical interests tend to affect the research by giving it an anti-managerial tone and challenging the legitimacy of authority.
- Descriptive research, which has neither managerial nor critical interests.

These interests may be correlated with the previously defined perspectives; integrationists tend to have managerial interests, while differentiation researchers prefer the critical interest, and fragmentationists have descriptive interests.

Martin's discussion is founded on the realisation that a lot of the organisational literature is written as if it accurately represents the objectively 'true' nature of the empirical world, in accordance with representational epistemology, which is the writing style expected in most mainstream organisational journals. Much of the research is done according to the scientific method, using deduction and induction to prove or falsify hypotheses. However, these claims of objectivity are exaggerated in her opinion. Martin claims that the debate regarding research methods that suite the researches are dogmatic and inconclusive; each method has its strengths, weaknesses, and *'inescapable limitations'* (Martin 2002a, chap. 7, 2002b); Martin's advice is to disregard the theoretical framework from which the research stems and concentrate on what it want to explore – focusing basically on whether one wants to study in depth and detail a rather small aspect, or study many aspects (=cultures) with less understanding about each.

The path that this research follows is more along the first lane of better and deeper understanding of culture development. Naturally the research methods that seem more suitable are those that serve sociologist and anthropologists; methods that give 'thicker' knowledge, a more comprehensive description, of course without claiming to be complete. A more elaborate discussion about research methods will be presented in chapter

1.2.1. SOME REMARKS ON THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN ORGANISATION CULTURE AND ORGANISATIONAL CLIMATE

Culture and climate may sometimes be used interchangeably in the similar context of organisational studies; however, this is arguably not the case. Davis (1984) discusses the differences between culture and climate; he claims that climate studies accepts the organisational context as given, and that what measurements of climate really indicate is the fit between the organisation's culture and the employees' individual values. In his words:

"While climate is often transitory, tactical, and manageable over the relatively short term, culture is long-term and strategic."

Schneider *et al.* (1994) make the following distinction between the culture and climate terms: climate — the 'feeling in the air' one gets from walking around. It arises from organisation members' observations of the organisational environment and their own position; they then use these as guidelines for how to focus their energies and priorities. It is the atmosphere employees perceive which is created by practices, procedure and rewards. Culture, on the other hand, refers to the broader pattern of an organisation's mores, values and beliefs. By observing and interpreting an organisation's leaders' actions, employees are able to explain why things are the way they are, and why the organisation focuses on certain priorities. Thus, culture stems from employees' interpretations of the assumptions, values and philosophies that produce the climates they experience. So according to them, climate is the perception created by culture.

Schein (2004) referred to climate as an artefact of deeper cultural levels, where organisational processes make certain behaviour routine. Some researchers claim that climate signifies the tension between the culture and the individuals' beliefs. So it is important to note that because different cultures might produce similar upper-level climatic artefacts and vice versa, studying climate is not as complete as studying culture and cannot supersede it as a tool for analysing and differentiating organisations.

The difference between the various approaches is also summarized by Denison (1996). He notes that organisational climate theory comes from the psychological aspect, where 'climate' refers to a situation and its link to thoughts, feelings and the behaviours of organisational members. Consequently, it is temporal, subjective and prone to manipulation. It is descriptive by nature and does not look into the processes that shape it. It is a good paradigm for quantitative studies and comparative analysis. As an example, Litwin and Stringer (1968) developed a generic multi-dimensional model for measuring organisational climate, accompanied by a structured methodology of analysing it through a set of questions addressed to employees. Organisational culture on the other hand, according to Denison, is founded on a social construction framework and presumes that social environments are created through emergent social processes. It is more focused on the socialization process, which is naturally more unique and idiographic, and thus it is more qualitative by nature and may have some disadvantages from the point of view of comparative studies. Martin (2002) adds to Denison's observations the argument that researchers with an integrative perspective

tend to see climate and culture as closely related and manifestations of climate or culture, when measured, would be consistent with each other. Although discussion of the difference between culture and climate continues, and consensus seems far from reach, researchers appear to agree with Denison's analysis, see for example Patterson *et al.* (2005, pp. 380–381). Also are of interest are the multitude of research cases led by McMurray regarding the relations between organisational climate and culture (c.f. McMurray 1994, 2003).

To summarise this chapter:

This research will follow the understanding of organisational 'culture' from the sociological/anthropological point of view for the reason that the imprinting of 'culture', both of the army on founders and founders on firms is a sociological process by nature, and therefore it seems more appropriate to study it as such. This does not mean, however, that the research will be limited to an interpretive paradigm (Burrell and Morgan's (1979a) **methodologies paradigms will discussed in chapter 4); on the contrary, I will try to look also at cultural functionality as seen by Schein (2004) – "the way in which a group of people solves problems." Furthermore, while this research limits itself more to the end results of this process, it is of interest as a follow-up research project to study the socialization processes themselves.**

1.3. ROLE OF FOUNDERS IN ESTABLISHING ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE

1.3.1. ROLE OF FOUNDERS

It seems appropriate to start this review with Pettigrew's (1979) observation that entrepreneurs and entrepreneurship are difficult to define, usually romanticised by terms such as heroism, courage, persistence and ability. Pettigrew discusses from a **sociological-anthropological** point of view the interdependencies and reciprocities between the entrepreneur and his staff and the crucial problems of organisational functioning and sets the assumption that the essential problem of entrepreneurship is the translation of individual drive into collective purpose. In that light, Pettigrew defines an entrepreneur as "*any person who takes primary responsibility for mobilizing people and other resources to initiate, give purpose to, build, and manage a new organization.*" Pettigrew also notes that entrepreneurs create not only the tangible and rational aspects of the organisation (e.g. organisational structure), but also intangible aspects such as symbols, ideologies, languages, beliefs, rituals and myths, which are

the cultural nature of the organisation and the social tissue that give meaning and a general sense of orientation to the more tangible aspects of the organisation's establishment and operation. Pettigrew suggests that the creation of new cultures, and the related processes by which entrepreneurs give energy, purpose, and commitment to the organizations they are bringing into being, are made possible by creating a common vocabulary and establishing myths, rituals and beliefs, all of which are magnified by the commitment of the entrepreneurs to the organisation.

Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1997) make a remark about the source of organisational culture which captures in a nut-shell the idea behind the paragraph title: *"When people set up an organisation they will typically borrow from models or ideals that are familiar to them. The organisation, … is a subjective construct and its employees will give meaning to their environment based on their own particular cultural programming. The organisation is like something else they have experienced."*

Research regarding the influence of founders can be found. Deal and Kennedy (2000)[9] reflect on the power of founders, referring to some founders of companies such as IBM, *"…they (the founders, M.M.) paid almost fanatical attention to the culture of their companies. The lessons of these early leaders have been passed down in their own companies from generation to generation of managers…"* According to Deal and Kennedy, when looking at the elements that determine the kind of culture in a company, one sees (1) the broader social and business environment in which the company operates as the biggest single influence on a company's culture, (2) values – the basic concepts and beliefs of any organisation[10], and (3) heroes – the people that personify the culture's values and as such provide tangible role models for employees to follow. From the perspective of this research, especially regarding young firms, the most dominant heroes are of course the founders. Deal and Kennedy differentiate between managers (e.g. CEO's) and heroes (e.g. founders) with the definition that *"Managers run institutions; heroes create them."* Moreover, at times there is a need to defy order in pursuit of a vision, which violates the management cannon: you do not do anything unless you can figure out whether it makes sense. Heroes make success attainable and human, they provide role models for other workers, they symbolize the company to the outside world, they preserve what makes the company special, they are standards for performance, and perhaps most

[9] First published in 1982

[10] note this definition is quite an unusual definition compared to other classical researchers' definitions that count values as *part of* the culture

importantly – they provide a lasting influence within the organisation. According to Deal and Kennedy, visionary heroes share several characteristics. The first and most obvious characteristic is that they were right. Secondly, these heroes were persistent, and at times were virtually obsessed with seeing their vision become reality. The third characteristic of the visionary hero is a sense of personal responsibility for the success of the business. They focus their work on rites and rituals which contribute to our perspective since people are inclined to carry the rites and rituals they became accustomed to in previous careers with them. This is a major platform for inheritance of culture along throughout the founders' careers. These rituals and ceremonies provide employees with a way to experience meaning, and they keep values, beliefs, and heroes in employees' minds and hearts. In the words of Deal and Kennedy: *"The rituals people learn in one culture mark them – in effect train them – in a specific mode of behaviour. This is especially true of managers. If they achieve success as managers in one environment using one set of management rituals, they are then more than likely going to carry these rituals to other environments or companies when they move on."* (p. 82).

Davis (1984) observed in the role of the CEO in shaping the organisation's culture, that guiding beliefs are invariably set at the top echelons, and permeate down through the ranks; founders and CEOs are the primary sources, transmitters, and maintainers of organisational culture. He distinguished between CEOs and entrepreneurs, saying that while most executives are neither able nor willing to establish their company's culture on their own; it is quite the opposite case with entrepreneurs.

Schein (1983, 1991a, 2004), in the same vein as Pettigrew, also noted that founders[11] have certain personal visions, goals, beliefs, values and assumptions about how things should be. According to Schein, culture and leadership are two sides of the same coin; neither can really be understood by themselves. On the one hand, cultural norms define how leadership is defined (who will get promoted, who will get the attention etc.) On the other hand, he argues that the only thing of real importance that leaders do is create and manage culture. Schein follows a step by step demonstration of the way culture is formed in new organisations: new organisations stem from the mind of the founder or founders, and as they form the organisation, they have in their minds an initial vision of it and the way they see fit to lead it. In his words: *"The individual founder—whether an entrepreneur or just the convener of a new group—*

[11] it should be mentioned here that Schein uses the terms "founders" and "leaders" interchangeably in different publications but actually in the same context.

will have certain personal visions, goals, beliefs, values, and assumptions about how things should be. He or she will initially impose these on the group and/or select members on the basis of their similarity of thoughts and values." Founders tend to mirror their personality in their enterprise and see it as part of their identity. Founders impose culture through several embedding mechanisms which may be divided into primary (explicit) mechanisms, again in his words:

- What they pay attention to, what they measure and control;
- How they react to critical incidents and organisational crises;
- Deliberate role modelling and coaching/mentoring;
- Setting criteria for the allocation of rewards and status;
- Setting criteria for recruitment, selection, promotion, and handling human resources;

And secondary (implicit) articulation and reinforcement mechanisms are:

- Forming the organisation's structure (the design of work, who reports to whom, degree of decentralization etc.);
- Setting organisational systems and procedures (the types of information, control, who gets what information, etc.);
- The design of physical space, facades, and buildings;
- Creating the organisational ethos through stories, legends, myths, and symbols;
- Formal statements of organisational philosophy, creeds, and charters;

Thus, as the organisation expands, the founders will select new members akin to them in values and the right set of assumptions and beliefs. This is, of course, natural since most people like to be surrounded by those who are similar, and it is also practical because it makes the process of recruitment and socialisation of new members a lot easier and less formal. Thus, the group learns that certain beliefs and values, as initially promulgated by founders and leaders 'work', and as they continue to work, they gradually become transformed into assumptions supported by sets of beliefs, norms, and operational rules. Using JRR Tolkien's phrase, the process of culture formation according to Schein is similar to the process in which *"History became legend. Legend became myth"* (The Fellowship of The Ring.)

In about the same period of the early 80's, Hambrick and Mason published their seminal work (1984) that coined the term "**Upper Echelon (UE) Theory**". It takes a broader look at top management, looks at it as a kind of a coalition, and tries to establish that organisational outcomes may be viewed as reflections of the top management values and cognitive bases. The central theme of this theory (summarised by Carpenter *et al.* (2004)) is:

- Strategic choices made in firms reflect the values and cognitive bases of the top management,
- The values and cognitive bases of such actors are a function of their observable characteristics like education or work experience,
- Significant organisational outcomes will be associated with the observable characteristics of those actors.

They proposed a three-step process through which executives' characteristics serve to filter and distort information, thereby influencing the organisation: executives' experiences, values, and personalities affect their (1) field of vision (the directions they in which look and listen), (2) selective perception (what they actually see and hear), and (3) interpretation (how they interpret what they capture.) The broader view of this theory, which encompasses psychology, sociology, management and economic points of view, makes it hard for research and substantiation as it requires an unbiased multidisciplinary approach. This theory suggests that top management matters, and deciphering it may give the observer better tools for:

- Predicting organisational outcomes
- Selecting and developing upper level executives
- Predicting a competitor's moves and countermoves

From the point of view of this study, this theory is substantial since founders commonly belong to the top of the organisation at least in the first stages; hence, they will arguably have the most prominent effect. This may also support one of the aims of this study which is establishing a predictive connection between founders' histories and firms' behaviour.

Baron *et al.* (1999) examined the influence of founding conditions on shaping the proliferation of management and administration in a sample of young technology startup companies in California's Silicon Valley. Their assumption was that *"Once formulated and articulated, a founder's organisational blueprint likely 'locks in' the adoption of particular structures, as well as certain premises that guide decision-making."* The companies they sampled were much homogenised from the aspects of human resources, capital raising and more; however, distinct variability was detected in organisational "blueprint" (they suggest several types of "blueprints" without establishing an elaborated theory behind them.) The research results could not attribute this diversity to distinctive contributions made by founders, or any other key actors for that matter, which seems to contradict the previously mentioned theory. Some of this may be attributed to an over-homogeneous sample.

Based on a similar sample, the same research group of Baron *et al.* (2001) came to a broader conclusion that the origins of how cultural blueprints are selected and imprinted on organisations during their infancy and how they are sustained, modified, or discarded over time *do* matter. It seems that the ill-selected 'blueprint' might later on force changes which affect the firms. The research looked mainly into HR topics, and there was evidence that changing 'blueprints' is a disruptive event which is followed by increased turnover of workforce which affects the firms' performance.

Ogbonna and Harris (2001), while studying the prolonged influence of the founders of an organisation's vision, strategy and objectives, adopt the idea defined by Schein, but they take a point of view which is more normative, suggesting that sometime the founders' legacy is a burden. They take the point of view that strategy and culture are mutually-dependent; moreover, they see strategy as an artefact of the organisational culture which in itself is a reflection of the founders' beliefs. Both have inertia, are quite reluctant to change easily, and hence sometimes the legacy of the founders persists for much longer than is good for the organisation.

Nelson (2003) also studied the persistent influence which the CEO and non-CEO founders have on a firm; his research is empirical, from the perspective of the IPO. He suggests that founders set the initial structure, strategy and culture of the organisation through early decisions, including many that occur even before the organisation is formally established, and developed a method for measuring it. She discusses the influence mechanisms, from a sociological point of view. Although the research lacks in clarity,[12] it measures empirically and over a very widely diversified population the founders' influence on ownership and management from more technical perspectives like control of the board. In general, her findings support the logic that the founders' influence may be persistent well into the life of the firm.

Carpenter et al. (2004) performed a retrospective review of studies backed by upper echelons theory. Rather than looking at diversity, they look for the universality of top management teams' constructs. The universality stems from the universality of the psychological processes involved, and the similarity of the top management teams' role in the firms' operational lives (as they note themselves this is not always the case.) One aspect which is very relevant to this

[12] It is interesting to note that Nelson ignores previous works regarding founders' influence most notably that of Schein. Also, she disregards the legal connection between a founder and the organisation which is well defined, and contradicts it in her article.

study is the studied and confirmed linkage between executives' backgrounds ("demography") and the strategies adopted by firms; however, they note that this linkage is not straightforward, and is definitely not normative in the sense of what is right for the organisation. Strategies are merely a working tool not a goal in themselves; having a strategy or being locked in one may lead to bad results rather than successful outcomes.

Ling *et al.* (2007) explored the influence of founder's-CEOs' personal values on a firm's performance. They relate to the congruence theory which implies that the value system of persons in positions of authority and responsibility influences the structure and strategy of the organisations, and this is supported by empirical studies. The fundamental reasoning behind this argument is similar to that of cognitive dissonance; generally, it is difficult over a long period of time for a person to be a part of an organisation that holds values which contrast with or contradict his own set of values. This theory was further developed as part of organisational lifecycle theory which takes into account the effect a firm's size and age have on that influence. They demonstrated through extensive empirical research that firms' ages and sizes have moderating effects on a founder's influence, at least according to the parameters they measured.

Tsui, Zhang, et al. (2006), continuing the theoretical line of Davis, Deal and Kennedy and Schein on leaders' influence on organisational culture, approach the issue of leaders' influence on culture from a contradictory position. They seek to discover if and when CEOs do *not* have an impact on organisational culture. They attempted to check the correlation between a CEOs leadership' attributes and organisational culture. Items of organisational culture were developed by Tsui, Wang, *et al.* (2006), consisting of five organisational culture dimensions (based on Schein's definition): harmony and employee orientation, customer focus, innovativeness, systematic management control, and social responsibility. The research was done on Chinese companies, thus it should be noted that in some of these companies the CEOs and other senior officers are state appointed and are not the founders, or selected directly by the companies. They conclude that there are more incidences of congruence than incongruence or decoupling between descriptions of CEO leadership behaviour and organisational culture. Their findings suggest that one cannot take for granted that leaders play a dominant role in organisational culture, at least from the perspective of how 'strong' or 'charismatic' a leader is.

Berson, Oreg, and Dvir (2008) examined the relationships between CEO values (i.e. psychological characteristics) and organisational culture, and furthermore between organisational culture and a firm's performance, which has less direct relevance to this study, but is of course of great interest. Their research empirically tests this connection. As summarised by John R. Schermerhorn et al. (2010, p. 345), they suggested that individuals (CEOs included) are drawn to and stay with organisations that have value priorities similar to their own; it is worth noting that this claim is close in nature to the congruence theory mentioned earlier. Their argument, based on many sources, is that when an organisation encounters a situation imposed by the environment there is always more than one way in which its culture can accommodate that demand. Here is where the leader's role comes into the play: the particular direction and manner in which the culture is modified is likely to reflect the leader's personal value system. In particular, they tried to assess the links between a CEO's' personal values and innovation, as well as the bureaucratic and supportive perspectives of organisational cultures. From perspective of the CEOs personal values, they employed Schwartz's (1992) system of basic human values. As expected, links were found between a CEO's values and organisational culture dimensions. For example, the CEOs self-direction values were positively associated with innovation cultures; moreover, innovation culture had a positive effect on companies' subsequent sales growth, which completes the influence vector.

1.3.2. IMPACT OF THE FOUNDER'S BACKGROUND ON ORGANISATIONS

Schein (2004): *"As I have observed executive groups in action, particularly first- generation groups led by their founder, I have noticed that the design of the organisation—how product lines, market areas, functional responsibilities, and so on are divided up—elicits high degrees of passion but not too much clear logic. The requirements of the primary task—how to organize in order to survive in the external environment—seem to get mixed up with powerful assumptions about internal relationships and with theories of how to get things done that derive more from the founder's background than from current analysis."*

"The strength and degree of internal consistency of a culture are, therefore, a function of the stability of the group, the length of time the group has existed, the intensity of the group's experiences of learning, the mechanisms by which the learning has taken place (i.e., positive reinforcement or avoidance conditioning), and the strength and clarity of the assumptions held by the founders and leaders of the group."

A cognitive model for the influence of founders' backgrounds on companys' conduct was suggested by Hambrick and Mason (1984), as mentioned previously (Upper Echelon theory.) This model describes the 'flow of influence' from top management's backgrounds through strategic decisions to results. The complexity involved in researching this topic makes it hard to investigate, hence the somewhat lacking research data. In a nutshell, the theme of this theory is that the choices made in firms reflect the top management's values; these values are based on backgrounds, such as educational, and work experience. UE theory claims that significant organisational outcomes might be associated with those UE actors' backgrounds.

Support for the part of the UE model which claims that executives' experiences (along with other characteristics such as tenure) have a strong affinity with their environmental perception is found in Sutcliffe's (1994) findings regarding the management perception of the environment and how it is affected by work history, diversity and team tenure. Environmental perception's congruence with objective conditions, i.e. a truthful appreciation of the external conditions, is the basis for an organisation's strategic conduct. Jo and Lee's (1996) finding is that education is an amplifier of the influence of other background attributes such as experience. Thus, educational background increases the ability to predict technical startup companies' success; although one might argue that acquiring an education is merely a skill and that it has a small influence on personality.

Lawrence (1997), on the other hand, challenges the 'congruence assumption' which is a corner stone of many studies of organisational demography. This assumption, simply stated, argues that instead of measuring hard to measure variables such as values and attitudes, one may measure easily recognisable demographic variables and use them as explanatory variables for organisational characteristics. Her argument is that this assumption should be better established by theoretically defining the processes that link demography and attitudes; according to her, without this, any analyses of results may prove ambiguous.

As mentioned earlier, in the discussion regarding the difference between organisational culture and organisational climate, this assumption was also challenged by other researchers such as Schein (2004). Miller *et al.* (1998) suggest that a possible explanation for inconsistent results when researching the benefit or detriment of diversity in top management lies in researchers being focused on demographic diversity rather than cognitive diversity.

Demographic diversity may not have direct effects on organisational processes or outcomes, but rather have indirect effects through cognitive diversity (Glick *et al.* 1993), suggesting that

the effects of demographic diversity may be too weak to be detected consistently. This again conflicts with the arguments of the congruence assumption mentioned earlier. Thus, Miller *et al.* question the validity of the profound argument that demographic diversity actually affects cognitive diversity. Randel and Jaussi (2003), in their study of the relationship between functional background identity, diversity and individual performance, demonstrated a connection between the level of social identity of individuals and their performance in a team. Their findings and the method they developed for measuring functional social identity seems applicable to this research as similar cognitive processes drive founders' influence on organisational culture.

Research findings (Beckman 2006) further support this, and focus directly on founders. The findings suggest that the founding team's diversity and affiliation give them advantages in some areas and disadvantages in others. For example, they argue that founders of common background have the advantage of shared understanding, but their lack of diversity limits the scope of new ideas. This is in line with Schein's description of the way organisational culture develops and is nurtured by the founders' selection of new members akin to them in values and the right set of assumptions and beliefs. In her words (author's emphasis): *"Overall, the results suggest that founding team prior company affiliations predict whether a firm pursues exploratory and exploitative behavior, and they also suggest that firms whose founding teams have both types of affiliations are more likely to grow over time.* ***In general, these results support a strong relationship between founding team affiliations and consistent patterns of firm behavior****."* In yet another study, Beckman and Burton (2008) explored how the breadth of founder prior experiences and early decisions about functional structures influence the types of executives who are attracted and retained, and the types of structures that are subsequently put into place. They hypothesized that founders will put functional structures in place that mirror their own experiences. Their research supports previous studies establishing that through homophily and imprinting, subsequent executives and structures bear a strong resemblance to founding executives and structures. This emphasizes the fact that founders bring important experiences and make critical choices early in an organisation's history, leaving a lasting, hard to change, organisational imprint.

Ding (2011) investigated the effect of founders' professional educational backgrounds on the adoption of the open-science technology management strategy in bio-technology firms (which is not a direct cultural characteristic but rather a derivative of it). A noteworthy finding of his study is that a founder's professional educational background can mitigate the

constraint of the organisational environment on strategy. For example, when a biotech firm has more founders holding a Ph.D., it is less deterred by the high-risk technological environment of open science, suggesting that academic open-science culture is imprinted in the founders and carried on when they leave the academic world.

Fini et al. (2009) looked into the relationship between attitude and entrepreneurial intentions. They demonstrate that attitudes directly predict entrepreneurial intention, which in turn influences the actions of existing organisations. Psychological characteristics, individual skills and environmental influence, on the other hand, have only an indirect impact. However, they did not succeed in establishing that environmental support predicts entrepreneurial intention.

Specifically, the influence of founders' military backgrounds was studied by Williams et al. (2000). They tried to assess possible links between managers' education and military service and corporate criminal activity. The results they found support the thesis that the link between firm size and corporate illegal activity becomes stronger as the percentage of TMT[13] members that have prior military experience rises. This result shows the influence of the depth of military back ground. The specific case of the Israeli software industry is discussed in Breznitz (2002), who claims that the IDF is one of the main nodes in the national innovation system and creates standards for the whole industry.

Other examples of the influence of founders' backgrounds may be found in popular literature like Malcolm T. Gladwell's "OUTLIER'S The Story of Success" (see for example Ch. 2 – "The 10000 Hours Rule" which demonstrates several similar cases where laboriously acquired proficiency influences the person's future). Gladwell attributes much of a companies' success to its founders' backgrounds, and especially to the special expertise they acquired earlier in their careers. A famous example is Steve Jobs' skill in calligraphy that had great influence on the development of Apple computers and later on other Apple products.

The bottom line is that there is clear research support for the influence of founders' backgrounds, both theoretical and empirical. However, it is lacking in breadth of evidence, and the benefit or detriment of diversity in top management remains unclear, at least from the point of view of performance and outcomes, as empirical findings do not provide consistent support for either argument on this point. As summarised by Edmondson *et al.* (2003), three factors hinder this line of research: first, demographic characteristics are low fidelity proxies for psychological constructs; Secondly, the actual mechanisms that serve to

[13] TMT = Top Management Team

convert group characteristics into organisational outcomes are difficult to investigate and measure; thirdly, situation-specific factors are hard to compensate for, and are often completely neglected.

This places a question mark over the ability to associate founders' backgrounds with their firms' organisational cultures as the evidence may only provide an indirect connection and it also may be hard to cancel out the mitigating factors.

1.4. TOTAL INSTITUTIONS AND RE-SOCIALISATION

I now take a temporary break from the topic of culture to present the concept of '**Total Institution**' or '**Total Organisation**' which will be needed for the following discussion of military culture.

Total Institution (TI) construct foundations were laid down by the sociologist Erving Goffman, who also made a seminal contribution to Identity Theory (Goffman 1957, 1959, 1961). Encyclopaedic definitions of the terms may largely be found (c.f. Bacon and Warren (2008), Rubin (2005)). Note that, as mentioned above, Goffman's TI theory stems from the same point of view that cultivated the identity theory discussed above. Nevertheless, its twin, social identity theory, can also be applied when analysing the processes that take place in a total institution.

The theory and concept of total institutions is important in the context of this research. The importance lies in the fact that total institutions are in some sense conversion organisations; they re-socialise their inmates (or conscripts.) The re-socialisation process is actually teaching the organisations' members the culture of the organisation (Czarniawska-Joerges 1992, chap. 7). The major differences between the teaching processes in total organisations versus normal organisations are the intensity of the process, the intention and orientation of the resocialisation, and the strength of the cultural imprint that remains upon leaving the organisation.

Goffman based his observations on a lengthy study of an asylum, and expanded his theory to other organisations with totalistic behaviour. Goffman classified total organisations as exhibiting features that take complete control and responsibility over the inmate's (Goffman's term for total institution occupants) life, blurring the distinction between public and private activities and thus blurring the differentiation between private and social identity. Although arising from different needs (control, changing behaviour etc.) the outcome in all cases is similar. Goffman mentions the need to control blocks of people as key for total institutions. It

is also important to make the distinction that Goffman makes between inmates and staff, which will later be relevant to this study. Goffman classifies several types of total institution as a starting point for looking at total institutions:

- First are institutions that care for the incapable and the harmless, like orphanages, hospices, elderly citizens' homes etc.
- Second are places established to care for persons thought to be both incapable of looking after themselves and a (unintended) threat to the community such as sanatoriums and mental hospitals.
- Third are institutions organized to protect the community against intentional dangers like jails, penitentiaries, camps and concentration camps.
- Fourth are institutions set up to better pursue some technical task and which justify themselves according to these instrumental grounds: army barracks, ships, schools, work camps, colonial compounds, large mansions from the point of view of those who live in the servants' quarters etc.
- Fifth are institutions designed as retreats as training stations for the religious (or sometimes camouflaged as religious): abbeys, monasteries, convents and other cloisters, orders and cults.

One important aspect of the differences between total institutions is the circumstances of admission. Entrance can be involuntary, as with jails, hospitals, the military etc. and at the other end of the scale there are religious institutions who only accept suitable volunteers. In between one can find military compounds where inmates are recruited by law, but have the feeling that this service is justified. Each of these has its own 'flavour' of totality, of adaptation processes, and eventually also of the fate of their graduates. Alumni (aka 'old-boys' fraternities) of schools and universities as well as reunions of military units are as common as the dispersion and melding of servicemen into civilian life and the diffusion of ex-convicts into the underworld community.

According to Goffman, total institutions don't try on purpose to acculturate the inmates, they do not strive for cultural victory; instead, it happens as a by-product of the socialisation process that the stripping processes of wonted supports through which mortification of the self occurs. Distinctive characteristics of the authority system in total institutions include, according to Goffman:

- A hierarchical system composed of echelons where each echelon has a set of unique rights and privileges
- Constant measurement and judgement of a multitude of items pertaining to every aspect of conduct, accompanied by a system of corrective sanctions and privileges.
- Punishment and privileges that follow this judgment can be in a sphere of life not necessarily related to the sphere where the judgment was made (strengthening the totality.)

Another aspect of total institutions is the development of an 'institutional lingo' that the inmates use to describe, explain and express events in that particular world. Also, one can find the 'fraternization process', socially remote inmates develop mutual support because of the forced intimacy and the egalitarian community of fate. This aspect is important from the point of view of this research; as will be demonstrated later – the 'institutional lingo' is retained after discharge and continues to follow the retirees in their post-service careers.

Goffman also notes the existence of *'Secondary Adjustments'* in total institutions which is a system that enables the obtaining of some privileges, either allowed or disallowed, by using techniques that do not challenge the institution's authority, for example the creation of formal or in-formal inmates 'clans' inside a jail, the ability to bring in drugs, etc. This allows for some marginal freedom that helps keep the previous, outside-of-the-institute, identity.

Goffman's TI concept was laid out from the late 1950s to the early 1960s and has faced some criticism since then despite its deep influence. A summary of the criticism may be found in Scott (2010). Some of the criticism regards the concept per-se while some criticise the methodology. For example, one major criticism of Goffman's construct is his overlooking of the context in which the total institution operated and especially the normative aspects, for example, the Nazi concentration camps and the Russian gulags. Goffman's concentration on the technical details and lack of moral attitude seems to imply the legitimacy of such institutions (see the bullets above), this hardly seems acceptable, so I will leave it as is. In the same area, another considered setback is the lack of dynamic structure in these institutions e.g. asylums such as the one studied by Goffman hardly exist anymore. From the methodological perspective, Goffman is attacked for not supplying supporting evidence from his interviews and making observations which are selective and impressionistic. Scott also suggests a less harsh reference to TI and provides the term 'Performative Regulation'. The

types of military organisations that are the focus of this research are indeed more in line with this type of representation than the traditional terminology.

Although one may see objections to the concept of the total institution, the remarkable fact that this theory is challenged regularly (c.f. Bengtsson and Bülow 2016) only magnifies its substance; the fundamental total institution construct seems to still be something of a consensus.

1.4.1. TOTAL INSTITUTION AND ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE

Pettigrew (1979, p. 580) suggests that Goffman's 'total institution' conceptual view of some organisations might be applicable to a broader spectrum of organisations than the traditional *"educational, religious, correctional, or social movement type of organization*". A similar discussion can be found at Kunda (2006, chap. Epilogue: Culture and Corporate Power) which mentions the rites and rituals nowadays associated in companies, and the reporting by employees of invasion of their private lives by corporate requirements. Moreover, proponents of 'strong culture' as a key to success e.g. Peters and Waterman (1982), encourage that type of conduct, especially for central members of organisations, as Kunda proposes: *"members… experience a pull that is not easy to combat, an escalating commitment to the corporation and its definitions of reality, coupled with a systematic and persistent attack on the boundaries of their privacy*". However, Kunda concludes that companies might still be far from becoming 'total institutions' having full control over their members' lives. As a major difference between a company and a total institution, Kunda points out the voluntary nature of membership, and that "*the economic rewards and benefits of membership are not insubstantial"*. Most military service in Israel, on the other hand, is not voluntary and the economic rewards are questionable, especially during the first years of service which have no reward at all (except for pride and experience.) Yet another discussion is conducted by Morgan (2006, chaps 7, Organization as Psychic Prisons), who employs a dramatic metaphor which is close to Goffman's initial research. Morgan refers to organisations' members as being *"trapped by constructions of reality that, at best, give but imperfect grasp of the world… (and) people in organisations can become trapped by favoured ways of thinking."* This type of 'groupthink' has been demonstrated time and again in research and real-life situations.

To conclude this section, one may use Wallace's (1971) remark about institutions' variability in their degrees of totality: *"Total institutions are not a separate class of social establishments, but rather specific institutions, which exhibit to an intense degree certain characteristics found in all*

institutions. The issue is not which institutions are total and which are not, but rather, how much totality does each display?"

1.4.2. MODES OF ADAPTATION AND THE PERSISTENCE OF TOTAL INSTITUTION CULTURE AFTER DISMISSAL/GRADUATION

The process of inmates' or conscripts' mortification of identity gives rise to mitigating measures where the inmates employ lines of adaptation to the organisations. These can be in principle one of the following types (c.f. Goffman 1957, 1961, Karmel 1972, Scott 2010):

- The first type assumes a 'situational withdrawal' - withdrawing attention from the surrounding environment, regressing into oneself.
- The second type assumes the 'rebellious line' - challenging the institution and refusing to cooperate. Goffman suggests that this mode of adaptation can lead to a deep kind of commitment to the institution.
- The third type is 'colonising' - becoming contented with the institution and thereby receiving all its gratification. Experience of the outside world is used to demonstrate the desirability of intra-institutional life, and the institution becomes 'home'.
- The fourth type assumes 'conversion' – completely adapting the institution al view of the inmate, and trying to act out the role of the perfect participant. While the 'colonised' inmate tries to make the best of what the institution provides, the 'converted' present themselves as adopting the identity of the institution.

The mode of adaptation used by the inmate is based, of course, on his own personality and the circumstances in the institution – the combination of the two determine the mode of behaviour. In some cases, the TI presents a model of ideal behaviour to which the inmates might aspire. These role models might also be selected by the inmates based on their own judgment. Traces of these modes of adaptation to the military institution can also be found in studies of military organisations as far back as Solomon's (1954) study of recruits in the Canadian Army which also points to the resemblance of military units to total organisations.

According to Goffman, total institutions often claim to concentrate on *"resetting the inmate's self-regulatory mechanisms so that he will maintain the standards of the establishment of his own accord after he leaves the setting."* However, this rarely occurs and even when permanent alteration occurs, it is often not that which is intended. With the possible exception of the great resocialization efficiency of religious institutions, neither the stripping processes nor the

reorganizing ones seem to have a lasting effect; the strongest evidence for this, perhaps, comes from our knowledge of the readjustment of repatriated brain-washed prisoners of war. This can be accounted for to some extent by the availability of secondary adjustments, and the natural resistance of inmates to the stripping process. Whatever the reasons, shortly after discharge, the ex-inmate will have forgotten a great deal of what life was like on the inside (Lahav *et al.* 2011).

Goffman suggests further that what the ex-inmate retains of his institutional experience upon exiting the institution tells us important things about total institutions. Often the inmate's social position on the outside will change permanently, for better or worse. Where the inmate's proactive status upon entrance is a relatively favourable one, as in the example of officer' training school, or high-ranking boarding schools etc., then the permanent alteration will be favourable, and they might be accompanied by periodical reunions announcing pride in one's "school". On the contrary, when the proactive status is unfavourable, e.g. in prisons, "stigmatization" is created and the ex-inmate may make an effort to conceal his past.

Of special interest to this research is the persistence of habitual military conscripts after discharge. Surprisingly, this topic is not very rich in information.

Arkin and Dobrofsky (1978), mentioned above, studied a military blueprint of masculinity and asserted that all indicators point to the fact that the change is not as dramatic as expected. However, they emphasise that since the military socializes so much of the population for such a long period that, at least from masculinity perspective, it might be the case that recruits are already socialised pre-drift to militarised standards through the general socialisation process.

A noteworthy study is Ruth Jolly's above mentioned study of British former soldiers' adaptation to civilian life (Jolly 1996), which also draws on Goffman's observations of total institutions. She brings up the statistical data from the British 'Labour Force Survey' which shows that about 40% of ex-military personnel choose to pursue a career which has a high level of continuity with their military occupation. This should, of course, be of no surprise as any reasonable man would want to maximise his personal assets. However, *"the narrowness of the range of occupations which leavers enter considering the range they come from and the range they could choose from is striking (Spilsbury 1994): uniformed civilian services and civilian security organisations between them absorb the bulk of non-officer leavers".* Note the distinction she makes between officers and non-officers; she remarks that officers tend to cluster into more managerial jobs and appear more in the health services, schools, as college bursars, in club management, the emergency services, planning in local government administrations, and also

in aviation both as pilots and maintenance crew. *"Why,"* she asks, *"do a number of ex-service people remain captives of their past, and see themselves mainly in terms of their ex-military status?*" The answer she gives (based on a previous survey by Simkin and Thompson) arises from a survey which found that, setting aside the sheer capabilities and experience, there is a tendency for this population to obtain a job by 'word-of-mouth'. Thus, leavers tend to follow their predecessors as a crystal is formed by nucleation.

Similar findings were described by Yariv (1980) who found that almost two thirds of retirees (57%) found a first post-service job through friends; moreover, most of the Israeli military retirees turned to the public sector as a first choice, and about two thirds of the employed retirees worked in the public sector. Galay (1989) reports that approximately a third of the retirees had difficulties finding employment immediately after retirement. Although these findings are a little dated and precede the 'information era' revolution, it seems that in these times the retirees' difficulties only got tougher as military experience and culture are becoming less relevant and the employment market looks for younger technologically-updated workers.

Also in the same vein, Higate (2001) discusses the topic of military persistence following his research into homelessness. He notes the significance of being in the 'tail' or 'tooth' side of the service under consideration, which correlates presumably with the extent of organisational totality. He suggests, following the other researchers he mentions, that military service might also have an impact through crippling into dysfunction abilities required to cope with civilian life. Higate argues that although thorough research regarding the long-term influence of military service is scarce, one can get a hint by seeing, for example, the disproportionate number of ex-servicemen amongst the homeless with respect to their relative proportion of the population, and also in other uniformed professions such as policemen and firefighters.

More supporting evidence is found in research which examines the habits of soldiers who either deserted or resigned from the Zimbabwe National Army, conducted by Maringira and others (Maringira 2014, Maringira *et al.* 2014). A main finding is that these men, even though they have left the army, hold on in the extreme to their identities as soldiers, and that identities which were forged through resistance continue to be reproduced in different ways in post-conflict society. Moreover, the nature of their training, the command in which they served, and their experience of violence, affects the veterans' identities in the aftermath of war. Citing previous sources, Maringira notes the military training period as the ultimate point

of identity transformation, and the shaping of the soldiers' identity. He claims that *'unmaking'* the military identity back into a civilian one ('*Demilitarising the Mind')* is a difficult, long and complex process, hence, one can imply, it is almost never successful even when attempted, and even more so when not attempted; e.g. characteristics such as language and the practice of *'repossession'* is regarded as a *'redistribution of the wealth'* rather than a crime (a Robin Hood type attitude.) They also continue to consider themselves as *'protectors'* and *'defenders'* of the community, retaining their identity as soldiers. In fact, they note this persistence of identity as a success of their training and take pride in it. No better example to end this discussion is the famous US Marine Corps slogans – 'Once a Marine, Always a Marine', and 'Sempre Fidelis' – always loyal.

1.5. CULTURE OF MILITARY UNITS AND SUB-CULTURE DIVERSITY WITHIN ARMIES

In another venue, considerable work has been done regarding the organisational culture of military units and its diversity. Zellman *et al.* (1993, p. 370), trying to capture in a nut-shell the core elements of military culture that distinguish it from other organisations, describe it *as "conservative, rooted in history and tradition, based on group loyalty and conformity and oriented toward obedience to superiors"*. Winslow (2000) adopted the approach of Martin (1991) and using the three perspective view (integration-differentiation-fragmentation) conducted a comprehensive literature survey of army culture-related publications, concluding that the most prominent point of view for army culture studies is from the integration perspective, which allows a researcher to examine core values, organisational structures, and symbol systems. Winslow argues that from the point of view of military culture, research is extremely important as culture is a key to understanding the military, as will also be seen later when Moskos' model is discussed in more detail.

The last couple of decades have seen a surge in multinational operations (e.g. Desert Strom & Desert Shield operations in Iraq, the prolonged operations in Afghanistan, Africa, Haiti, the Balkans, etc.) This has re-invoked research regarding military culture with special attention paid to cultural diversity among armies and its influence on interoperability. A NATO report (Febbraro *et al.* 2008) summarises such a study, including many examples of cultural diversity between armies of different nations, its effect on communication, leadership and command, decision making, use of technology etc. This report mainly relies on analyses of cultural dimensions using Hofstede's model.

Another major model that influences social perspective research into the military is the 'institutional' versus 'occupational' framework for military organisations developed by Moskos (1976, 1977, 1981, 2005). Moskos proposed a model of analysis based on the thesis that in the contemporary armed forces one can identify a parallel existence of **institutional elements** where members are commonly viewed and regard themselves as following a calling (often termed as 'duty' and 'honour') that distinguishes them from the broader society. Members of an institutional military are expected to perform tasks not limited to their specialties, and remuneration is essentially based on rank and seniority. **Occupational elements,** on the other hand, are ones in which military service is regarded as a contractual obligation by two sides: the servicemen and the state. From the occupational view point the military service is legitimated in the marketplace by supply and demand and is based on a set of core assumptions: (1) that cost-effectiveness analyses are as valid for military services as they are for civilian organisations; (2) that compensation should focus on the monetary; and (3) that compensation should be linked directly to the different skills of individual service members. The occupational model implies the priority of self-interest over the interests of the employing organisation. In the core of this debate is the conflict between the army being a state agency and the military as a professional organisation. Moskos also claimed more than 45 years ago (Moskos 1970) that *"The organizational characteristics tending toward convergence with civilian structures have been most apparent in the Air Force, somewhat less so in the Navy, and least of all in the Army"* which supports one of the underlining assumptions of this research, which is the distinct difference in culture between the different military commands.

Moskos (1977) summarises several previous research results regarding differences in institutional/occupational dimensions of units of various armed forces. The findings are that in some countries (e.g. Canada) support corps tend to be occupational oriented while combat forces tend to be institutional, whereas in other countries (e.g. USA) there is no clear correlation, and this tendency correlates with rank much stronger than with the type of unit. So, the natural expectation that as we move further from the 'flight line' towards the 'support areas' the occupational model appears more prevalent is not supported by evidence, at least in the US armed forces. Moskos' model of military organisation includes underlying arguments that in the recent past the military has been moving more and more from a traditional 'institutional' format to a civilian or 'occupational' format (Alpass *et al.* 1999). This phenomenon may lead to less differentiation between army units (at least the more

technically oriented units) as they tend to assimilate external culture trends; this in turn may lessen the effects this research is interested in.

Popper (1996), although not explicitly, applies Moskos' model to leadership. He notes that in 'total institutions' formal authority is the main, if not the sole, source for making members act. In business organisations, and their military parallels – 'occupational'-type units, people are motivated to act by use of social rewards, material benefits, prestige and so forth. In organisations such as combat units the sources of motivation for action are mainly emotional. Thus, the different leadership characterisation in diverse military units creates different types of leaders and followers, between whom different psychological contracts evolve.

Mastroianni (2006) also uses Moskos' institutional/occupational model to analyse intra-armed forces' diversity of sub-cultures in the US military. Mastroianni**,** taking the point of view of commanding officers rather than the force in general**,** emphasises the difference in culture between the US Army and the US Air Force. He attributes these differences to several causes such as the different operation of the forces, the different roles of officers and NCO's (non-commissioned officers) and their interaction with each other, different leadership styles, as well as the different myth models: solitary versus communitarian. Mastroianni extends the effect of the institutional/occupational model to a more psychological setting using the cognitive dissonance effect to explain some of its aspects. One more issue to point out is that services like the infantry, the navy and the long-gone cavalry predate more modern services such as the air-force, armoured forces and intelligence. Their ethos is rooted way back, in more ancient cultural themes, some of them pre-historical, and may share cultural characteristics with similar forces in other countries more than with their own country's different services.

Soeters *et al.* (2006) combine Martin's (1991) perspectives of looking at culture and Moskos' (1977) model into a unified scheme, demonstrating how Moskos' institutional/occupational model can be used to explain the diversity in military sub-cultures (i.e. the differential perspective.) They present the results of studies demonstrating the existence of cultural diversity between the armed forces of different countries. They support the study carried out by NATO (Febbraro *et al.* 2008) that was mentioned above. Another interesting aspect which this study suggests, however, is the cultural diversity within armed forces. Based on a scaling of the dimensions of risk to personal life and the turbulence of critical events the authors define two types of military organisations:

- ‘Cold’ organisations – These include military units such as headquarters, barracks, a navy vessel on a peacetime sailing mission and routine peacekeeping force operations.
- ‘Hot’ organisations – These include military units in full battle or military action, military units during drills and training.

The ‘cold’ organisation resembles an ordinary bureaucratic organisation. The ‘hot’ organisations tend to demonstrate what Jacobs (1992) has called the ‘guardian moral syndrome’ which stresses courage, obedience, loyalty, tradition, exclusiveness, vengeance and ostentatiousness. Naturally, these differences are reflected in the different behaviour of the organisations’ members (soldiers, commanders etc.). Moreover, these diverse circumstances call for different types of leadership. In the Swedish air force, huge differences have been found between the squadrons, the maintenance companies and the Air Defence Operation Centres (Weibull 1988).

Murray (2002) refers to military culture as *“a coat of many colours”.* Murray notes that most military organisations quickly develop myths that allow an escape from unpleasant truths. Murray demonstrates how the armed forces of different nations develop different cultural elements as responses to the general culture of society. Furthermore, Murray notes that military cultures are not and cannot be homogenies because of historical antecedents and the differences in the environments of operation. Some military organisations’ cultures are subjected to the influence of, among others, the external culture of society, recent military events and experiences, professional ethos, etc. Moreover, Murray maintains, even within military organisations there will be separate and distinct subcultures heavily influenced by traditions as well as the mission they perform.

Snider (2002) uses a functional approach to argue that what makes military organisations’ cultures unique is their being rooted in fighting war and dealing with its uncertainties while trying to add meaning to it. The most prominent uniqueness is the justification of performing horrendous actions as part of its core nature. This is part of the rationalisation of war actions. Snider identifies four elements that are prominent in military cultures:

- The first element is discipline, the purpose of which is to prevent disintegration as the chaos of military actions prevails.
- The second element is a professional ethos, which is the core set of norms that comprise its code of conduct.

- The third element of military culture consists of ceremonial displays, which have more meaning in peace time.
- The fourth element of military culture is cohesion and morale, its willingness to perform a mission and to fight.

Snider, like Mastroianni, asserts that the *"sharply divergent cultures"* of the forces is partly due to their different ideas about how a combat mission is handled. For example, the air-force emphasizes advanced technology as its basis of power, stressing the ability to concentrate massive power in a narrow slot of time and space, whereas the field forces' power lies in human resources, team-work and a joint offensive approach and prolonged operations. Snider also argues that military culture changes as one gets further away from the front where actual killing takes place and the probability of getting killed rises accordingly. In a more practical manner, McKee et al. (2008), following the methodology of Hofstede et al. (1990), examined the cultural diversity between armies and its influence on interoperability in multinational task forces. They mention differences in trust and ethics, decision making processes, the effect of power distance on communication, etc.

Wilson (2010), continuing the line of Moskos' model, agrees that in institutional organisations a sense of mission is a part of the institution's identity and is kindled in its members through myths and rituals. Technically, Wilson defines institutions as organisations that exhibit three noticeable characteristics:

- They can be identified through their members, either narrowly in the sense of qualified members of a professional body, or more broadly as all those associated with it, extending to the patients and ancillary staff, as well as the doctors and nurses, in the case of a hospital, and are frequently identified with buildings or some other specific location.
- Secondly, institutions use symbols, such as uniforms, to distinguish members from non-members and to emphasise identity.
- Finally, institutions have three channels of interaction: internally amongst members, between members and non-members, and other institutions.

Armies as organisations, according to Wilson, do not differ technically speaking from other institutions except that their primary mission entails a readiness to take life and destroy property. This breaking of taboo is authorized by the state. The juxtaposition of European and Europeanised (e.g. Latin American) militaries reveals major differences in culture despite the

ostensibly similar institutional setting. For example, some armies adhere to national defence, while some take part in internal struggles.

Wilson maintains that it is unlikely that a particular military internal culture will be fully integrated, with a single set of norms and values shared by all personnel. More often than not, military culture is fragmented, exhibiting different, possibly contradictory, attitudes and behaviour within the same army. In short, subcultures co-exist in the armed forces.

Winslow et al. (2006) discuss some more external contributors to diversity in the armed forces. They conclude that armies become internally diverse in terms of ethnicity, gender and religion. This is a result of several external factors. One of them is the change from a conscript force to an all-volunteer force. Militaries have to tap into new groups of ethnic minorities and women if they are to solve their recruitment and retention problems; they also need to provide them with a tolerant workplace. Moreover, societies are also becoming more and more ethnically heterogeneous as borders open and immigration is easy, raising issues of equal opportunities for all accompanied by the need to ensure that militaries are broadly representative of the societies they are supposed to defend.

An actual effect of military culture on combat results is presented by Corbacho (2006) who studied the case of the Argentine marines in the Falklands/Malvinas war, and assessed the effect organisational culture and structure had on the fighting performance of the military units. He relates the difference in performance to the effect culture has on cohesion and motivation. The style of command and control, adaptability, inter-service cooperation, and also the intangibles of unit history and tradition can stand as attributes of the organisational culture (for example - inducing conscripts). Note should be taken here that, traditionally, cohesion is a dimension related to the organisational climate paradigm, not culture.

Altman (1989), using the Grid/Group anthropological theory, offers a demonstration of how different military units develop diversified cultures espoused by the needs of their specific military profession. Although the army model Altman uses is mainly the IDF, his analysis is largely general enough to encompass almost any armed service. As Altman notes, the main feature of any armed forces in the first place is its emphasis on structure, hierarchy and discipline, and in that sense, it is strong Grid. Since most of its work is generally interdependent, that is group bounded, the top right quadrant seems to be the most suitable position for the military armed forces to be in. However, when scrutinizing the different commands, some variations emerge. In Figure 4 below, one can see Altman's crude analysis

of armed services culture. Altman uses the following questions as guidelines for determining the cultural perspective of military units, assessing where the main forces will fit:

- How much is the core mission group dependent? and what intensity of face to face interaction does it require? (Group dimensions)
- To what extent is the elementary fighting unit technology driven? (Grid dimension)
- To what extent is the detailed execution of the fighting command controlled? (Grid dimension)

For example, in the navy, when looking at a single combat unit – a combat ship – combines a core mission which is very group dependent on an isolated platform at sea, hence the group element is very strong. On the other hand, a ship's operation is highly structured in terms of role specificity both technically and operatively since it requires various technical proficiencies, and also the areas of responsibility are well defined and the hierarchy very strict, hence strong grid. A similar perspective can be applied to other commands, and the conclusions are quite straightforward.



Figure 4 - Grid/Group theory applied to armed services

1.5.1. SOME SPECIAL CASES OF THE IDF

In their discussion paper, De Fontenay and Carmel (2001) discuss some of the unique influences the IDF has on the Israeli industry. They emphasise, among other things, the sense of collectivism that is nurtured by compulsory military service as the young conscripts are trained to work together as a group, to trust each other and be loyal to one another. Later on, these values are reflected in the strong loyalty Israelis exhibit toward the firm. The implication for high tech firms is a low turnover rate (Bernshtock, 1999). Another significant implication

of Israeli collectivism is that Israelis are generally more comfortable working in teams. The more capable conscripts are usually given more training towards leadership. They are given and assume responsibility for their unit in the military working place, which requires long working hours, quick responses, flexibility, improvisation, and in general getting accustomed to operating in what Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1997) call a "guided missile" culture, or a "bet-your-company" type as defined by Deal and Kennedy. These skills and this experience are carried forward as they leave the army and join the work force, already trained for a startup environment.

In Israel, although military service is still a part of the national ethos, the transformation from institution to occupation also takes place and is accelerated (Levy 2005, 2007). As symbolic rewards are continuously being diminished following general socio-cultural processes, such as: demilitarization; demographical processes; poor military performance; the enhanced selectivity that affects the military's social representativeness; the legitimacy of war; veterans' competitiveness in the labour market versus non-veterans; the competitiveness of veterans from certain military units versus other veterans; military service has been gradually commodified, in the sense that a public, "institutional" service is being substituted by an "occupational" service and turned into a commodity – a paid-for job. This process has two effects that are of interest from the point of view of this study. The first one is the massive interaction between the Israeli army and civilian organisations that has an influence on the popularity and prestige of army commands and units (see for example (Ariav and Goodman 1994, de Fontenay and Carmel 2001, Breznitz 2002)). The second effect is (carefully stated, as this topic is more elusive and not exhaustively studied) that more cultural homogeneity arises between military units, especially the non-combatant units. This is unavoidable as the motivation for service deviates from duty to wages, and as centralised training schools (e.g. software, logistics, HR) indoctrinate the various forces' delegates in a similar way, making them liaisons of the central command in the force (what Breznitz (2002) coins as "collective learning and diffusion of knowledge".) Following this trend, the socialization process that is a part of the private ethos of various military units' loses its importance, and hence the variations among veterans with respect to the cultural transport they carry with them is less distinct. This trend was also observed by non-Israeli researchers (Giles 2006) as in the late-1980s, Israeli civil society had become less deferential to the military, and this greater scrutiny of the armed forces led to a wave of civil court cases in Israel for "deviant acts", leading to a

deterioration in the prestige of military personnel. Levy (2005) predicts that the acceleration of the military service model from institutional to occupational will further differentiate the intra-army hierarchy based on the material rewards differentiation, which will be amplified by the fact that a similarly rewarded population is less likely to be exposed to physical danger. This, in turn, is expected to deteriorate the integrity of the IDF as an institutional organisation, increasing differentiation and sub-cultural diversity.

From the rather narrow point of view of this research, which is looking at the effect of army sub-cultural diversity on veteran-founded organisations, this may on the one hand mitigate the relationship between the military background of founders and the culture of their organisations as the IDF becomes more occupational (less susceptible to the cultural ethos), but on the other hand increase the strength of this correlation due to increased diversity between combatant and non-combatant units.

Nevertheless, having said that, there is evidence that the typifying of military units still exists in the IDF. A specific study of the Israel Defence Forces (IDF) was made by Altman (1989) and Altman and Baruch (1998), who examined the IDF's culture from the anthropological point of view using Grid/Group analysis, maintaining that historically the IDF has tended to be strong on the group dimension and weak on the grid dimension. Based on this model, they examined typical military units and positioned them on the four quadrants of the Grid/Group model (as in Figure 4 above). They also compared the Grid/Group model to other model such as Hofstede's dimensions, and demonstrated their equivalence. They quote Hofstede, who admits that his dimension of 'Group' corresponds to individualism, while 'Grid' resembles uncertainty avoidance. Shamir *et al.* (1998) extensively examined leadership in various units of the IDF and its influence on the units' cultures, and specifically compared infantry units to tank units. They looked into external observable culture signs such as special slogans, special songs, special nicknames, special rituals, special jargon, internal jokes, and used them as parameters to measure the cultural strength. From that perspective they found that both types of units developed cultural characteristics with about the same level of strength, though admitting that they used crude measures to assess culture.

In a later study, Shamir *et al.* (2000), there is no clear indication, but proximity in publication dates hints that it uses the same data set of their 1998 publication, surprisingly concluded that despite the fact that cultural artefacts were recognised as mediators between leaders' efforts

to create a collective identity, soldiers' social identification levels were not correlated with the amount of symbolic artefacts.

Chorev and Anderson (2006) found that in Israel the military service of entrepreneurs is correlated with the probability of success. For example, team solidarity is perceived as very strong in Israel due to the influence of military service and this may potentially provide a unique advantage for Israeli startup ventures. Many respondents in the research noted that military service in Israel affects the capabilities of the young servicemen. Some of the skills gained during military service, such as improvisation, may be regarded as helpful in the startup arena.

An interesting study on time preferences was made by Lahav et al. (2011). They found that there is a significant difference regarding the time preferences of soldiers and students in Israel. This research demonstrates two phenomena: one is that army service, due to its nature, changes the perception of time, and secondly, that this effect diminishes after leaving the army. This second phenomenon should be kept in mind, since it suggests that the cultural influence of military service diminishes over time.

1.5.2. THE MILITARY AS A TOTAL INSTITUTION

The military's affinity to the total institution was pointed out before the term 'total institution' had been coined, and the characteristics that lead to TI had been thoroughly examined. Solomon (1954) pointed to phenomena resembling TI in military recruits after ethnographical research that lasted 3 years, and associated its strength to inter-group relations, staff leadership and mentoring.

Zurcher (1967), based on the characteristics of the daily conduct of a navy 'boot camp', asserted that they very much comply with Goffman's definitions of TI.

On the other hand, Rootman (1972) points out that the nature of these institutions is to 'weed out' the population whose values are not consistent with those of the institution, which results in a more homogenised population at the end of the process but not because people changed their values and orientation but rather because they had them from the beginning and that helped them survive the socialisation process.

Arkin and Dobrofsky (1978), without referring to Goffman, and using the term 'total society' instead of 'total institution' looked at the military's socialisation process. They point out that *"Military discipline refers to and thus encompasses the total individual's conformity to a prescribed role, including one's behavior, attitudes, beliefs, values, and definitions.*" And this is the primary focal

point of the re-socialisation process – to shape the individual into a 'cog in the military machine'. For that end the military encourages loyalty, esprit de corps and team work. As part of this process, the military creates an alternative 'immediate family' for the recruits. This observation is of interest to this research because in the Israeli military there are significant differences in the types of service premises between commands and between units of the same command.

In the same area, Rosa and Stevens (1986) challenge the applicability of the TI concept specifically with regard to military academies, and concluded that based on their characteristics, and the depth of value changes they measured, it cannot be overruled. However, they point out that the changes that cadets' experience might be attributed to other alternative socialisation processes such as rites of passage. Interestingly, probably because of contradictory findings in other studies (Priest *et al.* 1982, Bridges and Priest 1983), Rosa and Stevens revisited this topic later on (Stevens *et al.* 1994), reinforcing the previous results without attributing them to TI but rather to socialisation processes in general (e.g. maturation). They enumerate the following reasons why a military unit is different from TI:

- The unique institutional (e.g. occupational, social and academic status) purpose for which conscripts are willing to enlist.
- The institution is selected by the applicants rather than vice-versa, which enhances the applicant-institutional value match.
- There is substantially greater freedom for cadets than for inmates.

As a general remark regarding the research into military institutions in the light of TI, Stevens *et al.* (1994) note that these studies are at least partially biased because researchers make a pre-emptive choice *"…to utilise the total institution concept because they assume that, in addition to being accurately descriptive of critical environmental parameters, the concept will assist them in their study of resocialization outcomes or behavioral/value profile changes."*

Looking at this from another perspective, Popper (1996) notes that in total institutions the ways of making people perform tasks is by formal authority, while in military combat units the sources of motivation for action are mainly emotional, and that is because commitment is typically a prominent characteristic of such organisations; such organisations liken themselves to a family, at least at the battalion levels. This is in line with the findings of Kachtan (2012) discussed in the review of Identity Theory.

Jolly (1996), in her vast study of the transition from military to civilian life, depicts the process of socialisation in the army in a very similar way to Goffman's description of TI. The process

that Jolly describes is the 'institutionalisation' of the conscripts. In the same vein, Higate (2001) comments on the difficulties of generalising the military service experience, which can be extreme on the one hand and very similar to a regular career on the other hand. This is, again, close in nature to Mosko's' (1976, 1977, 1981) model of the 'institutional' versus 'occupational' model of service. In a way, this argument suggests that the socialisation process in the army converts the conscripts from belonging to the 'occupational' type to being the 'institutionalised' type. This conversion is a type of adaptation to a total institution which was discussed herein above in paragraph 1.4.2.

Goffman mentions the attitude towards work as one major implication of the total institution. As opposed to regular organisations where authority of the workplace is kept within strict bounds and the incentives are e.g. payments, in total organisations the incentives to work are different and are related to a punishment-payment mechanism (Goffman 1957). Oddly enough it is reminiscent of Moskos' occupational-institutional theory (Moskos 1976, 1977, 1981) discussed in paragraph 1.31.3.

Some interesting research was conducted on the culture created on board a nuclear submarine (Bierly 1995). Although aimed at demonstrating the handling of a risky environment through culture, the study exemplifies how this vessel is an archetype of a total institution, including all the above-mentioned characteristics observed by Goffman. It is of special interest that a couple of respondents in this research are veterans of the submarine flotilla. This is an example of the process of acculturation that is required in the military and achieved partly through total institutionalism. Bierly relies on the acculturation process described by Trice and Beye (1993), which in turn relies on Van Gennep's analysis, describing the anthropological 'rites of passage'.

To sum things up – some researchers test the applicability of TI to military organisations, based on the features of the organisation and their proximity to the classical TI definition, while others test it by evaluating the extent of change in values which the conscripts experience while going through the military socialisation process that is part of the induction into the service. Most researchers show an interest in 'boot camps' where trainees are indoctrinated, but the more interesting and relevant studies are those that look at the long-term effects that the military service has. From the point of view of this research, the army may fall into a total institution category when the circumstances develop to that end, either intentionally or unintentionally.

In the author's opinion, Stevens et al.'s (1994) reasoning for counting out TI is rarely sound. It is true that military organisations (not the 'boot camps' but the organisational units) are closer in nature to elite boarding schools and monasteries than to mental hospitals and prisons, but that makes them 'less total' and does not eliminate the characteristics and effects of TI.

For example, the service in a submarine definitely resembles a total institution, a service in a closed military compound may resemble a total institution depending on additional factors like the homogeneity of the conscripts, the type of discipline, how closed it is to the outside world etc. The level of 'totality' is of importance and may later on be attributed to the level of value assimilation differences among veterans of various forces and commands.

1.6. Legitimacy and Identity

1.6.1. Legitimacy

Let us start with some explanation of what legitimacy has to do with this research. Entrepreneurial enterprises in their early stages, and even more so in novel fields of operation, are a mystery. They are unknown to investors, to the market and customers, to employees, and other stakeholders who do not fully understand the nature of the new ventures (Aldrich and Fiol 1994). They must bridge that gap in order to get funding, to get employees, to educate the market, in other words they convey mostly dreams and their curriculum vitae. The way to bridge that gap is by earning cognition and legitimacy, a term that will be elaborated more shortly. One useful method of achieving legitimacy is to assume an identity that has already earned its cognition and legitimacy, and bathe in its aura. This encourages entrepreneurs who are veterans of a prestigious military organization to preserve their previous identity; naturally, it helps if that entrepreneur indeed assimilated the group identity of the military unit, and this is discussed in the review section elaborating upon identity theory. Hence, there is a conscious path that leads entrepreneurs to have a common identity and culture – the need of legitimacy. Another unconscious path is the culture and identity imprint that is created by total-institution-type military service; this vein will be pursued in the review section discussing total institutions.

The roots of the legitimacy concept were broadly discussed by Weber as early as the 1920's (1978, 1st edition published posthomously in 1922 in German), and encompass a very broad aspect of society. Weber asserted that people as well as organisations, regardless of their size, seek legitimization of their acts, or their structure and modus operandi (what Weber referred

to as ‘order’). That legitimacy mostly arises, for example, from a belief in authority, self-interest, or just plain habit. Moreover, according to Weber, when people operate in the context of a group it is because they have a belief in the group’s legitimacy. That legitimacy might be rooted in one of the following options: tradition, faith or enactment. Elaboration of these points is beyond the scope of this work. One must remember that Weber’s work has political roots and that he believed that the concept of legitimacy was invented by the higher classes, those who have the power, wealth and honour, because of their need to justify their good fortune. Thus, for example, since time immemorial kings have received legitimacy from priests who receive it from some supreme divine God or entity. So, in Weber’s view, legitimacy is functional, and he developed his thesis to promote the Protestant view that man gets his legitimacy directly from God and does not need intermediates. Later on, the legitimacy concept was imported to organisational theory.

I now take a leap in time, to a less distant time and organisational theory. Pettigrew (1979) claimed, in logic similar to Weber’s, that organisational culture, especially the part of it that reinforces what is valued in the organisation, such as rituals and organisational myths, plays a crucial role in establishing and maintaining what is legitimate in the organisation, and what is not; this is when looking internally into the organisational culture.

Legitimacy was connected by Hannan and Freeman (Hannan 1986, Hannan and Freeman 1989) to the organisational ecology theory introduced by them earlier (Hannan and Freeman 1977). They considered legitimacy as one of the resources organisations need on a par with capital and other resources, which they combined into the term ‘organisational ecology’. Hannan and Freeman claimed that legitimacy has a cognitive aspect as well as a socio-political legitimization aspect; the first one is about being recognised (‘taken for granted’ (Hannan and Carroll 1992)) and the second is about having a good reputation. The need for legitimacy comes both from internal perspectives e.g. organisational structure, and external perspectives e.g. regulation and financing; it follows that that a lack of legitimacy lowers the chance of survival of new organisations.

Aldrich and Fiol (1994) claim that entrepreneurs confront a legitimacy obstacle and have to struggle with it. They need it in order to mobilise resources (funds, personnel…) from existing organisations to theirs. Entrepreneurs need to build their reputation to be considered reliable and trustable; they must give ‘reasons to believe’ (Low and Abrahamson 1997). Several strategies are used, conscientiously or unconscientiously, to obtain legitimacy in cases where

there is no history that can provide clues to help stakeholders in assessing risk/reward trade-offs. Of these strategies, two are of interest to this study; the first one appeals to a common bond, and the second frames the entrepreneurship to encompass existing known knowledge and frameworks. The first one leads to the approaching of people with a common background with whom the 'symbolic transaction' is easier; these include, for example, family members, people one had done business with before, colleagues from previous workplaces, or people with similar military service backgrounds who share the lingo, rituals, approach to management and culture in general. The second one is the extending or projecting of a known field of technology or business to reflect the current enterprise. In fact, this is the building of a narrative of: 'trust me I have successfully done similar things before in another company \ military \ organisation'. Thus, entrepreneurs try to put forward evidence to gain legitimacy, both for themselves personally as well as for the organisation (in the early stages these are hard to discern...)

Suchman (1995), at a similar time to Aldrich and Fiol, gave a modern definition to legitimacy as a *"generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions"*. Suchman, following other researchers, divides legitimacy into the strategic and the institutional, which has some affinity with Hannan and Freeman's proposition of cognitive socio-political legitimacy, the affinity between cause and effect; strategic legitimacy treats legitimacy as a resource used to gain cognition and set a stance, while institutional legitimacy is the set of constitutive beliefs that form the foundation for legitimacy. Suchman suggests a finer distinction between pragmatic, moral and cognitive legitimacy. In most cases all the types of legitimacy co-exist on various levels. According to Suchman, the management of legitimacy is a challenging cultural process. Generally, Suchman suggests similar strategies of gaining, preserving and repairing legitimacy, which are similar in nature to those suggested by Aldrich and Fiol.

Scott (2014, 1st edition 1995), who worked in roughly the same period, also discussed the connection between legitimacy and resources, and its connection to, what he called, 'the three pillars of institutions: Regulative systems, normative systems, and cultural-cognitive systems'. Scott maintained, in a slightly different way to Suchman, that legitimacy was not a commodity resource - it cannot be possessed or traded; it is rather a condition reflecting perceived congruence with relevant regulations, normative values, or alignment with cultural-

cognitive frameworks, and in many cases, it is observable and noticed only when it is lost. Quoting earlier researchers, Scott describes legitimacy as a link that that gives cognitive validity to more objective constructs such as strategy and goals.

Lounsbury and Glynn (2001), supported also by Humphreys and Brown (2002), add that story-telling is critical in the process of gaining legitimacy. They propose, among other things, that resource capital such as credentials and social connections provides key content for entrepreneurial stories that identify and legitimize the venture. Moreover, affiliation with prestigious elites will enable new entrepreneurial ventures to gain legitimacy more easily. Thus, entrepreneurs have a good incentive to create a narrative that affiliates them with an organisation that already carries an 'ethos' of prestige and success, such as an elite academic institute, elite military unit, or a successful venture. In this same field of research, with similar results, one can also see for example (Navis and Glynn 2011, Martens *et al.* 2016).

Along the same lines, the Israeli situation can be learned from the research by Levy and Sasson-Levy (2008) regarding militarised socialisation. They have found that in Israel the usage of military service as a source of legitimization carries special favour. Since in Israel the majority of the population serves in the army, the legitimization arises not from the service per-se, but rather from serving in a specific unit. This is in line with the findings of Kachtan (2012) which are discussed in the review of military identity. For example, combat military service can be considered as the sole source of legitimization for some of the population in Israeli society; some of it attributed to the fact that some socio-economical back grounds limit these populations' access to elite-technological units. This demonstrates the power of the military service narrative as perceived by Israeli society.

It all boils down to the reasons why an entrepreneur might preserve his identity: because it gives him the legitimacy to establish a culture in a place where there is none, to get resources, to educate the market etc.; so in our case, the Archimedean point is the entrepreneur's previous military service identity and how it legitimises him, internally, to promote the culture he carries from the military. Consequently, again this could be consciously or unconsciously, an entrepreneur is encouraged to build himself a narrative that presents his current entrepreneurial venture as a continuation or as having affinity to his military service; this of course can be supported by demonstrating cultural attributes associated with that military service, e.g. lingo and rituals.

1.6.2. Identity Theory and Social Identity Theory

'Identity Theory', in fact includes two parallel 'grand theories' – 'Identity Theory' (IT) and 'Social Identity Theory' (SIT). For the purposes of this research, both of them are pertinent, hence, both will be discussed here, and that discussion will lead to the section of 'Organisational Identity' (OT) which is of more relevance to this research in the sense that it demonstrates the applicability of the identity theory to organisations, though it is also of rather less importance as this research is focused more on the individual.

It is of interest to compare 'Identity Theory' with 'Social Identity Theory' (see (Hogg *et al.* (1995) and (Stryker and Burke 2000).) Some of their parallel development might be attributed to the fact that the first has its origins in the USA, in sociology disciplines, while the second emerged in Europe from psychology disciplines, and they were based on different agendas. As with the discussion of culture, some of the differences between these two theories may be attributed to the disciplinary roots of the researchers that established them: IT takes the point of view of psychology, and SIT that of sociology. The confusion between the two theories is understandable, and some have tried to unify them into a 'grand' identity theory (c.f. Reid and Deaux (1996), Deaux (2000), and Turner (2013).) A typical approach for unifying (keeping in mind I have not presented them yet) is depicting identity as a layered model (Turner 2013) occupied by identity levels from core identity, through social identity, group identity, and role identity. Though the concept of layers makes sense to a casual observer of identity theories, and seems of interest to this study, it seems that most researchers adhere to their own fields of research. Thus, there is a review of the two most prominent theories that bear the identity title.

In section 1.4 I will discuss Goffman's total institution theory. As a premonition, it is of interest to note that in 1956, shortly before, and probably parallel to Goffman publishing his seminal 'Asylum' (Goffman 1957, 1961), he studied the topic of identity theory before it was coined as a grand theory (Goffman 1956, 1959). From the point of view of this research a question of interest is whether different types of military service, exhibiting different levels of organisational totality (to be discussed in the next section), result in retirees' adopting a military command organisational group identity (which can be related to that group culture or 'ethos'); are there empirical results that support the suggestion that at some point the individual assimilates his group (military) identity and prefers it to his own personal identity, at least from some perspectives of his existence, even when it is logically not for his benefit?

It will be demonstrated in the next paragraph that such a process can take place in total institutions, and more specifically in the army.

1.6.2.1. IDENTITY THEORY

Identity theory (IT) was firstly developed by Stryker, and further developed notably also by McCall and Simmons, Serpe, and Burke (Stryker 1968, 2007, 2008, McCall and Simmons 1978, Stryker and Serpe 1982, Stryker and Burke 2000). IT strives to explain social behaviour in terms of the mutual interactions between the individual self and society. It is based on symbolic interaction theory which dates back to the 1930's (Mead 1934), however, it does not accept the principle which underpins symbolic interaction theory that society is a 'relatively undifferentiated, cooperative whole'; on the contrary, it argues that society is complexly differentiated, but, nevertheless organised (Stryker and Serpe 1982). Some further and more contemporary elaboration on the connection between symbolic interaction and identity theory, trying to reconcile Stryker's reluctance to accept symbolic interaction as a whole, can be found, for example, in Howard (2000), Stryker (2008) and Turner (2013). Because symbolic interaction is also one of the underpinning foundations of culture studies I quote here a synopsis of the symbolic interaction framework that is given by Stryker and Serpe (1982), based on other sources:

- Behaviour depends on a named or classified world; organising the chaos and multitude of stimulations which the environment induces helps in reducing the load on one's senses, absorbing and processing the endless flow of stimuli. The names or class terms attached to aspects of the environment, both physical and social, carry meaning in the form of shared behavioural expectations that grow out of social interaction. From interaction with others, from birth and onwards, one learns how to classify the objects one comes into contact with, and in that process, one also learns how one is expected to behave with reference to those objects.
- Among the class terms learned in interaction are the symbols that are used to designate 'positions', the morphological components of social structure. Positions, which carry shared behavioural expectations, are what are conventionally labelled later on as 'roles' in identity theory.
- Persons who act in the context of organised patterns of behaviour, i.e., in the context of social structure, name one another in the sense of recognizing one another as occupants of positions, and through that express their recognition of both the situation and the

participating parties' positions. When they name one another they also invoke expectations with regard to each other's behaviour.

- Persons acting in the context of organized behaviour, as part of recognising the situation, apply names to themselves as well. These reflexively applied positional designations, which become part of the 'self', create expectations in persons with respect to their own behaviour.
- When entering interactive situations, persons define the situation by applying names to it, to the other participant in the interaction, to themselves, and to particular features of the situation, and use the resulting definitions to organize their own behaviour in the situation; this behaviour includes both the interpretation and action/reaction.
- Social behaviour is not, however, covered by these definitions, though early definitions may constrain the possibilities for alternative definitions to emerge from interaction. Behaviour is the recursive product of a role-making process, initiated by expectations invoked in the process of defining situations but developing through a tentative, sometimes extremely subtle, probing interchange among actors that can reshape the form and content of the interaction, including corrections to both action and perception.
- The degree to which roles are 'made' rather than simply 'played', as well as constituent elements entering the construction of roles will depend on the larger social structures in which interactive situations are embedded. Some structures are 'open', and others are relatively 'closed' with respect to novelty in roles and in role enactments or performances. All structures impose some limits on the kinds of definitions which may be called to play and thus on the possibilities for interaction.
- To the degree that roles are made rather than only played as given, changes can occur in the character or definitions, in the names and the class terms utilized in those definitions, and in the possibilities for interaction. Such changes can in turn lead to changes in the larger social structures within which interactions take place.

Thus, the symbolic interaction process is one of the basic processes that build identity (or 'role' in IT terms) in a never-ending recursive process. IT proposes that the self is a reflection of social complexity and is also both multifaceted and organised. On the empirical side, IT is concerned about the choices made when multiple alternatives courses of action are available, and each of them makes sense of some sort. From that perspective, the components that comprise the complex self are referred to as identities. This multifaceted collection of

identities plays a role in the individual's social behaviour. IT is based on symbolic interaction because it suggests that identities are constructed through interactions with others, where symbolic interaction is a core process. Because individuals tend to socialise in groups, each interaction group constructs a unique identity that reflects the role of the individual in that particular group. These identities are a self-concept that people build as a result of interactions, and they provide meaning and self-definition for the individual which signifies him in the group. Eventually, after enough interactions, when the identity is structured and stable, some social interactions become reflexive.

Identity theory is also related to Personality Theory, however, this connection follows IT rather than precedes it (c.f. Roberts and Donahue (1994), and Stryker (2007).)

In comparison with symbolic interaction theory, Identity Theory focuses more on the self-defining roles people play in society (Hogg *et al.* 1995) rather than the spectrum of possible social attributes that are available for self-ascription (for example, gender, sexual preference, ethnicity, class, age etc.) In many cases these attributes override other personal characteristics and these were classified by Stryker as 'master statuses', because they do not bring about predictable behavioural aspects, rather they have an indirect impact on role identities because they affect the individual's positioning in society. IT asserts that *"identities are ordered in a salience hierarchy, defined as the likelihood that an identity will be invoked in a variety of situations"* (Stryker 2008). Identities with higher hierarchy are more likely to be invoked in a certain situation. Moreover, identities which are higher on the hierarchy scale are more closely related to behaviour.

Hence, the self is constructed by a set of role-identities, which will be as numerous as the groups that an individual is part of. These identities will typically be ambiguous, and seldom can a 'pure' identity be identified because rarely is there a purely defined situation where one role identity prevails. Another term introduced by IT is 'commitment'. Commitment is conceived as ties to the social networks that constructed the identity (Stryker 2007); *"Commitment is measured by the costs of giving up meaningful relationships with others should persons pursue an alternative course of action in situations in which they are expected to play out a role in a given network."* IT hypothesizes that commitment is the source of the salience and the importance attached to given identities. Additionally, some more interesting hypotheses arise from that concept which will come into play later on in the research (Stryker and Serpe 1982), the more relevant ones are:

- The greater the commitment premised on an identity, the more salient that identity will be, the more positively evaluated it will be, and the more self-esteem will be based on that identity.
- The more salient an Identity, the more likely the performance role will be consistent with the expectations attached to that identity.
- The greater the commitment, the more salient the identity will be, and the greater the impact of role performance on role-specific self-esteem and on general self-esteem.
- The more a given network of relationships is premised on a particular identity, as against other identities that may also enter that network, the more salient that identity will be.

Furthermore, Stryker (2007) asserts that identities are not situation specific; people carry them all the time, apply them in a diverse range of situations, and they always impact upon the course of conduct.

1.6.2.2. SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY

Social Identity Theory (SIT) is also one of the 'grand' theories of the social sciences, and it focuses on intergroup relations. Later on it also developed into self-categorisation, and influenced topics such as group-cohesion and motivation (Capozza and Brown 2000), as well as triggering a considerable amount of discussion and research (c.f. Taylor *et al.* 1983, Ellemers *et al.* 1998, Hennessy and West 1999, Terry *et al.* 1999, Van Hiel and Mervielde 2002, Hong *et al.* 2004, Van Der Zee *et al.* 2004, Hagger and Chatzisarantis 2006, Ashforth *et al.* 2008) in many fields, from politics, through sports, to organisational behaviour and many others. It started its initial formulation as a 'theory of intergroup conflict' in the 1970s, and has been extended and refined ever since. It was first introduced by Henri Tajfel and John Turner following Tajfel's group experiments (that were triggered by his experience as a Jewish survivor of World War II.) In his experiments (c.f. Tajfel *et al.* 1971) he pointed to the fact that people sometimes behave as group members rather than as individuals. The concept of social identity is defined as (Tajfel 1974): *"that part of an individual's self-concept which derives from his knowledge of his membership of a social group (or groups) together with the emotional significance attached to that membership".* Over time the powerful impact of people's social identities on their perceptions, emotions, and behaviour has been demonstrated time and again in research (c.f. Kwon *et al.* 2012, Aguirre-Rodriguez *et al.* 2014, Le Hénaff *et al.* 2015).

Ellemers and Haslam (2012) explain its core premise that in many social situations people think of themselves and others as group members, rather than as unique individuals. The theory

argues that social identity underpins intergroup behaviour, and focuses on social context as the key determinant of self-definition and behaviour. People's reactions are appreciated in terms of subjective beliefs about different groups and the relations between them. Thus, SIT tries to explain how and why people adopt social identity over personal identity. SIT addresses these three main issues: the psychological processes, the identities management and socio-structural characteristics.

The psychological processes explain how people's social identities are different from their personal identities, which is an interesting issue from the perspective of this research. Individuals are clustered into groups by a process of 'social categorisation'. It is a functional process that takes place in complex social situations. It helps in organizing environmental social information, and understanding and predicting situations and behaviours. It is done basically by grouping individuals into a cluster based on some 'group-defining' attributes which differentiate them in some way. One result of the process is a focusing on similarities rather than differences between individuals, professions, religions, skin colours etc. The characterisation is dominated by a 'social comparison' process which subjectively interprets group features and marks them as 'good' or 'bad' relative to other groups. A by-product of the process is that (Ellemers and Haslam 2012, p. 382) (emphasis by the author):

> *"…when specific features are associated with a social group, or when these features are valued in a certain way,* ***the process of social identification determines how this reflects upon the self****. This can either imply that the self is identified with that group and presumably shares its characteristic features, or lead to the conclusion that the self is distinct from that group and its features. Importantly,* ***social identification*** *not only refers to the cognitive awareness that one can be included in a particular group, but* ***also incorporates the emotional significance of that group membership for the self*** *(Tajfel 1974).* ***To the extent that people care about the groups they belong to (i.e., ingroups), they will be motivated to emphasize the distinct identity of those groups, and to uphold, protect, or enhance the value afforded to those groups and their members****."*

Identities management According to Tajfel (1978), as one is associated (by oneself) with a group, one is motivated to amplify the positive distinctiveness of that group. This results, for example, in the members' of high-status groups' tendency to protect their status. On the opposite side, members of devalued groups (e.g. immigrants) seek to move themselves out of the group by, for example, acquiring a lucrative education or profession. Other methods used to mitigate dissonance are putting the focus on another feature of the group, e.g. comparing

friendliness rather than wealth, or giving a devalued group an opposite characteristic, e.g. 'black is beautiful'. Alleviation of another type is by associating the group with other groups with somewhat similar features, but considered more valued, e.g. comparing the status of migrants' groups with each other rather than the hosting society.

Socio-structural characteristics SIT addresses the circumstances under which individuals are predicted to follow a mitigation strategy for social identity movement or improvement. Some options are not available, e.g. in a military environment your military command is rather fixed, changes in rank are set according to rules, etc. Specifying the key characteristics of the social structure allows one to determine which of these strategies is most likely to be used in any given case.

Tajfel and Turner (1979) maintain that, naturally:

> *"1. Individuals strive to achieve or to maintain positive social identity, 2. Positive social identity is based to a large extent on favorable comparisons that can be made between the in-group and some relevant out-groups: the in-group must be perceived as positively differentiated or distinct from the relevant out-groups, and 3. When social identity is unsatisfactory, individuals will strive either to leave their existing group and join some more positively distinct group and/or to make their existing group more positively distinct."*

Thus, Tajfel and Turner (1979) identified the following three core predictions, based on empirical findings, regarding SIT (mainly quoted from Ellemers and Haslam (2012)):

1. To the extent that individuals internalize group membership as a meaningful aspect of their self-concept, they will strive to make favourable comparisons between this group and relevant outgroups, in order to achieve or maintain a positive social identity. Actually, this means that the members of that group will devalue other groups, building an internal 'superiority' paradigm.

2. As a result, social categorization can be sufficient to stimulate intergroup discrimination and inter-group conflict.

3. The search for positive social identity may take different forms (see the second point above), depending on consensual definitions of social reality that relate to socially shared justifications and perceived cognitive alternatives to current status relations (and their dynamics).

Ashforth and Mael (1989) count some factors that may support increasing tendency identification: distinctiveness, even negatively devalued, of the group's practices and beliefs, prestige that affects self-esteem, and, of course, the factors that helped the creation of the group in the first place - interpersonal interaction, shared goals or threats, common history, etc.

Interestingly, as Ellemers and Haslam (2012) point out, even small scale studies on SIT have produced a 'mere categorisation' effect, which is the phenomenon of individuals thinking about themselves and others in terms of 'us' and 'them' (them referring to the ingroup.) That effect is a very good theoretical explanation of why people favour candidates who belong to their group (a common practice obvious to all and readily understood by laymen…). This explains the crystallisation of people with common backgrounds, which in this case translates to shared categorisation, into entrepreneurship kernels.

Some criticism related to SIT is that it homogenises an 'all about' categorization, assuming that all identities are driven by the same principles, and overlooks, for example, moderating factors that may affect an individual's behaviour such as boundary conditions of the group or the individual. Social identities might differ from one another in the level of centrality, their being collective or individual by nature, their desirability and status, and the degree to which an identity is attributed or achieved.

In other words, the main criticism is that SIT is in some way an over-simplification of the 'real environment' which is more complicated. SIT was developed over time (Deaux *et al.* 2000) to also address the self-structure of individuals, as they are defined by categorical memberships, and the relationship of the individual to the broader social structure. In fact, some of the extensions echo the co-existence of SIT and IT and try to bridge them.

1.6.2.3. ORGANISATIONAL IDENTITY

Organisational Identity (OI) is a term closely related to, and sometimes used interchangeably or in conjunction with, organisational culture. The concept was introduced in a seminal work by Albert and Whetten (1985, Whetten 2006) who questioned whether the concept of 'identity' can be metaphorically projected onto an organisation. They maintained that organisational identity can be regarded as a distinct variation of Identity Theory, and defined it as a set of statements that organisation members perceive to be **central**, **distinctive** and **enduring** in their organization, to answer questions such as "Who are we?" "What are we doing?" "What do we want to be in the future?" In much later papers, Cornelissen and others

(2002, 2005, Cornelissen *et al.* 2007) questioned the use of the identity concept as a metaphor and argued that the use of the identity metaphor concept (any metaphor for that matter) may smuggle hidden or unconscious assumptions into organisational theory from its domain of origin

In the same vein, Dutton, Dukerich and Harquail (Dutton and Dukerich 1991, Dutton et al. 1994) developed a model that explains how images of one's work organization shape the strength of his or her identification with the organization. The model starts with the notion that the images that members hold of their work organizations are unique to each member. As a consequence, an individual's values and beliefs may or may not match the collective organisational ones. In addition, each member's own construal of the organization's external image may or may not match the reputation of the organization in the minds of outsiders. This is interesting from the point of view of this research because at least one investigated population, of air-force retirees, stated that at drafting time they held a negative image of the organisation. When an organisation's members interpret the external organisational image as devalued and unfavourable, they may experience negative personal symptoms such as depression and stress. These could lead to undesirable organizational outcomes, such as increased competition among members or reduced effort on long-term tasks. The suggested model includes many connections between the organisation's image and the strength of members' identity. From the point of view of this research, the most interesting points are the cases where the organisation's image is negative and the forces operate in opposite directions (e.g. when the organisation's image is very distinct which strengthens identification, but it is negative, which lessens identification.) Interestingly, I shall demonstrate later on that the results of the socialisation process for that population might be quite the opposite. This might be attributed to the aspect of developing a categorisation identity that relates to belonging to a group that shares the common stigma of being devalued. Since in all the cases studied the result seems to be a strengthened identification with the organisation, it hints that the image of the organisation changes to a more moderated or positive one, and it might be that the external image is replaced by an internal image. This process might be attributed to a socialisation process such as total institution to be discussed later on.

OI can be looked at as an interpretation of personal or social identity when applied to organisational behaviour. OI was discussed in literature as early as the 1960's and 70's, but without the theoretical framework, crystallised later on by works such as Tajfel's social

identity theory, which made it more coherent. Since it mainly discusses the question of 'who are we' rather than 'who am I (inside the organisation)' it is closer in its terms and framework to social identity theory (SIT). Nevertheless, there is some discussion based on identity theory (IT) or an interplay between the two (Hatch and Schultz 2002, Sveningsson and Alvesson 2003). Since, as will be discussed shortly in this section, organisational identity as well as culture has the habit of taking over the individual's identity (which underpins the topic of this research), through frameworks such as total institution, which was discussed earlier in paragraph 1.4, it deserves a specific review.

Continuing the line of Albert and Whetten, Ashforth and Mael (1989) also assert that the individual's organisation may provide one possible answer to the question 'who am I?' which is one of the possible other answers - stemming from other categorisation groups as suggested by Social Identity Theory, or multiple role layers as suggested by Identity Theory. Through social identification, the individual is indirectly beneficial of the successes and status of the group. It should be noted that social identity is multi-layered and is derived not only from the organisation but also from the sub-organisation workgroup, or department, labour union and even lunch-group (c.f. Hennessy and West 1999). Also, according to SIT in general, identification and internalisation of group behaviour, goals, behaviour etc. are not necessarily the same. The relevance of SIT to organisations is threefold, according to Ashforth and Mael:

- Individuals tend to choose activities congruent with salient aspects of their identities; hence, it is likely that identification with an organisation should enhance support for and commitment to it.
- Social identification supports intragroup cohesion, cooperation, positive evaluations of the group, loyalty, adherence to group values and behaviour.
- Social identification, in a positive feedback manner, reinforces the distinctiveness of the organisation's values, practices, prestige etc.

These have an effect on the socialisation processes that take place in organisations, intergroup relations, and conflicts between the multitude of roles occupying the individual's personality and determining the order of precedence and dominance. Furthermore, Albert *et al.* (2000) maintain that answers to the question 'who are we?' or 'who am I?', even preliminary ones, are essential for effective interaction with the environment, similarly to individuals, and that makes this construct such a powerful one, especially as the environment becomes more

dynamic and complex. Moreover, they assert that of no less importance is the answer to the question 'who are they?'

Czarniawska (1997), following some of Morgan's (2006, 1st. edition 1986) observations, presents the metaphor of the organisation as a 'Super-Person', and that for all practical purposes organisations are like individuals; in that case an organization's identity is equated with what its members believe to be its distinctive, central and enduring characteristics. However, Czarniawska presents this anthropomorphism from an opposing position. Contrarily, Czarniawska claims that this view stems from the instinct to see the individual as a rational institution rather than the other way round. In the same breath, Czarniawska provides an explanation that suggests that although they are different they are also analogous. The analogy lies in the way identities are constructed; from that point of view organisational identities are created not by any action but by a self-narrative (Bruner 1990, note that Bruner uses the term 'Self' rather than 'identity'), in a manner similar to personal autobiography.

In a valued and much quoted body of work, Hatch (Hatch 1993), Hatch and Schultz (1997, 2002) and (Schultz *et al.* 2002) bind together the concepts of organisational culture, identity and image, and develop a dynamic model that describes the inter relations between them:



Figure 5 The Organizational Identity Dynamics Model Downloaded (Hatch and Schultz 2002)

In the same vein as Ashforth and Mael (Ashforth and Mael 1996), who claim that organizational identity orientation is distinct from organizational culture in that it is more purely cognitive and goes into the core of what the organisation *is* and what defines it, this model puts some order into the relations between the closely related concepts of culture, identity and image, which they visualise as a Babel Tower of terms, defining their different properties and suggesting the inter-relations between them. Organisational culture is a broader concept, concerning all the aspects of an organisation's explicit and implicit conduct,

while identity involves how we define and experience ourselves (who we are?); and therefore, it is less overlapping and more influenced by our activities and beliefs, which, as discussed herein above, are part of the cultural framework. What we care about and do defines us to ourselves and thereby, to some extent, it forges our identity in relation to our culture. While identity is used to interpret the environment, it is reinforced or changed while applying deep cultural standpoints. In the opposite direction, identity is back-embedded into cultural understandings. Hatch and Schultz describe this process as *"the process by which organisational members understand and explain themselves as an organization."* Ashforth *et al.* (2008) suggest, based on a literature and research survey, that lately, as individuals are hired to perform specific tasks, looking at the multitude of identities constructing the self, individuals' identification is turning more and more away from organisations towards occupations and careers. In simple words – individuals identify themselves in terms of their occupations or careers rather than as employees of some organisation; thus, the organisation's identity is less 'inherited' by employees.

1.6.2.4. MILITARY IDENTITY

The case of military identity is similar to organisational identity – a mixture and interchange between identity and culture. Most literature discusses the broader aspect of 'culture' rather than 'identity' and that topic has already been elaborated upon above. Interestingly, most of that literature deals with how the peculiar military identity is acquired upon drafting, and what happens to it after retirement. Because this mainly relies on the total institution, this will be discussed in detail in the next section. Measuring military identity is rather heuristic, like identity in general; this relates largely to Moskos' military service model described in para. 1.3. Such is the case presented by Johansen *et al.* (2013) who suggested measuring idealism, professionalism, warriorism and individualism as dimensions of military identity.

Militaries have always kindled and nurtured their identities. This is of small wonder, since militaries by nature strive to mobilise people, draft them in many cases against their will, to do things that defy their initial basic values and beliefs, and sometimes endanger their lives. Identity is one of the tools militaries use to enhance cohesion, morale and motivation and through them performance. The military needs to win the continuous conflict between the personal interest of survival and the benefit of the group; identity is one of the tools used for that purpose.

The discussion of military identity goes back to historical eras: classical references include, for example, the famous military identity of the Sparta city-state in ancient Greece. Another example from historical times is the Roman army in Britain in the fourth century A.D. (Gardner 1999). Gardner points to the formation of unitary identities, which may be attributed, for example, to changes in *"recruitment patterns, in supply mechanisms, in status differentiation within the army, and in the relationship between the army in a province and the people of that province."* This resulted in military units identifying more with the community they live within than with the larger community of the army, which is notable in some units, based in a particular place for a long time.

Military identity is traceable also later on in time in Renaissance military memoirs (Harari 2004), however the conflict between personal and social identity appears less severe, the individual more as a 'man of war'. It is noted that in Renaissance times, armies were not harmonious, and soldiers were very independent-minded; so identity was more tied to occupation than to a specific force, or a 'collective', something that resembles the medieval knights' codes.

It seems from a survey of the literature that almost every army looks for its own identity. In Mexico, for example (Deare 2000), for many decades, up to the 2000's, the army had been a part of the political system; after a change of regime, the army started to look for another way of defining itself and bilateral relations with society, and even between commands inside the army.

In Scotland (Strachan 2006), as a part of the United Kingdom, people, especially from the Highlands, were always considered warriors and since the 18th century this has been manifested in British wars. British military identity took root at that point in history when the crowns of England and Scotland were unified. However, within the British army, the regiments from Scotland have a Scottish identity rather than the county (Scottish, but not regimental) based identity that characterises the English regiments. It is of interest to note that although historically within the British army the Scottish units are marked as such, outside of Britain, and especially in battle, they identify with the British Unionist nationality and have proven to be ultra-loyal. The success of the Scottish identity was such that faux Scottish units were formed in Australia, New Zealand, South Africa and India, with fabricated Scottish identity, including pipes and skirts. The English units, on the other hand, were identified by their county origin, following a re-organisation in the late 19th century called the Cardwell–Childers

Reforms, which are discussed in detail by French (2005). The reforms renamed the numbered regiments and each of these regiments was linked by the headquarters' location and territorial name to its local 'Regimental District' whence its conscripts came.

Devaluation of the prestige of military service is described by Martins Filho and Zirker (2000) as affecting the identity of the military and giving rise to nationalistic and defensive discourses. An example is the case of the British army in Palestine during World War I (Bar-Yosef 2001, Kitchen 2014), which borrowed its identity from the crusaders of the 10th and 11th centuries. Veterans of that period named their memoirs: 'Khaki Crusaders', 'Temporary Crusaders', 'The Modern Crusaders' and others, although it is not clear how this was explicitly demonstrated.

The Russian army's identity and culture are discussed by Baev (2002) in relation to a decline in military service prestige which is also related to changes in the political scene and, similar to the case of the Mexican army, the detachment of the military from being a part of the political system (which previously created a 'state-within-a-state'.)

Military academies are depicted in Visser's Survey of archival documents (Visser 2002), with a special historical review of the military academy of the South African defence forces (SANDF) after the establishment of the new political dispensation. The academy initially had a negative identity and a lack of credibility mainly due to factors such as, for example, the lack of credibility of its degree studies; a lack of premises; a focus on Afrikaner identity etc. To reverse that identity the academy tried to copy the conduct of leading military academies such as West Point and Sandhurst, and market itself as a unique high-level academic institute.

An interesting account of US military identity is presented first hand by Burgos (2004), who was in active service in Iraq during his academic career, and this triggered articles in reaction. Burgos claims, for example, that the identity of the US army in the case of Iraq is that of a liberator rather than an occupier. Some argue that Burgos' observation testifies that *"the army has become staunchly Republican and conservative"* and that it sees itself as *"separate from and superior to society at large"* (Holsti 2004), and hold this against the army rather than claiming it to be to its benefit. While it is not surprising that military personnel tend to judge their organisation beneficially, as would many other organisations' members do, they do consider themselves as superior to civilian society.

In the Israeli army (the IDF), identity seems to lie more with the corps, and even with specific units like a brigade/regiment, or even a specific battalion, flotilla or air wing (Harari 2004). This is also supported by field research into infantry units (Kachtan 2012). By using grounded

theory, she found that *"the brigade culture as presented by the soldiers was the most significant and influential"*, more than ethnicity, religion and military identity in general. Note that the research uses identity and culture interchangeably. The soldiers themselves equated this choice of identity to being a fan of a specific sports club.

As a more specific example, that will lead us into the next chapter discussing total institutions, one can look at Bielry's study (1995), again as a fluid interchanging of culture and identity, which gives an example of how a military culture and identity are acquired in the US Navy; based on Trice and Beyer (Trice and Beyer 1993) he describe the classic three stages of acculturation:

- Separation from the 'old' culture,
- Transition as the 'new' culture is learned,
- Incorporation into the new culture as a legitimate member

These stages are accomplished by applying total institution methods, as will be discussed shortly, and results in converging, hopefully, into the desirable adaptation mode.

1.7. LIMITATIONS OF LITERATURE AND SUMMARY OF RESEARCH GAPS

The preceding review of the theoretical foundations on which this work relies reveal several limitations, some regarding theoretical aspects and some relating to methodology.

Firstly, although the field of organisational culture is well established and its importance is widely agreed upon, the research and modelling of the connection between culture and performance, and between management demography and culture (and hence on performance) is on-going. There is a drift of researchers towards research that looks for a good practical use of the understandings that have been achieved by now in the field of organisational culture. Hofstede, for example, has recently updated his cultural dimensions model and added more insights which had been overlooked before (Hofstede et al. 2010). Hambrick updated his Upper Echelon model (Hambrick 2007), admitting that the original model needed augmentation. This is partially a reaction to the ambiguous results that come out in various pieces of research which reflect both the complexity of the cultural topics, the inter-dependence of variables and the lack of clarity between cause and effect that makes culture related models incomplete almost by definition. The ambiguous results emerging from empirical studies manifest the multifaceted nature of culture even in the limited realm of

organisational research; the vagueness of the distinction between cause and effect and the recursive process of creating culture and identity.

The complexity and vastness of theory, which has been recognised (Martin 2002a, Sackmann 2007), also leads to diversity, even opposing and contradictory, research methodologies. Thus, it is difficult to compare the results of research as it hinders the peer reviewing process that is at the heart of scientific progress. One finds it difficult to establish stable conclusions on which further assumptions and further research can be safely formed.

Secondly, the more specific field of management background influence delivers inconsistent indications regarding the connection between management background and performance. Some of this may be attributed to the vagueness of the concept of performance (which is also cultural by nature and normative), and some of this might be ascribed to a lack of observability in the sociological and psychological/cognitive processes by which background is imprinted in humans, and the processes that are used to disseminated that imprint in current situations. Although modelling exists to describe these processes (Hambrick and Mason 1984, Schein 2004 and many more), which are akin also to leadership research, many studies use secondary artefact indicators (e.g. climate in lieu of culture) and use congruence theory to justify this approach; though this is somewhat problematic (Lawrence 1997). The models still remain at a high level of abstraction.

Thirdly, there is no clear-cut methodology best suited for examining the subject which is the focus of this work. As a matter of fact, there is a growing trend of combining quantitative and qualitative methods (mixed methods/multiple methods), which is supported theoretically by research as early as Schein's, but one wonders if another driver is the inability to reach a consensus among researchers regarding methodology, and overcoming foreseen theoretical objection to research results.

Another major setback is the lack of information regarding the Israeli armed forces, and more specific data regarding the conscripts' detailed backgrounds and post-service information. Some of this is due to security issues (e.g. the order of battle), and some of it simply does not exist or is heavily biased towards the public relations purposes of the military or the industry or other alumnae. However, as demonstrated, Israeli society exhibits broad participation in the armed forces, much higher than, for example, in European countries, thus it can be assumed, for example, that the majority of entrepreneurs have some military experience in their resumes.

The purpose of the above literature review was to expose the field of organisational culture, its paradigms and research toolboxes, and the supporting grand theories, to demonstrate how these might be applied in relation to the military forces, and at the same time to demonstrate the influence of founders' backgrounds on organisational culture. The goal was twofold: one was to demonstrate and explain the diversity in culture in general and military culture in particular, and the second was to substantiate the possible concept that founders' background of military service is reflected in the culture of organisations they found. This should pave the way from generalisation to more focused research.

However, despite an acknowledged relationship between founders and organisations there is only a small body of research regarding founders' backgrounds/demography. Moreover, much of the research is interested in demographic heterogeneity versus the diversity of the founding or management group (introspective and relative point of view) and its influence on organisational aspects (cf. Beckman 2006, Beckman and Burton 2008), and only a few are interested in the actual backgrounds of the management group (extroversive and more absolute) and the influence on the same organisational issues (cf. Williams *et al.* 2000, Ding 2011). So, research relating to the relationship between cultural diversity and founders' backgrounds/demographic diversity is scarce, and in relation to particular background aspects, other than education it is virtually non-existent. The interest of this research' is military background, but other connections might also be of interest (e.g. religion, family aspects such as being an only child, etc.). On the practical side there are a few research methodologies that have been tested and proven and can be used as a golden standard.

This works strives to extend the theoretical basis of how the demographic backgrounds of founders influence organisations through studying the case of the influence of military service in Israel on organisational culture.

2. RESEARCH QUESTION, FRAMEWORK, AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

2.1. RESEARCH CONTEXT – ISRAELI ARMED FORCES AND BUSINESS DEMOGRAPHY

The Israeli armed forces – IDF (Israel Defence Force) totals 176,500 personnel and an additional 7,650 personnel serve in the border patrol which is considered a part of the police force (Shapir 2012). Most of the Jewish and Druze population is subject to compulsory drafting at the age of 18 (Wikipedia). Both sexes are obligated to complete military service – 32 months for men and 24 months for women. What follows is a brief review of the IDF order of battle. Some of it is based on public domain sources and some are calculated guesses and they are explained where needed. In some cases, there is no basis for estimation so they are left open. This the latest available estimated number of personnel in the armed forces, with internal composition of forces:

Personnel (regular)	**2014 (Shapir 2012, updated 2014)**	**2016 (IISS 2016)**
Ground Forces	133,000	133,000
Air Force	34,000	34,000
Navy	9,500	7,000
Total	176,500	174,000
Border Patrol	7,650	8,000
Total	184,150	182,000

This is a concise development of the armed forces over time; note that a) the total size remains on the same order, b) the size relative to the population slowly decreases and more rapidly relative to labour force size; this is mainly due to budgetary cuts that diminishes the size of the professional army, and probably also aging of the total population.

Year	1991	1994	1997	2000	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2014	2016	2017
Military size [k]	141	176	175	173.5	168	168	168.3	168	176.5	176.5	176.5	176.5	174	NA
Population [M]	5.06	5.47	5.99	6.29	6.78	6.93	7.12	7.24	7.34	7.55	7.70	8.35	8.52	8.63
Military Size Relative to Population [%](IISS 2016)	2.8	3.2	2.9	2.8	2.5	2.4	2.4	2.3	2.4	2.3	2.3	2.1	2.0	
Military Size Relative to Labour Force [%][14]	9.38	7.88	7.15	6.52	5.85	5.70	5.83	5.67	5.56	5.41	5.28	4.85	4.66	4.42

[14] Based on The World Bank and IISS data 2017

To enhance the details, here are the author's estimations of corps' sizes and their reasoning:

Corps/Command	Personnel
Air Force	34,000[15]
Navy	9,500[16]
Intelligence	10,000[17]
MAMRAM	2,000[18]
Signals-Corps	5,000[19]
Infantry	20,000[20]
Armoured Corps	20,000[21]
Artillery Corps	15,000[22]
Field Intelligence Corps	5,000[23]
Combat Service Support	?
Homefront Command	?
Combat Military Engineering	?
Medical Corps	?
Military Police	?
Regional Commands	?

It can be seen that the air force comprises about 20% of the armed forces and is significantly larger than all the other commands.

[15] INSS report
[16] INSS report
[17] (Gilad and Orbach 2012, Orpaz 2014), it is headed by a Brigadier General so this is an approximated size
[18] Computing centre headed by a Colonel (Orpaz 2012)
[19] Estimation without sources
[20] 5 Brigades (according to INSS), each NATO brigade is 3200-5500 personnel (Wikipedia)
[21] 4 Brigades (according to INSS), an armoured brigade is typically larger than an infantry brigade
[22] 3 Regiments (according to INSS)
[23] 1 Brigade (according to INSS)

Comparison with some European countries for 2014 (data is from Wikipedia, and includes paramilitary forces):

Country	Total Population	Total Armed Forces (including Gendarmeries)	Percentage of Armed Forces in the Total Population
Israel	8,300,000	184,000	2.2%
Poland	38,500,000	120,000	0.31%
France	67,000,000	313,000	0.47%
UK	64,500,000	157,000	0.24%
Czech Republic	10,500,000	28,500	0.27%
Italy	61,000,000	279,800	0.46%
Hungary	9,900,000	29,700	0.30%
Slovakia	5,400,000	16,300	0.30%
Spain	46,500,000	204,700	0.44%
Lithuania	2,900,000	15,600	0.54%



Figure 6 - Percentage of Armed Forces in the Total Population



Figure 7 - Size of Armed Forces vs. Size of Population

It can be seen from Figure 7 that the size of the armed forces relative to the population is less than half a percent while in Israel it is about 2.25 percent of the population.

This outlier can also be seen in Figure 7. Other significant outliers are the UK and Poland, but in opposite directions.

As a benchmark for entrepreneurship in Israel, one might use the census provided by the Israeli Bureau of Statistics (Weissman and Schwartz 2014, 2015). According to this data, in 2016 more than 55,000 new businesses were established in Israel (53,000 in 2015, 48,000 in 2014, 46,000 in 2013). Of the new business, about 60% have no employees at all and 30% employ 4 employees or less (see Figure 8 below):



Figure 8 - Distribution of number of employees per new venture in Israel

The most popular type of new business venture started yearly in Israel is in the category of Professional, scientific and technical activities (category M of UN's classifications, Rev.4 (*International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities* 2008)), see Figure 9 below):



Figure 9 - Business Births in Israel by Industry (2016)

Since many of the reviewed ventures surveyed in this research belong to the Class M category, it is of interest to look at employee sizes distribution:



Figure 10 - Distribution of number of employees per new venture in professional, scientific and technical activities in Israel (2014 (upper), 2016 (lower))

Employee' distribution used to differ a little from the norm, and it seems that entrepreneurs tended to be more like 'lone wolves' than typical entrepreneurs. In 2016 the statistics of the technological category almost equalled the general distribution. The author's assumption is that some of this can be attributed to changes in taxation, policy changes, which made it less profitable to establish 'wallet-companies.'[24] In the past, some 'no-employees' companies

[24] Wallet-companies are one-man companies created by high income workers in order to exploit taxation benefits as a business rather than as an employee

were not actual companies, which biased the data for earlier years. The fact remains that in many startups with technical activities, such as certain software ventures, no assistance is really needed to start an operation:

	2014		2016	
Number of employees	Ventures in general	Professional, scientific and technical activities	Ventures in general	Professional, scientific and technical activities
None	60%	73%	58%	58%
1-4	30%	23%	32%	33%
5-9	6%	3%	6%	5%
10-19	3%	1%	3%	2%
20+	1%	Negligible	1%	1%

According to these statistics, about 89% of new businesses survive their first year of operation, and about 35% survive at least 10 years of operation (this is a drop relative to 2014 with 91% and 46% accordingly). As mentioned above, out of the *operating* businesses in Israel, the largest section is professional, scientific and technical activities (as of 2016 - 16% of the total business, category M of the UN's classifications, Rev.4 (*International Standard Industrial Classification of All Economic Activities* 2008)), and of these businesses almost 50% survive at least 10 years of activity. Interestingly, the portion of this sector seems to have diminished somewhat, but as explained it is probably not real diminishing but a bias correction to tax regulations.

A few more demographic statistics to enhance the data about entrepreneurship in Israel, taken from Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (Zusman and Atar 2016):



Figure 11 - Population of New Businesses According to Marital Status (2012)



Figure 12 - Age Demography of Owners of New Businesses in Israel (2012)

2.2. RESEARCH QUESTION AND FRAMEWORK

As elaborated upon above, there is a consensus regarding the influence of founders on organisations, and organisational culture (**OC**) in particular. A number of useful models have been developed to describe the processes and mechanisms which reflect the effect of founders' backgrounds on the organisations that they create (cf. Schein (1983, 1991a, 2004), Martin (1992, 2002a), Deal and Kennedy (2000), Morgan (2006), Ogbonna and Harris (2001), and many more). It is a well-supported claim that founders' cognition, perception, values, working habits and methods are influenced by numerous primary and secondary agents; however, only limited research specifically focusing on the effect of founders' backgrounds exists.

The main question I raise is **how the founders' military service influence OC**? I argue that service personnel who might later on become entrepreneurs carry a **'watermark'** that remains from their service's culture and that it contributes to forming the **imprints** that they subsequently leave on the culture of the organisations that they found. The purpose of this study is to test my argument and look for evidence of the imprints that retirees carry over to their enterprises. I aim to investigate organisational cultural imprints, might they be manifested functionally or symbolically, explicit or implicit, that might be traced back to previous service in various military commands (navy, infantry, intelligence, etc.) For example:

- Do they relate or reference themselves to their military background?

- Do they use methods similar to ones they used in their service to plan, manage, organise their venture?
- How do they do business?
- Do they confine themselves to topics they dealt with in their service?
- With whom they prefer to do business with?

This study also examines founders' narratives and their businesses' characteristics in order to discover whether links between diversity in military culture and diversity in OCs exist, and if so what are they, and what might be the causes of that link: is it a reflection of the total institution mitigation type that results in resocialisation and the adoption of military identity or a conscious search for legitimacy?

2.3. RESEARCH METHODS FOR MEASURING ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE DIMENSIONS

As is very noticeable from the previous chapter, the research approach and research methodology in the case of organisational culture are closely related to the point that when choosing a research approach, one chooses its related methodology by default and excludes other methodologies. In a nutshell, the purpose of this chapter is to present and clarify the protracted rivalry between the main paradigms of culture research in general and particularly organisational culture. This is the basis upon which the research method is selected. The main fundamental methodologies are qualitative and quantitative research and combinations thereof. Each of them represents a scientific point of view and a set of arguments to justify its use and reject its counterpart. I will try to follow the two main paradigms that some researchers converge into the forming of a third paradigm which tries to take the best of both – a hybrid/multidimensional methodology.

2.3.1. METHODOLOGY FRAMEWORK

As a first step I will try to localise the basic framework of this research in the Burrell and Morgan's (Burrell and Morgan 1979a, Morgan and Smircich 1980, Smircich 1983) classic four paradigms conceptualisation of social research. Burrell and Morgan maintain that within the theorists of sociology the methodological debate is basically between two poles of two mutually exclusive paradigms: either subjective or objective point of view, and whether one looks for regulation or irregulation. Over time these debates led mainly to a conflict between interpretive and functionalist perspectives; from the point of view of culture these naturally

came hand in hand with the interpretive versus functionalist conception of culture that was already discussed (1.1 powyżej).



Figure 13 - Four paradigms for the analysis of social theory (Burrell and Morgan 1979a)

For a long time, since early 20' century the functionalist paradigm dominated the sociology framework; it is *"characterised by a concern for providing explanations of the status quo, social order, consensus, social integration, solidarity, need satisfaction and actuality. It approaches these general sociological concerns from a standpoint which tends to be realist, positivist, and determinist."* (Burrell and Morgan 1979a, p. 26).

In my opinion this was led by the tendency for 'scientific rational management' which was amplified by business schools, mainly in the US, which led to search for 'objective' positivist methods for analysis and assessment of organisations, with a preference for the organisations' point of view over the organisations' members point of view. The search for functionality led to quantitative research methods favoured by many, as will be elaborated in the following chapter. Over time this paradigm proved to be far less than complete and interpretive paradigm rooted in anthropology researchers such as Geertz (1973b), which also tends to consider the organisation as a continuing sociological process, returned to be considered; this in turn gave rise to qualitative research methods which will be elaborated upon later on. The interpretive paradigm strives *"to understand the world as it is, to understand the fundamental nature of the social world at the level of subjective experience. It seeks explanation within the realm of individual consciousness and subjectivity."* (Burrell and Morgan 1979a, p. 28).

A more elaborated description of this conception is depicted by the following figure taken from Ylimaki and Brunner (2011):



Figure 14 - Four paradigm elaboration

The basic question to ask in my opinion is whether the research paradigm standpoint is focused on a sociological process?

Following Smircich (1983), I will try to map this research guidelines over the paradigms standpoints, and this will locate us on the four-paradigm chart, and lead us to the choice of research method (ch. 2.4 poniżej). I have circled on the rulers what represents this research fundamentals:



Network of Basic Assumptions Characterizing The Subjective—Objective Debate within Social Science

	Subjectivist Approaches to Social Science					Objectivist Approaches to Social Science
Core Ontological Assumptions	reality as a projection of human imagination	reality as a social construction	reality as a realm of symbolic discourse	reality as a contextual field of information	reality as a concrete process	reality as a concrete structure
Assumptions About Human Nature	man as pure spirit, consciousness, being	man as a social constructor; the symbol creator	man as an actor; the symbol user	man as an information processor	man as an adaptor	man as a responder
Basic Epistemological Stance	to obtain phenomenological insight, revelation	to understand how social reality is created	to understand patterns of symbolic discourse	to map contexts	to study systems, process, change	to construct a positivist science
Some Favored Metaphors	transcendental	language game, accomplishment, text	theater, culture	cybernetic	organism	machine
Research Methods	exploration of pure subjectivity	hermeneutics	symbolic analysis	contextual analysis of Gestalten	historical analysis	lab experiments, surveys

Figure 15 - Objective versus subjective (Smircich 1983, p. 492)

From a standpoint of core ontological assumptions this research can be roughly typified as assuming the social world as a never-ending process of interactions between human beings, and between humans and their environment. This continuous process creates rule-like following behaviour that is manifested by actions that can be observed. It also assumes that humans are social actors that create their realities by interacting with their peers and creating a shared reality.

Having described these framework baselines it seems that on Burrell and Morgan diagram this study is located as follows:



Figure 16 - Research framework within Burrell and Morgan's paradigm chart

Simply put – this research lies within the realm of the interpretive paradigm.

Here is the place to elaborate some more upon the reasoning behind the various viewpoints of research methods; this will lead us to description of the main research methods, and the method selected as being most fit to this research.

Let us start by following Altman and Baruch's (1998) observation about organisational culture from their point of view as anthropologists:

> *"The use of a cultural typology for organizational analysis has an implicit limitation: culture as a multi-faceted concept, cannot be easily captured by a two-dimensional typology or any other model for that matter (Sackmann 1992). Recall, that even Hofstede's widely acclaimed theory only accounts for 49 per cent of data variance (Hofstede 1991). Grid/Group, as all models go, has only limited explanatory power."*

A study of organisational culture bears within it the risk of shallowness. Barley (1991) observed that when studying organisational culture in general most researchers overstress the superficial symbolic artefacts of culture rather than delving into the core of its interpretive system which are the inner layers of Schein's model.

Schein presents a consistent point of view regarding culture research; in his earlier work (cf. 1991a), while elaborating upon the major methodological approaches regarding culture, he opposes most of them. The *'survey research approach*' (represented, for example, by Hofstede), is objected to. He states that the passion to measure and define culture as a measurable property, forcing the data into a-priori defined dimensions, only actually reflects the outer observable layers of culture, despite their presentation as 'mental models.' In that respect they are no more than 'climate.' Moreover, it implies that all cultures share common attributes which may be distinguishable by their dimensions' magnitude alone. Schein suggests that this approach is erroneous and that cultures are as unique as personalities, and therein lies the power of the 'culture' concept. Schein also criticises the 'analytical descriptive approach' for the same reason of being superficial. Interestingly, Schein's, one of the prominent organisational culture researchers, methodological approach superficially contradicts his paradigmatic functionalistic approach to organisational culture according to Burrell and Morgan rough typology which typically matches functionalistic paradigm with quantitative research methods.

The **'ethnographic approach'** which is based on interviewing informants (cf. Kunda 2006), although thorough, is criticised for its communal view and lack of organisational perspective, as well as its inability to detect cultural aspects unless they are enacted and observable. Schein suggests that culture *"draws on anthropology, sociology, and social psychology, and that reflects*

research methods broader than the traditional ones." Schein urges researchers to put on the helper/consultant hat and use it as another point of view which he terms a 'clinical perspective.' Kunda himself claims that the ethnographical approach is only 'experience-near' and that *"it lacks the distance required of a valid interpretive effort."*

In a later work, Schein (2004, p. 60) repeats the opinion about broadening the view of research methods while giving more weight to the clinical approach: *"In dealing with culture it is necessary to 'triangulate,' using all of the methods available, but the clinical method is central because only by involving the members of the group can one get at their deeper assumptions."* Schein recognises the need for the incorporation of quantitative with qualitative methods for culture research, and that broader view has gained followers as will be demonstrated herein after. More detailed discussion of triangulation methodology may be seen, for example, in (Greene *et al.* 1989, Greene and Caracelli 1993, Martin 2002a, Greene 2006, Creswell and Clark 2007, Creswell 2012, 2013).

Hofstede, (Hofstede et al. (1990); Hofstede (1998)) one of the renowned proponents of the quantitative approach, advocates the validity of the quantitative paradigm by pointing out what, in his opinion, is at the heart of the matter: *"In operational terms, the issue is whether membership in one organization rather than another explains a significant share of the variance in members' answers to questions dealing with culture-related matters. Our hypothesis was that it would."* According to Hofstede, the quantitative approach has the strength to take a culture concept which is actually a gestalt and make it more easily understandable to an outsider (outsiders to that gestalt) by using a framework that makes it more structural. As a practical approach, Hofstede (1998) follows the advice of textbooks (cf., Selltiz et al., 1965; Blalock and Blalock, 1971) which suggest starting with a qualitative orientation and following up with a quantitative verification.

Denison, applying the same rationale, developed his Organizational Culture Survey (Denison 1984, Denison and Mishra 1995) based on grounded theory that evolved into a structured organisational survey whose focus is on cultural attributes that most effect organisational effectiveness. Fey and Denison (2003) demonstrate the usage of that multi-method approach in comparative research applied to foreign-owned companies operating in Russia. Here the mixed method is reversed in order: first quantitative research and then sample case studies are selected based on the empirical tests.

Morgan (2006) takes Schein's point of view further, warning researchers that culture is more than the sum of superficial artefacts that meet the eye. Culture is an evolving sociological

process, and framing it into a reduced set of discrete variables that can be documented is misleading. It is like describing a living scene with stills photography snapshots, which is an abstract imposition. It helps in making sense to an observer but is far from the experience of being part of it.

Johnson and Onwuegbuzie (2004, Onwuegbuzie et al. 2009a, 2009b) – discuss qualitative versus quantitative methodologies in the social sciences in general, and in educational research in particular and they also recommend the use of mixed methods: *"The goal of mixed methods research is not to replace either of … approaches but rather to draw from the strengths and minimize the weaknesses of both in single research studies and across studies."* A common reference to this mixture of methods is a triangulation which comes from geometry to express the ability to fix a point in space by triangulation of its vector towards some other points. Putting quantitative and qualitative findings side-by-side and checking how congruent they are, gives more substance and validity to the research and a deeper understanding of the results.

A series of articles by a group of researchers (Molina-Azorín and Cameron 2010, Cameron and Molina-Azorin 2011, Cameron and Molina-Azorín 2011, Cameron and Quinn 2011) have summarised the reasoning behind using mixed methods- *"A monomethod study uses only one type of method, one quantitative or one qualitative. In general, in a quantitative study, the data is in numerical form and this information is analyzed using quantitative data analysis techniques. In a qualitative study, the information, which is mainly in textual form, is analyzed employing qualitative data analysis techniques. Drawing an initial distinction between monomethod research and multiple methods research may be helpful to determine what is understood as 'mixed methods'. A multiple methods study uses more than one method. Moreover, a differentiation can be made within multiple method designs between multimethod research (multiple qualitative or quantitative methods) and mixed methods research (integration of quantitative and qualitative methods)"* (Creswell and Plano Clark, 2007).

They mention several definitions by researchers regarding mixed methods research:

- Methods that include at least one quantitative method and one qualitative method (Greene *et al.* 1989).
- Methods that combine the qualitative and quantitative approaches into the research methodology of a single study (Tashakkori and Teddlie 1998).
- Methods where the researcher mixes or combines quantitative and qualitative research techniques, methods, approaches, concepts or language into a single study. (Johnson and Onwuegbuzie 2004).

- Methods that combine qualitative and quantitative data collection and data analysis within a single study (Creswell and Clark 2007).

Hurmerinta-Peltomäki and Nummela (2006) surveyed the methods used in international business research. About 15% of them had applied a mixed method strategy. They note that most mixed method studies adhere to a single design, leaving considerable potential for increasing validity and knowledge.

A later literature review conducted by Bryman (2008) came out with an interesting finding that about a quarter of research articles used a mixed method (i.e. triangulation), though no reasoning was given for the selection of that approach. In his words, this may indicate that *"combining quantitative and qualitative research has become something that does not warrant a special discussion. This would imply that mixed methods research has become so integral to the practices of social scientists; the case for employing it does not require special mention."* It seems that mixed methods have come of age.

2.3.2. COMPARISON OF QUANTITATIVE METHODS

Since this research tends towards the comparative, and quantitative methods might be employed, hence it is of interest to follow Sackmann's (2007) comparison between the major quantitative models that are in use for assessing organisational culture. A brief summary of the models' dimensions is given below, as well as a 2-dimentional mapping of the models' main focus (Sackmann 2007).

Fink *et al.* (2005) summarise some of the most important and influential ones, and the methodology behind them, as follows (a thorough comparison may be found at Sackmann (2007)):

Researchers (Sources)	Dependent variable	Independent variables
Kluckhohn/ Strodtbeck (1961)	Human problem solutions	Five Dimensions: • Human Nature Orientation • Man Nature Orientation • Time Orientation • Activity Orientation • Relational Orientation
Hall/ Hall (1990)	Communication at work	Four Dimensions: • Fast and Slow Messages • High and Low Context • Space • Time
Hofstede (1980)	National cultural difference within one organisation	Six Dimensions: • Power Distance • Individualism vs. Collectivism • Masculinity vs. Femininity

		• Uncertainty Avoidance • Long Term vs. Short Term Orientation • Indulgence vs. Restraint
Trompenaars (1993)	Management relevant problem solutions	Seven Dimensions: • Time • Status Achievement/Status Ascription • Individualism/Collectivism • Universalism/Particularism • Emotional/Neutral • Specific/Diffuse • Man Nature Relationship
Schwartz (1992)	Present and future in society	Eleven Dimensions: • Self-Direction • Stimulation • Hedonism • Achievement • Power • Security • Conformity • Tradition • Spirituality • Benevolence • Universalism
GLOBE (2002)	Business leadership present and future	Nine Dimensions: • Performance Orientation • Future Orientation • Assertiveness • Humane Orientation • Gender Egalitarianism • Power Distance • Institutional Collectivism • In-group Collectivism • Uncertainty Avoidance

It seems that there are many defined dimensions which might not be unique, but rather correlated. Thus, it seems of lesser importance which one is chosen unless a special focal topic is studied (e.g. innovation), as was elaborated upon earlier based on the analysis by Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1997).

As can be easily seen there are many quantitative organisational culture models (not all models are presented). The variability stems from a disparity in points of view, in points of interest, in the depth of involvement of the researcher etc. It is also undeniable that some models are a result of commercial interests. As was mentioned earlier, there is some overlapping between the models on the one hand and some gaps on the other hand. Since models arise from the perception of their creators, they are usually biased somewhat towards what interests them, and shed light on some aspects of culture while leaving other aspects in the shadows.

Sackmann (2007) puts some order into the quite chaotic jungle of models, and maps them according to their depth versus their origin (insider's vs. outsider's view) and purpose (understanding vs. intervention), as can be seen in Figure 17 -Figure 19.

Figure 1: Dimensions and culture types (adopted from Sackmann 2002/2004: 45)



Figure 17 - Comparison of quantitative models (Sackmann 2007)

Figure 2a: Methods for assessing corporate culture (1)



Index

AA	Assumptional Analysis (Kilmann 1983)
B&J	Bourgeois & Jemison (1982)
BS	Bertelsmann Stiftung approach to assess culture (2003)
CA	Culture Assessment (Sackmann 2002)
CM/PM	(Burchell & Kolb 2003)
CO	Culture Orientations (Pümpin/ATAG 1984)
CT	Culture Types (Cameron 1984; Cameron & Freeman 1991)
DOCS	Denison Organizational Culture Survey
Ethnography	Based on participant observation (e.g., Van Maanen 1988, 1991)
Hofstede	Hofstede et al. 1990
OASIS	OASIS Culture Questionnaire (University of Michigan/PIMS/ MMZSG)
OCI	Organizational Culture Inventory (Human Synergistics 1989/2002)
OCP	Organizational Culture Profile (O'Reilly et al. 1991)
OCPa	Organizational Culture Profile (Ashkanasy et al. 2000)
OCQ	Organizational Culture Questionnaire (Sackmann 2002)
OI	Organizational Ideologies (Harrison 1975)
ON	Organizational Norms Opinionnaire (Alexander 1978)
ONA	Organizational Narrative Approaches (story-telling, discourse analysis, humor analysis, oral history)
OVQ	Organizational Values Questionnaire (Woodcock & Francis 1989)
RG	Repertory Grid Technique (as used by Malik Management Zentrum St. Gallen)
Schein	Schein's (1985) approach to culture analysis
U&S	Unterreitmeier & Schwinghammer (2004)
VC	Value Culture (Deep White: Herrmann et al. 2004)
VdP	Organizational Culture Survey (developed by Van der Post et al. 1998)
WMS^{ZfW}	WerteManagementSystem^{ZfW} (Zentrum für Wirtschaftsethik [ZfW] GmbH)

Figure 18 - Quantitative models comparison based on origin (Sackmann 2007)



Figure 19 - Quantitative models comparison based on purpose (Sackmann 2007)

Sackmann points out a weakness in focusing on perceived expectations and norms rather than values. However, for the purposes of this research it might be a benefit rather than drawback. From a practical point of view, these qualitative methods have more than 20 years of legacy research, which may be used to assist the analysis process and for comparison. As previously discussed, on the negative side, quantitative methods need large enough population to satisfy adequate confidence levels, and is weak on explaining observations that result from the research.

2.3.3. QUALITATIVE RESEARCH METHODS

In this chapter I discuss several qualitative methods that were considered as potential candidates for the research. In this context it is useful to distinguish between the practices used for collecting the data (for example: interviewing, documentation analysis, shadowing, action research etc.), and the methodological approach, which leads the analysis and

interpretations of the gathered information (what I look for in the data), although they are can be closely intertwined, as per example in ethnography research.

Not all qualitative methods will be discussed as some (e.g. action research) might quite obviously be regarded as inappropriate; some are less suited for a comparative research because of the great time needed for data collection that puts a limit to the number of organisations surveyed, some require collection of data that is unavailable either because it is inexistent or commercially confidential. Also, some methodologies are suited mainly for studying individuals' behaviour and less suited for the context of organisations.

Case studies, grounded theory and narrative research approaches will be elaborated upon. These seem as the best candidate methodologies firstly because they are suited for comparative study, and secondly because the expectations regarding the type of finding as well as the supporting theories are not clearly defined. As reviewed in chapter 0 powyżej, there are hints and clues, but choosing might pre-emptively lead to the a-priory selected vein. For example, what organisational culture traits will be manifested, whether they will be explicit or implicit, etc., cannot be anticipated in advance.

2.3.3.1. CASE STUDIES

Robert K. Yin (2014) proposes the following definition for case study research:

> *"A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and the context are not clearly evident."*

Case studies focus on understanding the dynamics within specific settings and use them for generalisations. Onwuegbuzie et al. (2009a) emphasize that case study research requires reframing qualitative and quantitative analyses as case-oriented, variable-oriented or process/experience-oriented analyses. Case oriented research uses particularisation for inductive generalisation; this can be done in any of the classic approaches (Levi-Faur 2005):

- Representative (typical of the category)
- Prototypical (expected to become typical)
- Deviant (an exception to the norm)
- Crucial (tests a theory in the least favourable conditions)
- Archetypal (creates the category)

The study may include a single case or multiple cases. Many researchers point out that a key strength of the case study method involves using multiple sources and techniques in the data

gathering process; both qualitative and quantitative data may be used. Data collection can include various tools such as surveys (quantitative), interviews, documentation review, observation etc. This diversity has the same effect as was elaborated upon earlier regarding a mixed methodology and triangulation. Many researchers tend to give more weight in their triangulations to methods they are accustomed to because of their backgrounds (Eisenhardt 1989). The variety of data calls for systematic organisation, documentation of data, evaluation and analysis.

Case studies are inductive by nature, thus the researched object, should it be a person or an entity, needs to be carefully chosen and studied, keeping in mind the generalisation applicability of the research to the topic at large. For example, a deviant approach seeking to disprove a hypothesis is an easier goal to achieve using a case study (finding a black swan.)

2.3.3.2. GROUNDED THEORY

Grounded theory was developed by two sociologists, Glaser and Strauss (Glaser and Strauss 1967), as a pragmatic tool for qualitative analysis in nursing studies, and is still a fundamental research tool. It is close in nature to the method of a case study in that it calls for qualitative research of cases, and adds the building of a theory to the study (Eisenhardt 1989). The process is based on a concurrent conducting of research while developing and constructing the theory that underlies the hypotheses of the research – an emerging theory; each session in the continuous process of data collection is determined by the previous sessions in which the data have been closely examined. This process is known as *"theoretical sampling"* (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 45); this data-collection process continues until *"theoretical saturation"* is reached (Glaser & Strauss, 1967, p. 61), meaning there is no added value in further development of the theory and conducting the research. A detailed explanation can be found, for example in: Calman 2011., Fernández 2007., Turner 1983, Age 2011, Jones and Alony 2011, Sbaraini *et al.* 2011, and many others. As Age (2011) summarizes, some researchers consider grounded theory to be a positivist methodology (cf. Charmaz 2000, 2006), while some classify it as an interpretive methodology (cf. Goulding, 1998). Strauss and Corbin (1998) provide practical analytical tools that can be used to construct an emergent theory from interviews.

From the practical point of view of this research, the grounded theory approach is more suited to areas of research which are relatively new, or where research is hindered by complexity, so there is gap or lack of knowledge regarding the contextual factors. In those cases there is a need for a 'Punctum Archimedis' to serves as a basis for the research; *"To find the answers,*

the researcher must enter the environments of [the subject (M.M.)] and observe, interview, and take notes to begin to understand the issues…" (Crooks 2001, p.17). However, in our case, the topic of organisational culture is mature enough and there is some research which is similar in nature to the subject of this research and which may be used for advisory guidance. Based on these assumptions, a grounded theory approach seems less suited to this study.

2.3.3.3. NARRATIVE RESEARCH

The research question calls for a comparative methodology. However, the organisations under investigation are variously sized, and many of them are so small that using quantitative survey-based methods and applying standard cultural models such as those used by Hofstede et al. (2010) or Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner (1998) may not always be suitable.

Moreover, keeping in mind the research question which investigates the influence of founders and their backgrounds, as they create some of the more rational and tangible aspects of organizations and also symbols, ideologies, languages, beliefs, rituals and myths (Pettigrew 1979, p. 574) - a better way to capture that effect is to use narrative research methods. Clandinin and Connelly (2004), who use narrative methodology in educational research, elaborate upon that point, stating that: *"narrative is an intuitive way of coming to terms with life, because life is filled with narrative fragments. It is the way we gather experience and the way we convey that experience. It is both descriptive and explanatory."* Some seminal work applying narrative research to organisations was done by (Bruner 1991, 2004), who argued that narratives are tools used by the mind: *"we organize our experience and our memory of human happenings mainly in the form of narrative - stories, excuses, myths, reasons for doing and not doing.", "… narrative as text operates as an instrument of mind in the construction of reality"*. Bruner gives ten features of narratives; perhaps the two most important of them are that a narrative should have a meaning and a point, thus they pay tribute to some canonical script either supporting it, breaching it, violating it or deviating from it.

Furthermore, as Deal and Kennedy (2000, chap. 5) observe, people tell stories to gain power and influence, and as such stories are culture construction tools and a natural focal point for the purposes of our research question. Riessman (1993), for example, uses structural and functional tools for narrative' analysis, while Czarniawska (1997) uses narratives as **metaphors** for organisations. Vaara *et al.* (2016) examine the various ways organisational narrative research can contribute to organisational research, and be used as a tool (by management) to achieve stability, or promote change in organisations.

O'Connor (2002), using ethnographic research and grounded theory, claims to have identified six basic narrative types in ventures: founding, visionary, marketing, strategy, historical, and conventional; these might be categorised in three main categories: personal, generic, and situational, and are essential in founding and governing a new company. He argues that these stories enable founders to gain legitimacy for the benefit of the organisations, and help decision making.

Nicholson and Anderson (2005) examine metaphors in entrepreneurs' narratives as a tool for construction of entrepreneurial culture in the media, as a part of building entrepreneurial myth, giving some sense to the entrepreneurial process which is sometime difficult to understand.

Browning and Morris (2012) discuss six angles of narrative appreciation that can be applied to story interpretation and which sum up most of the accumulated work of narrative scholars:

- Action, motivation and outcome – what is done, why and a normative assessment regarding whether it is right or wrong
- Sequence and locale – the spatial and temporal dimensions of the story
- Character and identity
- Interest and memory
- Aesthetics
- Complexity and control

In practice, the guidelines of Eriksson & Kovalainen (2008, ch. 14) were used.

Note that although most of the narrative research discussion above, and the associated examples, is related to organisational level narrative, the main aspect this research is interested in is the personal narrative of the entrepreneurs rather than that of the venture. The research methodology is similar, but is applied toward a somewhat different end-point.

Another word of caution is needed here – as Bruner (1991) notes – narratives are by nature normative as both the narrator and the researcher are human, thus, when analysing them the researcher should be aware of that and adhere as much as possible to the objective content.

2.3.3.4. DIMENSION BASED MODELS IN QUALITATIVE RESEARCH

Other dimension-based models may be applied which are based more on qualitative-intuitive assessment (cf. Deal and Kennedy 2000), but are of less interest in our case. Moreover, when small organisations are considered it is more difficult to comprehend the culture than in large organisations, and determine how it should be analysed and what methodology should be

used for studying it. There are not many previous studies of small organisations, however when small organisations are studied in conjunction with large ones as a comparison study or as a part of a sample, some researchers use mixed methods for culture assessment (e.g. Gray, Densten, & Sarros, 2003; Gudmundson, Tower, & Hartman, 2003; Watson & Gryna, 2001); and when mostly small organisations are studied - qualitative methods seem to be the preferred ones (e.g. Carr, 2000; Cumberland & Herd, 2011).

2.4. SELECTION OF SUITABLE METHODOLOGY

After detailing the toolset available for the research question, one may summarise that the research question calls for a comparative methodology. However, the organisations under investigation are variously sized, and as mentioned above, many of them are so small that using quantitative survey-based methods and applying standard cultural models such as those used by Hofstede et al. (2010) is not always suitable.

While studies of very small organisations are few in number, some small organisations have been studied comparatively with large ones and some researchers have used qualitative or mixed methods to assess culture (Carr 2000, Watson and Gryna 2001, Gray *et al.* 2003, Gudmundson *et al.* 2003, Cumberland and Herd 2011).

I found narrative research to be the most suitable of the possible qualitative approaches, because it captures the functional and interpretive aspects of the research question, (cf. Bruner (1991, 2004), Czarniawska (1997, 2000, 2004), Clandinin and Connelly (2004), Buchanan and Dawson (2007), Corbett-Etchevers and Mounoud (2011), Browning and Morris (2012), Korthals Altes (2014), and Sellnow (2014)).

Capturing both the **functional** aspect - culture as a variable, a tool (Martin 2002a, p. 4), focusing more on metaphors, rituals and symbols, and the **interpretive** aspect – culture as a metaphor (Martin 2002a, p. 6), focusing more on the social processes, should give a broader, thicker and better understanding of the organisation.

Clandinin and Connelly (2004), as mentioned earlier, following Brunner, describe narrative as a major tool we use to decipher the complexity of life. Bruner (1991, 2004), has produced seminal work, using narratives to study organisations, which he argued are the tools used by the mind as instruments for constructing reality, while Czarniawska (1997) uses narratives as metaphors for organisations. The research focus of small companies has been mostly on the founders, partly because their dominance in small companies is often more pronounced.

2.5. RESEARCH DESIGN

Following the reasoning described above, this research uses narrative research approach, based on interviews with companies' founders, which are veterans of substantial military service. Veterans of the Navy, Air-Force, and Signals-Corps were approached and interviewed, and the interviews analysed. I have chosen these three, and my guidelines for selection were as follows:

- Choose military commands which are large enough so that there should be a large population of veterans to be interviewed (unfortunately this would prove to be not quite accurate later on in the research.)
- There is a minimal size of population required from each branch to substantiate the research result, therefore to keep the research on a manageable size not too many branches should be studied.
- From the research aim point of view, to demonstrate the imprint of military organisational culture and the distinctive difference between veterans of various commands three military branches should suffice.

The following sections depict the participants' selection process, the interviews' structure, the analysis and the organisation of the results.

2.5.1. PARTICIPANT SELECTION AND SAMPLE

Building the pool of participants was done mainly using the LinkedIn professional-social network. I acquired a 'pro' membership of the network which enabled me to see a little more detailed information regarding members, and, more importantly, allowed me to contact them directly without the need to be included in their circle of associates or be introduced.

I used search terms that included combinations of the following words: 'Founder', 'CEO', 'VP', 'Entrepreneur' for digging out the founders and leaders of the enterprises, and 'Air-Force', 'Navy', 'Signals-Corps' to mark out those with a history of military service. This, of course, means that only entrepreneurs who identified themselves as having a military background came out in the search. Additionally, I asked the interviewees for recommendations about other entrepreneurs they knew about, however this proved to be useless.

All the companies that were surveyed, and the entrepreneurs interviewed are start-ups. The reason for looking into startups is because as a company matures more influences have impact on the organisational culture like more people, regulations etc, moreover, the entrepreneurs

might have been already replaced by professional managers, and this does have effect on the organisation (cf. Deal and Kennedy (2000)). Moreover, the variability in the timelines between the companies, such as the age of the company, points in time when management was replaced, when an investor got involved and imposed some requirements, regulations changed, etc., makes it harder and harder to be comparable. Furthermore, it can be also seen, that some researchers with similar goals of studying founders influence made a similar choice (Baron *et al.* 1999, 2001, Schminke *et al.* 2005, Lange *et al.* 2007, Ling *et al.* 2007).

The Bottom line is when the company matures it is harder to distill the entrepreneur fingerprints, and within it the sub-topic of the entrepreneur military service; the differentiation between the variables requires a much larger database, and even then observability is might not be achievable.

Regarding the survey method, I had an intention of surveying the premises of the companies and look at documentations; however, most entrepreneurs that were willing to cooperate and be interviewed were reluctant to let me into their premises. Some simply said that they fear commercial espionage, and some simply do not have premises; they work out of homes, coffeeshops, university offices and libraries, parents' basements (what is sometimes called 'garage startups'), and even if they have documents (most of them don't) they are not willing to share. So, naturally, I couldn't take pictures, or use shadowing technique.

Moreover, since the cooperation rate level was very low (about 1 respondent out of 10 approaches), I ended up interviewing whomever I had a chance to, without any selection. Also, as will be seen later on these ventures are extremely small, and the majority of them have no employees, rather the only 'employees' are the founders, and a lot of work is done by out-sourcing and sub-contracting; more about this will be elaborated in the results and discussion chapters.

I aimed to interview 8 entrepreneurs from 3 different military arms, Navy, Air-Force, and Signals-Corps, with the aim of achieving the following goals:

- Selecting services with a large enough population in each service to substantiate the observations, and make generalisations regarding that population sounder.
- Study enough services to be able to substantiate differences in attitudes between different paths of service; I believed that 3 services were enough, actually however, to fulfil the purposes of the research probably only two services would have sufficed. In these services the conscripts tend to serve longer periods because training periods are

longer and require volunteering for longer services. Another service that has similar characteristic is the intelligence, but I realised quite early that these veterans are more reluctant to cooperate.

- On the other hand, I wanted to make the sample as small as possible to make the research goal achievable and manageable from the point of view of time for interviews, transcription and analysis.

I did not manage to reach my aim, as can be seen in *Table 3- Interviewees' demography* below. A total of about 100 founders were approached, 60 of which from the Air-Force, Navy, and Signals Corps, of which about 20 responded positively. Almost no one responded negatively, those who were not interested simply did not answer my lead. Some kept postponing the interview schedule so I counted them out. As a bottom line I did not achieve my goals for two main reasons: Firstly, there were not enough Signals-Corps veteran entrepreneurs out there and of the ones that were found most were reluctant to cooperate, so only 3 interviews were held with Signals-Corps veterans. Secondly, during the interviews I noticed that within the Navy veterans there were distinct differences between officers that had served in technical positions and officers in surface ships, as well as between surface ships' officers and submarines' officers; therefore, I decided to enlarge the population to some extent to better validate the research findings.

This is the demography of the interviewees:

Table 3- Interviewees' demography

Command	Military rank	Nick name	Years of service	Age (at interview)	Education	Position	Field of Operation	Number of Employees
Signals-Corps	Capt	SC1[25]	6	45	BSc, MSc, MBA	CEO	Internet	1-9
Signals-Corps	Capt	SC2	6	33	BSc, MSc	VP	Finance	1-9
Signals-Corps	Maj	SC3	8	60	BSc	CTO	Medical Dev.	1-9
Air Force	Capt	AF1[26]	6	43	BSc, MSc, MBA	CEO	Medical Dev.	1-9
Air Force	Capt	AF2	7	44	PhD EE	CEO	Security	1-9
Air Force	Maj	AF3	20	53	BSc, MSc, MBA	CEO	Life Science	10-49
Air Force	Maj	AF4	17	48	BSc, MSc	CEO	Aviation	10-49
Air Force	Capt	AF5	6	36	BSc, MSc	CEO	Internet	1-9
Air Force	Maj	AF6	7	52	BSc, MBA	CEO	Telecom	50-500
Air Force	Capt	AF7	6	43	LLB & B.A, Aviation	CEO	Aviation	1-9
Air Force	Capt	AF8	6	38	PhD Phys.	CEO	Medical Dev.	1-9
Navy	Capt	NL1[27]	6	37	BSc	CEO	Medical Dev.	1-9
Navy	Capt	NL2	6	27	Naval Academy (BA), BSc	CEO	Medical Dev.	1-9
Navy	Maj	NLT1[28]	8	45	PhD Phys.	CEO	Telecom	1-9
Navy	Capt	NT1[29]	7	44	BSc, MSc	VP	Defence	50-500
Navy	Maj	NT2	8	49	BSc, MSc	VP/CTO	Finance	1-9
Navy	Maj	NT4	8	50	PhD Phys., Post-Doc	VP	Technical Services	1-9
Navy	Lt	NT3	4	34	BSc, MBA	Founder	Medical Dev.	1-9
Navy	Capt	NS1[30]	6	26	Naval Academy (BA), MBA	CEO	Medical Dev.	1-9
Navy	Capt	NS2	6	27	Naval Academy (BA), MBA	CEO	Education Tech.	1-9

[25] SC = Signal Corps
[26] AF = Air Force
[27] NL = Navy Littoral Ship
[28] NLT = Navy Littoral Technical
[29] NT = Navy Technical
[30] NS = Navy Submarine

Giving just a glimpse into the next chapters - from the research point of view I believe that my research population can be segmented into 5 distinct populations, with the naval officers' population divided into 3 different categories which will be elaborated upon in the results and discussion parts of the research.

As a first generalisation, it can be seen at a glance that the population is well educated, with substantial experience, and that they are not youngsters. Their age has to do with the length of military service, and in many cases a long volunteering service period, which makes for a late start for these entrepreneurs in comparison to countries where military service is not compulsory, or not considered favourably (for that matter see above the discussion regarding 'legitimacy' in section 1.6.1.)

2.5.2. METHOD OF INQUIRY DATA COLLECTION

After contact had been made with founders who were willing to participate in the research, a semi-structured interview was held with each of them. The interviews each took at least 40 minutes, and up to 4 hours when the interviewees were more open. Some of the interviews were held in company premises, but most of them were held in a 'neutral' place. Some companies have practically no premises and are run from homes, garages or coffee-shops; others were reluctant to let me in into the premises due to the fear of a technological security breach. Since one of the points I wanted to look for in the cultural aspects was the organisation of the company premises, this perspective was lacking. However, this gave an insight into the leanness of the companies.

The interview was divided roughly into two parts (see Annex A for elaboration upon the interview questions):

- In the first part the interviewees described their pre-service lives a little (up to the age of 18), the drafting process and the following of a career path within the military. Guiding questions for this part asked interviewees to describe their choice of educational path, the choice of military service force (for the volunteers, and where the choice was possible), acceptance into the forces, guiding figures, type of work done in the service, where it was carried out, the management tools used, the steps in promotion during the service.
- The second part asked the interviewees to describe their post-service professional lives. Guiding questions here asked about careers path either as an employee or an

entrepreneur, and the decision to choose the entrepreneurship path. Further questions were aimed at eliciting the conduct of the enterprise and the founders: how the field of conduct was chosen, how funds were raised, the relationships within the enterprise between founders and employees, how decisions are made, how the tasks and responsibilities are divided between the partners, what management tools are used, what is important in their view, how they would like to see the development of the enterprise, and where do they see themselves in the future.

I did not limit the interviewees in time and I let them answer as freely as possible, with little interruption as they were carried away by a stream of consciousness. I hoped that in this manner the more important memories of events would flow out.

A typical interview would transcribe into 20-30 pages of print; this was done by a paid professional transcriber. In order to be able to include quotes from the interviews some of the transcriptions were translated to English; this was done by me because professional translation was very expensive.

The research, thus, resulted in about 11 hours of recorded interviews (some interviews were transcribed during the interview without recording), and about 400 pages of transcriptions. Selected parts of the transcriptions were translated by myself from Hebrew to English to serve as quotations in this work; I tried to translate so that the English quotation reflect as closely as possible the interviewee meaning, but one should keep in mind the original is in Hebrew and includes a lot of Hebrew slang, entrepreneurial lingo, and martial lingo in Hebrew that do not have a direct translation.

2.5.3. STEPS OF THE RESEARCH

Almost all interviews were recorded and transcribed. The first ones were not recorded and only hand notes were taken before it was clear that recording was a necessity. It was necessary because of the intricacy of the interviews and the need to exactly frame phrases and themes within the context of the conversation, which was very difficult to analyse post-interview. From the fifth interview and on recording was taken. Transcriptions of the recordings were done professionally, and were loaded into Atlas.Ti software for ease of analysis.

Processing using Atlas.Ti was not straightforward for several reasons:

- I had a difficult time loading documents in Hebrew into the software and needed help from the manufacturer make this happen (at that point the software did not support

right-to-left documents in Word format so there was a need to transform the documents from DOC format to RTF format.

- The version I started working with did not support the saving of documents in a cloud, so all the documents needed to be downloaded to a specific computer where the software was installed and analysis could only be done on that computer.

The software was used to find and mark repetitive phrases and themes in the interview texts. Important sections in the interview texts were located then translated to English, and some are included as quotes in the following sections. In order to preserve the context of the phrases and as much as possible from the narrative context, the quotes are not just sentencing, but are more like paragraphs. In some cases, I marked inside the text what was in my opinion the most important part, but kept it within the context for better understanding. Since translation was found to be the most expensive part of the research (budget wise), I did all of it myself; this process took several months because of the amount of the material, and also because I tried to stay as close as possible to the initial intent of the interviewees' texts in Hebrew, and since a lot of slang was used the translations were quite challenging, which required a very specialised translator which was out of my budget. Since many interviews were made in public places (as explained earlier), the transcriptions proved to be not very accurate, and I had to re-transcribe some of them all over again to be able to capture the right meaning, and also translate accurately.

2.5.4. TEXT ANALYSIS AND REPRESENTATION

As detailed earlier in para. 2.1, The interview texts were analysed with the following goals in mind – the first was to locate organisational culture aspects of both the military service and the post-military service enterprises, and the second was to look for traces of narratives in the interviewees' stories. Organisational culture traits were picked from the founders' descriptions of the companies, how and why it was established and how it is organised and operated, why in that particular manner? their daily conduct, their aspirations etc.

As will be observed in the next chapter there is a division in the analysis between the business practice (i.e. issues of organisational culture) and the narrative. The first topic is a **descriptive interpretation of the current situation** in the companies, whereas the second topic is the **analysis of processes** that might have led to the current situation. There is also a third point of trying to assess organisational culture in the military from the interviews, and see if it

correlates with the current culture. **Each of these is analysed differently**; one is looking for current situations in the data, while the other tries to follow the timeline of the service hoping to find a narrative. Practically I did the analysis at least twice for each interview, one for each branch of thinking, and that is how I organised the material during the analysis, and how I presented it in the next chapter (Ch. 0). I believe that these are two, of course intertwined, but different topics.

Narrative deconstruction was done by examining the time line of events, and the events themselves of course, described by the interviewee was used to analyse the narratives encrypted in the text. Each text was examined by itself, then conclusions were drawn regarding similarities within veterans of the same military service, in aspects of organisational culture both in service and in established companies, meta narratives, and possible sources of that particular procession; specifically, I looked for signs of total institution/total organisation as a possible source of organisational culture imprint, if indeed there was such a culture to be imprinted beforehand. After conclusions were established regarding veterans of the same services, a comparison was done, of these same aspects, among veterans of the various different services that were surveyed.

Thus, the interviews were read, more than once, in different manners – once as a story, with events, timeline and reactions significant, and once again looking for details of the particular description of methods and more minute details. Such details are essential for depicting both organisational culture aspects, and in helping to look for hints of 'Total Organisation' perspectives in military service.

During the interview, and later on in the transcription analysis, I tried to learn why the ventures started in the first place, how they were formed, how partnerships were created, why a venture in that particular business field, how and from whom the funding was raised, if and how employees were hired, what is the interaction with the environment (customers, subcontractors, regulation, etc.), how the business is operated, how decisions are made, who makes them, is there a planning and what is its extent, what are the founders expectations: are they targeting for exit or organisational growth, and why that path is preferred?

When doing the interviews some interviewees talk more freely, and offer freely extensive information about the venture; other might be more closed, or I might have been clear enough in my expectations from the interviewees, so more precise questions were needed to get particular information regarding the data I was interested in.

The results are organised accordingly in two sections for each military command population: one section describes the cultural aspects found in the research and the second section describes the narrative aspects. Each of these is divided internally into two sub-sections, one dedicated mainly to the findings and another dedicated to discussion and elaborated analysis of the findings.

The differences and commonalities between the different military commands are further discussed in a separate discussion part of the thesis (chap. 4) which summarises the entire research.

2.6. LIMITATIONS OF THE RESEARCH

2.6.1. LIMITATIONS OF THE METHODOLOGY

Without going too deeply into the ontological and epistemological labyrinth, there is a debate regarding the sheer ability to research organisational theories in general and organisational culture in particular; the debate is about whether it exists at all or is rather created via the research and reflects in that process the self-generated beliefs and views of the researchers. Elaboration upon the topic can be found, for example, in Chia (1996) and Martin (2002b). These discussions exceed the scope of this study, however, and from the point of view of this researcher, this entanglement can be worked around by adopting a point of view similar to Czarniawska (Czarniawska-Joerges 1992, Czarniawska 1997, 2000) and Morgan (2006, first published 1986) who simply treat organisations as metaphors, meaning to look at organisations as cultural phenomena. One cannot deny the existence of organisations and the huge body of research into organisational theories. Therefore, willingly or not, the framework of organisational culture is already in place whether this preceded the research or followed it. Note that this approach is opposed by some researchers e.g. Cornelissen (Cornelissen 2005), who maintains that, although metaphors exist in organisational theory, they are too figurative and inherently imprecise and thus might be misleading as they tend to be rhetorical devices. The bottom line of this criticism is that comparative research that has its roots in metaphors is questionable. Other researchers claim that the narrative approach to social phenomena limits the scope to human actions (MacIntyre 2007, first published 1981), Czarniawska (2004, chap. 6) challenges that claim, making the observation that *"everything is a narrative or at least can be treated as one"*. In any case, the main focus of this research is indeed on humans – the entrepreneurial founders, and not the narrative metaphor of the organisation.

2.6.2. SAMPLE SIZE AND DIVERSITY

Sample size is fairly small relative to the number of veterans, so the results are inductive by nature. Also, the results cannot be neutralised from other uncontrolled variables such as company size, company age, entrepreneur age, gender, education, family background etc. Furthermore, all the participants in this study have a technological background, and all the founded companies are technology oriented. Most of the respondents were picked through the LinkedIn business-oriented social networking service, which may be naturally oriented towards a population that has an interest in making contacts and displaying their businesses; some entrepreneurs have an interest in operating 'under-the-radar' so these are missed. Another outcome is that about 10%-20% of the research leads were responded to and actually culminated with an interview; this may limit the population to entrepreneurs who are willing to be exposed. Also, prominently missing from the study population are aircrew, the major reason being that there is a far greater number – by more than an order of magnitude – of technologically trained personnel in the air force than aircrew members. As mentioned above, the small sample size makes it difficult to differentiate the military background influence from other influences such as family influence, youth-movement influence, type of technical education, schools and universities, the career in the service etc. However, they are diverse enough to highlight the commonality amongst the research participants, thus, despite the limited sample size - certain artefacts emerged very clearly, as discussed above.

2.6.3. AUTHOR ROLE AND BIAS

In the language of Trompenaars & Hampden-Turner (1997), we should never forget that each opinion we voice regarding explicit culture usually says more about where we come from than about the community we are judging. Having served in the IAF for a significant period, the author is very intimately acquainted with the IAF's internal processes and, thus, does not claim objectivity. Great care was taken not to bias the interviews with the author's own point of view, but the possibility cannot be completely dismissed. The quotations of interviewees were included to demonstrate as directly as possible what was conveyed in the interview, translated from Hebrew.

Another concern is the guidance of the interviewer during the interview. Interviews were semi-structured, with most of the time being dedicated to interviewees freely describing their

autobiographies in a conversational manner for quite a long time, so it is assumed that guidance was minimal.

2.7. SUMMARY OF METHODOLOGY

To sum up everything again before I go into the results and discussion, these are the key points of the research:

- I argue that entrepreneurs with a history of military service carry a 'watermark' that remains from their service's culture and that it contributes to forming the imprints that these entrepreneurs subsequently leave on the culture in the organisations that they found.
- In order to demonstrate that, I want to show that there are differences in culture between different military commands, differences in organisational culture between enterprises, and that these can be correlated with each other based on the history of military service of the founders. Moreover, the military service type itself can be used to explain to some extent that imprint.
- The first part of the above, regarding the organisational culture of the military, especially differences between different armies and commands, was elaborated upon in a broad literature review, and also in data gathered during the research regarding the explicit military service of the surveyed population.
- The second part, regarding the organisational culture of enterprises, was studied in this research.
- The methodology used for this study is narrative research, applying the analysis of extensive interviews with founders and entrepreneurs with various military backgrounds. Choosing this particular qualitative methodology simultaneously enables:
    - Looking into the organisational culture of the different military commands which the founders came from,
    - Typifying the organisational culture of the current enterprises that were established post service,
    - Giving a deeper perspective on the processes that might create the link between the two – namely the imprint of the military organisational culture on servicemen.
    - Making it easier to study organisations of very different sizes and fields of operations.

3. RESEARCH RESULTS

3.1. EVIDENCE OF QUALITY - VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY OF THE DATA

I will start with a discussion about the validity of qualitative methods in general, which is a source of dispute and disagreement within the research community. It is much larger in scope than this study, and there is no point in repeating it here. Some of this was discussed in the theoretical background review, and the issue is of constant dispute between quantitative researchers and qualitative researchers. An abundance of articles can be found (c.f. Bryman 1984, 2008, Kirk and Miller 1986, Creswell and Miller 2000, Cho and Trent 2006, Bapir 2010, Ali and Yusof 2011, Leung 2015), though specific discussions regarding the validity of narrative analysis are relatively scarce.

More specific to this study and for the purposes of this discussion I would like to cite an article by Polkinghorne (2007) which addresses directly the issue of the validity of narrative research. One of his main assertions is that since proponents and opponents of different methodologies lack support for each other's' claims of evidence, the issue of validity should be approached by applying one's own community's protocols about what, in its view, is acceptable evidence. This view is also supported by Creswell and Miller (2000) in a systematic paradigm they label as an 'audit trail'. From this perspective I will try to assess the level of 'validity', or confidence level in the arguments that would follow herein below.

The validation of arguments about understandings of human experience, which is one of the foundations and justifications for narrative research, *"requires evidence in the form of personally reflective descriptions in ordinary language and analyses using inductive processes that capture commonalities across individual experiences."* (Polkinghorne 2007, p. 475). Practically, in the case of narrative research, Polkinghorne suggests that one should look for supportive evidence given alongside the claim in order to justify that claim; so, the justification process is an argumentative one.

In the presented results and discussions below, I try to support the findings by firstly presenting as much direct evidence in the form of successive quotes from different interviewees (given with as much context as possible under the limitations of the length of the thesis, and it being a written document) that represent similar observations from idiosyncratic participants within a broader frame of behaviour. Secondly, supportive evidence is provided to add, for example, a broader historical perspective of an argument, an

observation of similar cases in other countries or another population from other studies, which might be similar or opposite in nature so that the reader can judge for himself whether the claims are justified; this puts the observations in the theoretical context (Kirk and Miller 1986). The combination of both serves the purpose of establishing the research's credibility by providing a thicker description (see also Geertz (1973c).)

As strengthening support I would also like to borrow the term 'theoretical saturation' from grounded theory methodology (Glaser and Strauss 1967, Glaser 2002, Charmaz 2006, Age 2011). Since statistical methodologies for assessing the validity of data and results cannot be applied, and because there is not much background relating to this topic, I suggest using that criterion because, although grounded theory has a broader view and might use many research methods to produce data, there is a common point to both of them and it is the point where the researcher gets to the stage when more research ceases to yield new information (Glaser and Strauss 1967, Bowen 2008, Age 2011). During this research, I believe that I reached this saturation point after 3 interviews. In the case of Air-Force veterans I extended the number of interviews beyond that because firstly - I started with Air-Force veterans and was not sure that the saturation point was reached, secondly - I wanted to have enough recorded material, and since I started the research with written interviews I wanted to augment the data base, and thirdly – during the interviews with Navy veterans I noticed there was fragmentation in the population so I needed both to establish the fact that there is indeed fragmentation, and to create sufficient data for each segment. In comparison to similar studies, it seems that 3 interviews is similar from that perspective (Harding *et al.* 2017), and that a total population of about 20 is also reasonable (Hood 1984, cited by Charmaz 2006). Thus, from the point of view of sample size and data saturation, the scope of this research is well within the boundaries acceptable in practice.

3.2. FINDINGS

The findings are organised in the following order: In this chapter the findings per each military command are presented and discussed from cultural and narrative perspectives; in the next chapter (Ch. 4) the findings are discussed from the broader comparative perspective, and analysed to assess and substantiate the findings relations with the theoretical background. In the following paragraphs quotations are given with a reference to the interviewee; for example – AF1 is interviewee number one from the Air-Force. Likewise, SC would refer to

Signal Corps, NL to Navy littoral ships, NS to Navy submarines, and NT to Navy technical officers.

3.2.1. Findings amongst Air-Force Retirees

3.2.1.1. Participants Demography

Roughly twenty founders, retirees from the Israeli Air Force (IAF), were approached; ten of them responded positively and eight were interviewed, all CEOs. The participants were found mainly by searching an IAF veterans' network and scanning LinkedIn profiles; broadly outlined profiles of the participants' and their companies' follow below:

Table 4 Air-Force Participants Demography Summary

Company size	1-9 employees	10-49 employees	50-100 employees
	6	1	1

Military rank	majors	captains	lieutenant
	4	3	1

Years of service	5-9 years	10 years and more
	4	4

Age	30-39 years	40-49 years	50-59 years
	2	5	1

Education	PhD	MSc/MBA	BSc/BA/LLB
	2	4	2

3.2.1.2. Organisational Culture Aspects – Findings and Discussion

The commonalities that prominently emerged from the interviews are presented, here and hereinafter for the other groups, in two divisions: practices, which can be related to the upper level of culture, and narratives, which the findings suggest are, in fact, grand narratives (Eriksson and Kovalainen 2008, chap. 14), that were shared by entrepreneurs whose military background was similar.

The interviews also clearly revealed the founders' attachment to their companies, but this phenomenon has already been well researched and, therefore, it will not be discussed here (cf. Cardon et al. (2009, 2013), Chen et al. (2009), Clarke and Holt (2009), Tamizharasi and Panchanatham (2010), Breugst et al. (2012), Thorgren and Wincent (2013), and Watne and Hakala (2013)).

The following are more explicitly observable characteristics of the practices used by the entrepreneurs and implemented in the businesses that were surveyed, as they emerge from the interviews, and some limited observations of the premises.

Type of businesses - All the companies in the study are sophisticated, technologically oriented enterprises, mostly research and development (R&D), such as medical devices, security, and aviation, but, interestingly, even some service-oriented ones. Nearly all the businesses operate in rather heavily regulated fields, as expected in the fields of operation, that require of them significant expertise and the ability to conform with regulations governing medical devices, the spectrum, radiation and aviation, which place significant demands on the companies and require a careful allocation of their resources.

Vision and business plan - All the founders established their companies with the expectation of organic growth, rather than expansion through mergers and acquisitions or initial public offerings. The founders plan ahead and all of them expect to be running their companies in the foreseeable future. None of the companies was founded simply to exit the market with a high profit; which may explain the fundraising model the companies all share, as elaborated upon subsequently.

> *(AF4): "We are operating for 8-9 years now, and we are not there yet. I believe that in a year, or a year and a half, we will break through."*
>
> *(AF7): "I intend to stay with the same (customers). All the components are there, and I have my professional style."*

Personal ties - All the interviewees reported that they cultivated excellent personal ties with their suppliers and customers and that they think of them as 'being on the same boat', as one commented. Furthermore, the interviewees mentioned mutual trust as a feature that smoothed their day-to-day interactions and eased their managerial burden.

> *(AF1): "I have two friends working with me one is doing assembly and testing and another helps with accounting. We all worked together in a company previous as employees."*
>
> *(AF5): "I worked with a friend from the academic reserve."*
>
> *(AF4): "All the people here, the management, were officers in my section in the Air Force."*
>
> *(AF6): "It is never a business; it is a home, a family. Consider how much time I spend there. Half of the time I am abroad, and on the other half I work until midnight. This is strong romance. Startups are an addiction; nothing less than a full addiction."*

Fundraising and managing money - All the companies were initially funded by angels or by taking out personal loans; typically, funding of this kind characterises 'long-distance runners'

like the founders who were interviewed, all of whom planned on operating their businesses for an extended period. Businesses that are funded by venture capital funds tend to be expected to show fast and high returns, which is less likely in firms that are aiming for organic growth. But money that may belong to a family or to someone they know personally places greater pressure on the founders than being funded by an impersonal source. All the founders expressed how seriously they regarded their responsibility to handle the company's funds with care. They all seemed to count every penny, to cautiously weigh each expense and to conduct themselves very modestly.

> *(AF1): "All the investment here is my money and family money."*
>
> *(AF6): "The first time we went looking for investors was after we had the first customer; all the initial development was our own money."*
>
> *(AF7): "If I need money that is not mine or my family's I might take a small lawn from a bank. It is always a small un-risky amount."*

Lean companies - All the companies surveyed conduct their day-to-day affairs modestly; no fancy offices or cars or business-class flights. Rather, all the funds are dedicated to achieving the company's goals.

Recruiting personnel is only resorted to when there is absolutely no other choice, as the companies all prefer to outsource as much as possible, even aspects closely related to the business's core operations. Only the expertise needed to create the end product is kept in-house; namely, understanding the market, in-house research, planning, integration and close personal ties with the customers and subcontractors.

> *(AF1): "I do almost everything in outsourcing; I designed the system myself, including everything from optics to software and mechanical design. Then I contract for production. Optical fibres I get from a German contractor with whom I have relations from a previous work, cases, catheter and stuff I contract a company in Turkey. I assemble the kit in this warehouse, and market and sell myself. My wife does accounting, my father and brother also give a hand now and then."*
>
> *(AF5): "I worked with a friend from the academic reserve. He worked on his entrepreneurship and I worked on mine. We agreed on some mutual cooperation: h needed my programming skills and I needed his management and marketing. So, we worked together, until the worst thing happened and we both succeeded…Then we hired an employee and raised money from a venture fund."*

(AF7): "The office is at home. I joke with my wife that I might talk with a CEO about a $ 60M air plane with the baby's diaper in my hand. He is sure that he is speaking with an organised office. Can't imagine what he would have thought if he could have seen."

Structured planning and management - Among the founders whose companies developed products (as opposed to service-oriented ones), most used structured planning and management tools; some because they are familiar and experienced with them and some also because of regulation requirements. All the founders applied an approach based on the so-called 'waterfall' or 'vee' models, frequently referred to in project management handbooks [cf. Haskins et al. 2007], except for one who vigorously rejected both as being too structured, favouring instead the agile model. These two models are considered conservative, and the literature suggests adopting models such as 'agile' and 'spiral' where rapid development is required such as in the case of many entrepreneurships (Haskins *et al.* 2007). The main difference in incentives between these models is how to deal with decision gates along the timeline of development, e.g. does the product satisfy the business case, who decides and how whether to halt or proceed. Some companies are not aware of these models, but all the reviewed organisations are aware of them and most adapt the model typically used by the Israeli-Air-Force.

(AF2): "Every time I neglected to document I paid dearly."

(AF4): "As in the military there is this thing of always looking at the process, and search how to improve it… The conduct of the company aspires to American style development mechanism: PDR, CDR[31], Red-Team, Test-and-Review, all the time applying the development processes that we have experienced."

Involvement in long-term projects and processes – This aspect is similar to Hofstede's model dimension of 'long term versus short term orientation'. Selecting a process model, making an early assessment of risk factors and planning for risk mitigation, as well as mapping out the complete life cycle of a product, are common IAF-retiree practices; IAF officers learn them on their army courses and routinely implement them. It should be noted that in the same way that entrepreneurs' attitudes are universally marked by commitment, they all think in terms of the long term. Israelis in general tend to view time from a broader vantage point, which extends further both into the future and the past, resembling in that respect far-eastern

[31] PDR (Preliminary Design Review), CDR (Critical Design Review), etc. are standard milestones in procedural development process in military projects, following the guidelines of the United States Ministry of Defense directives.

cultures such as China's and South Korea's (Trompenaars and Hampden-Turner 1998, chap. 9); it is also perhaps the reason more people turn to entrepreneurship than they do elsewhere.

Power distance - Lack of power distance was evident in the conversations and when visiting the companies' premises. One interviewee brought up the subject of mission debriefing as an example of the low level of power distance in the IAF. Debriefing in the IAF is a type of ritual; operations, projects and processes are repeatedly assessed in a cycle of learning-correction. This process is fairly open in the sense that rank carries little weight: higher ranks might be openly criticised by lower ranks and everyone is required to share their experience for the benefit of the community (Weick and Roberts 1993, Ron *et al.* 2006). This open process, during which there is a flat hierarchy (a General, although respected as such, might be criticised by a young Lt. pilot), might be the reason for the relative lack of power distance noticed in the companies that were studied. During the interviews in the largest surveyed company, people went in and out of the CEO's office; no nocking since the door is always open, reporting, discussing freely topics of the hour, and getting instructions. High-ranking officers become accustomed to being openly criticised by the lower ranks, and they, in turn, learn to overcome their natural anxiety at having to express opinions which may embarrass a higher-ranking officer.

The debriefing process, which became one of the IAF's cornerstones (Terraine 1987, Dickinson 2000), was probably bequeathed to the IAF around the time of the War of Independence in 1948 (Ambar *et al.* 1997) by the Force's first pilots – mainly Jewish pilot veterans of the British Royal Air Force (RAF; (Shavit 1995, Cohen 2004, chap. Introduction)) and of World War II. Other distinctively RAF cultural characteristics (Francis 2008) might have also been imported into the IAF during the period it was being established, mainly the lack of formality: *"RAF flyers certainly found a common identity in the service's 'adolescent vigour' and relative lack of formality. Pilots adopted, by army and navy standards, an extremely lackadaisical attitude towards drill and saluting….Even senior commanders appeared oblivious to decorum or protocol"* (Francis 2008, chap. 2).

Ability to cope with bureaucracy - As mentioned above, all the interviewees selected types of business that are associated with bureaucracy and regulation and require a long time-to-market. This pattern may be explained by the fact that the type of projects that are handled by technical personnel in the IAF also require long-term planning, a decade or longer in advance, and involve considerable paperwork. Here is a demonstration of regulations that these companies must conform to in their operation:

(AF4) (AF7): Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA).

(AF1), (AF9): Food and Drug Administration (FDA) and CE-mark

(AF3): CLIA lab certification (FDA and CE-mark), ISO-13485

(AF2): Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA)

(AF5): Copyrights control

(AF6): Federal Communication Commission (FCC) and CE

The IAF as an agent of socialisation - Evident in all the surveyed companies is the reflection of a traditional American way of thinking and operation style, which were probably acquired by the IAF through close working relations with American companies and agencies. The IAF internally adopts American methodologies and instils them in its officers through courses and posts in the US and through its style of managing projects.

3.2.1.3. NARRATIVE PERSPECTIVE – FINDINGS, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

Similarly to Czarniawska (2004) (see also Davis (2008) for a similar treatment of stories), who looked for narratives in life stories, I looked for the meta-narrative and typological plots in the founders' stories. Two main intertwined narratives emerged.

The exploration narrative (being the first) - All the interviewed founders expressed a desire to be the first at something (or at least to be the best at something), and to thereby make an impact on society, to leave a legacy. They describe the entrepreneurship process as a journey of exploration: for the right idea, for funds, for markets and for partners. It can be in the terminology used:

(AF4): "We haven't raised the flag yet, but we are very close...Everything (in air-traffic control, MM) is centralised; no one has a chance to step in. The fact that we deal with FAA and not the traffic control lets us in; nobody is allowed in the FAA zone."

(AF5): "Nobody updated this conception… Nobody did this research to find the root causes, and I feel proud that it was me who came in and said: guys maybe there is a need to change the concept here."

(AF7): "I don't know where did I find the guts…No body in the level of executive airplane new me…Nobody knew what a navigation contest is; I invented it, invented and started to run navigation competitions."

A growing-up story (Bildungsroman (Bal 1988, Bruner 1991, 2004, Czarniawska 2004)) - All the interviewees shared the experience of serving a significant period in leading roles in the

air force and then joining an already-founded or an on-the-verge-of-being-founded startup company, which they grew with (which at times might increase in staff to as many as 500-1000 employees), before founding their own enterprise and assuming a more significant role. As typical of coming-of-age stories, the interviewees begin with a traumatic event connected to their service: almost all were drafted to the air force against their will. In the words of one interviewee:

> *(AF5): "At one point you specify your preferences for service, and I did write down the air-force as an option but not at high priority… Some of my friends said clearly, they didn't want to serve in the air-force, but some of them ended up there anyway. Let's say that the bottom line of this story is that the air-force was not the 'highlight' everyone was aiming at; it was something sort of middle-of-the-road… At the end of it I can say in retrospect, after completing 6 years of service, that this stigma has a grain of truth."*

Another interview about leaving the flight academy:

> *(AF7): "So, after that stage they decided to move me to the helicopters' pilots' course and to the WSO[32] course; at that point I decided to quit the flight academy."*
>
> *"(After flight academy) I was told I' was going to be an air-controller. I told them they were crazy – I'm not going to sign additional two and a half years of service for this job. They told me – no problem – you are assigned to the artillery for two weeks and we talk to you after that…Then I said I'd sign... I remember that as a trauma, something that is etched in my head… I was sure I was [going to be] a pilot."*

In the maturation process that followed for the interviewees, each related a story of acceptance by the older, more experienced personnel: their stories begin with a kind of mentorship, usually comprising more than one phase, until they become assimilated into the air force, at which point they reconcile themselves with the air force's norms:

In the words of the interviewees:

> *(AF5): "I arrived at a wing that comprised many senior NCOs[33] and I managed to build personal relations with them, because they looked to me just like… some of them were real mentors to me, even years after I left the air force, and taught me most and foremost on the professional level; it was a great service and an excellent school."*

Another interviewee:

[32] Weapon System Officer
[33] Non-Commissioned-Officers

(AF6): "The guy that was my first wing commander relocated to a project in the United States, and then when he decided to return he called me up and asked if I would like to come over… When I returned to Israel, he was the unit commander and he called me again to come over and take command over the wing. I refused."

Another interviewee:

(AF4): "(The base commander) told me he thought there were more interesting positions for me, but even though I really valued him, I didn't follow his advice."

"This, by the way, follows me here when I speak with the young guys… I tell them that it is very important to do a role where you can close a loop.... meaning that you saw something from the conception, through the realisation, testing, and embedding. The fact is that the eight years I did in service undoubtedly very much contributed, because you can see the order of processes."

Another interviewee:

(AF7): "The commanders at the pre-flight-academy told me I was too nice and not tough enough, so I can't manage subordinates well."

"The commander told me – listen, you are good and professional, but you are not well organised and you are untidy."

"There was someone, a company, with a big telephone call-centre, who gave me in a week's period of time a course that I remember by heart, some of the things he said. This is the starting point of what I do today, when I market or sell."

It is, thus, a story that begins with frustration and dissatisfaction and ends with reconciliation in several cycles of redemption; this perspective is in line with identity adaptation process that are found, for example, in Hammack (2008), Watson (2009), and McAdams and McLean (2013), to name several. Evidently, the interviewees' mentorship continues after being discharged from service and only after completing one or more cycles do they feel mature enough to start a business of their own. The duration of this process, including the service years and the mentorship following them, usually lasts until they reach 30 or even much older; they will, from that point forward, become serial entrepreneurs, moving from one entrepreneurship to another.

The Bildungsroman can also be found in some variances (Tobias 2012), though these are not true narratives, but rather themes and plots that use the growing-up-like narrative as a dramatic focal point: Metamorphosis, Transformation, and Maturation. Each of the sub-variants has some ways of being a more accurate descriptor:

- The **Metamorphosis** narrative usually includes a type of 'curse' incurred on the protagonist. This might be somewhat harsher than being drafted into the air-force, but might be similar to the state of mind of air-force conscripts – they are drafted into the air force against their will (as can be inferred from the above citation); from their point of view they are under a curse.
- The **Transformation** narrative follows the process of change of the hero, not necessarily young, through stages of life, as he changes and moves from one character-state to another.
- The **Maturation** narrative deals with young persons with no clear goals or vision of the future; usually the transformation is triggered by an incident that challenges the protagonist's beliefs. This is the case of young professional academic officers fresh from the academy and officers' academy who are entering both the professional and military realms.

All these variants share the process of the transition of a protagonist from one state to another; they differ in alternate starting points, and the driving force that leads to the change. All of them fit to a certain extent each of the informants' personal stories. However, in the metamorphose narrative case, usually an antagonist is involved in the plot, while in our case there is no personal antagonist, rather the antagonist is an obscure 'institution' that arbitrarily casts a curse on our hero - a sort of Deus-ex-Machina. On the other hand, the metamorphose narrative incorporates a supporting role of the saviour of the protagonist from the curse; that character is present in all the informants' stories.

The growing-up narrative theme seems to play a profound role in the entrepreneurs' stories; it seems to instil in them a predisposition to the air force's management style, for example, to forgoing power-distance in their relationships. Probably, additional aspects of the Air-Force ethos can be found, but which are more difficult to evaluate (e.g. ethics). IAF officers most often find themselves involved in activities that either started long before they joined, or that begin with them, but will be ongoing for years after they themselves retire. Looking at the way conflicts are resolved in the stories of retirees, it seems they revolve around mentorship and induction by an older, more seasoned figure. This negative-start and positive-ending repetitive narrative ('redemption' type narrative) makes it unsurprising that the air force–retirees carry with them the toolbox that was bequeathed to them in their service.

In the words of the interviewees (highlighted by the author):

(AF4): "I had a few large projects there which I initiated, and I can say that I left my mark, and in that sense, I am very pleased; this was what had been important to me – to have that feeling that you are indeed doing something."

Another interviewee:

*(AF5): "We did some interesting things, things we could do… then all the activity began to flourish and **it was thrilling**."*

Another interviewee:

*(AF7): "I had always written (in questionnaires) that my first failure in life was flight academy… Now you take people with trauma and place them in front of the guys that did make it through the flight academy (pilots); on a daily basis they see and hear and work with them, this is the work in the air control centre. **I very much loved this job**, the role of air traffic controller, **loved very much and still do**."*

This is in contrast, for example, with navy veterans who were interviewed, whose response' show a tendency to adhere to narratives that are quite the opposite of the air force veterans'; namely, a positive-start and negative-ending ('contamination' type narrative) and a 'lone ranger' narrative as opposed to the typical 'redemption' narrative theme of air-force retirees. Furthermore, navy veterans go into lines of business that are barely related if not completely unrelated to their branch of service; they start afresh with a completely new toolbox.

3.2.1.4. Conclusions regarding Air-Force Veterans

The purpose of this research was to demonstrate through field research the common features of entrepreneurs with a service background in the IAF. It was suggested that the cultural imprint of the service would be carried over by the retirees to their own enterprises. On the basis of a relatively modest sample, the findings demonstrate that similar practical aspects and narratives are shared by the participants in this study. Air force veterans turned entrepreneurs and entrepreneurs in general share many characteristics considered by researchers to be the cornerstones of success, mainly a strong connection to their businesses. However, as was hypothesised, alongside these characteristics certain attributes emerged in the study that are more closely identified with the particular community in the study, some of which may be attributed to the experience gained during their military service.

Their ability to cope with bureaucracy and administrative difficulties is really noticeable, as is a willingness to take on complex and long lead-time projects, involving integration of multi-disciplined knowhow. In their managerial style, they are very systematic with respect to handling technological issues and lean in terms of the operational aspects of their business.

Only the essentials of the technology are kept in house, possibly because the technical personnel in the IAF are accustomed to handling these types of projects in such a manner. The bottom-line is that these entrepreneurs apply the cultural imprint that they carry from the air-force in the organisations they establish, and this is manifested both in practice and beliefs. This is in line with the model suggested by Schein (1991a) and Hambrick and Mason's (1984) Upper Echelon model.

It is suggested that the reason IAF retirees follow similar practices to those in the military is to some degree because of the ubiquitous Bildungsroman narrative shared by this population. This process of reconciliation results in adaptations of the IAF culture. It is further suggested that the process observed is similar to the re-socialisation process that is typical of total institutions (Goffman 1961), and it will be discussed shortly, however not to depth as it is a broad subject that deserves a separate research.

Another aspect of IAF veterans which the study revealed are their long-distance-runner characteristics: they accept the fact that the development processes may take considerable time and do not appear to be interested necessarily in making a quick profit, but are interested rather in their companies' organic growth. From a broader viewpoint, they resemble other entrepreneurs (Alvesson and Empson 2008, Alvesson 2013, chap. 3) in that they love what they do, are highly committed to it and are devoted to their companies, which they regard almost as an alter idem.

3.2.2. FINDINGS AMONGST NAVY VETERANS

3.2.2.1. PARTICIPANTS DEMOGRAPHY

Roughly thirty founders, retirees from the Israeli Navy, were approached; nine of them responded positively and were interviewed, 5 CEOs, 3 VPs and one founder without a formal title. The participants were found mainly by searching a Navy veterans' network, scanning LinkedIn profiles; broadly outlined profiles of the participants' and their companies', and using Talpionet[34], and they follow below:

[34] A network of elite technical group alumni.

Table 5 - Navy Participants Demography Summary

Company size	1-9 employees	10-49 employees	50-100 employees
	8	0	1

Military rank	majors	captains	lieutenant
	3	5	1

Years of service	5-9 years	10 years and more
	9	0

Age	20-29 years	30-39 years	40-50 years
	3	2	4

Education	PhD	MSc/MBA	BSc/BA
	2 (1 post-doc)	5	2

Type of service	Technical	Surface ship officers	Submarine officers
	4½	2½	2

Although the population size is similar to that of the Air-Force veterans, several characteristics should be noticed regarding this population:

- **Age** – a significant portion of the population is younger than 30 years, while there are no such younger interviewees in other populations.
- **Type of service** – interviewees from the Air-Force and Signals Corps are technical people. Air crew veterans were not interviewed (not intentionally, some were approached but refused to be interviewed), and the Signals Corps is not a fighting command but rather a supportive one. On the contrary, interviewees from the Navy include a mixture of both operational and technical officers. Among the operational personnel there is also diversity between surface ship officers and submariners. This is emphasized because each type of population demonstrated somewhat different characteristics from all aspects of this research. Each sub-group could be typified distinctly within itself, but also distinctly differentiated from the other despite being in the same military command. This will be elaborated upon in the findings and discussion. This point was brought up to me by the

interviewees, and I wish to express my thanks to them. The 'half' service was completed by a veteran who spent half the service as a missile boat officer and half as a technical officer.

In their words:

A missile boat officer said:

(NLT1): "…By the way, I think the submarines are a completely different movie."

While a submarine officer said:

(NS2): "A submarine is a very intimate unit, small, with almost no (external M.M) ranks … the commanding net is a little different and does not necessarily rely on experience, and not on ranks because ranks are often irrelevant… …the 'officers' and 'soldiers' terms are not part of the lingo… there is much more eye-level stuff, a lot of consulting with and learning from your soldiers; they teach you a lot and it is different from other places in the navy such as missile boats. "

Moreover, another interviewee further elaborated that:

(NL2): "There is such a thing as the spirit of the navy, but it is better described as 'the spirit of the vessel'. Every vessel is characterized a little differently; there is something that is general navy, but the conduct in every vessel is different."

3.2.2.2. ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE ASPECTS – FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Similarly to the Air Force veterans described above, some commonalities were detected; however, these were intertwined with inter-group diversity. The inter-group diversity will be shown to have a correlation to the type of service the veterans experienced; which could be a technical venue or a commanding venue which is also diversified by littoral ships and submarines.

The commonalities that emerged from the interviews will be categorised into two groups: practices, which can be related to the upper level of culture. Characteristics that are common to entrepreneurs in general, and were largely researched will not be neglected, but described in less detail.

Note that because sub-culture distinctions were observed in the ex-Navy population, in each quotation I added the main position he had been in the Navy. This serves to better distinguish between subtle nuances in culture.

One of the ex-Navy interviewees said something which summarised a view that underlines most of the ex-Navy officers who were interviewed; they don't want to be categorised or told what to do and how, whether or not it related to service in the navy:

(NL1): "I worked in a few organisations, I know what organisational culture is, and one of the things I am trying to do (successfully up to now) in my current position, where I am the entrepreneur and executive of the company, is just to avoid organisational culture."

Another interviewee said bluntly that demobilising from the Navy was like *"hatching from an egg"*; starting fresh with a clean sheet.

Type of businesses – There was no distinct characteristic of naval veterans' preference towards any specific field of operation; the only prominent drive is business success and money. One interviewee simply and openly said that he doesn't care about the type of business, just the challenge and the profit:

(NL1): "Nowadays, I have no interest in a complicated, technically challenging product, definitely not. The truth is this is not only nowadays, for me the main challenge was always leadership; doesn't matter if this is in projects or people or the integration and connection, this is what mainly draws me. This company is a business, it is a selling of the company as-is…What next? I will look for another one like this, one more that I can do."

And he continues to stress the preference to short term view, and business first:

(NL1): "…My goal was to find a project where you can find customers relatively quickly, at first sight, and not necessarily something extravagant that will make me the richest man on Earth. It is going step by step, looking for something you can get funding for; the minute funding can be raised my interest begins, and maybe this is also where it ends… if it's eventually a success it's a very nice bonus, but from my perspective – the day funds are raised and a contract signed I am done, everything else is just fun."

Note in the above quote that the interviewee is not emotionally attached to the company; one might say he is attached to the metaphor of the company, has no interest in a real business, just in his image as an entrepreneur and manager.

In the same vein, an interviewee with a technical background shared the no-nonsense business attitude:

(NT1): "Our vision is first of all business. What I want to say is that our business model reflects on our conduct…there is an organizational culture of a company that has business activity that every day should make business sense. We are 3 guys from the same unit in the navy where the vision was the same."

This is supported by yet another interviewee who claimed that:

(NS1): "To say now, I don't see myself building a large company like (company name) … This is not my vision right now… Shortly, things can change from end to end, and it is strictly business. I like diversity; I like to change things, this is what I love."

Another interviewee described how the company changed its focus from one type of business to another. He describes it in a positive tone, as he regards it as a good transition to a field of operation he feels more comfortable in:

(NS2): "We made a transition from gaming to education, to B2B education, this is where I felt comfortable and I knew what to do…I was used to it. It seemed amorphous to me to provide an application for the app store and hope someone will buy and pay; I have very little control."

In the above quote there is one hidden point which is also common to Air-Force veterans – the interviewees show a reluctance to deal directly with individual people, and prefer to work with businesses. Again, this might be attributed to many reasons: preference for a more structured and logical way of doing business, overhead investment in each negotiated deal produces more profit, targeted marketing is clearer etc.

Another interviewee showed his indifference to the type of business, as long as it fits the exploitation of his technical skills, and what he really sells is not a product but his ability to solve problems and provide a solution given the chance (i.e. given the appropriate funding):

(NT4): "We started asking ourselves what application does the market need, I mean, since we were in (many things, M.M) before, we did a lot of things, we do not have a single domain we went with, the title is signal processing."

"(Same interviewee NT4, about entrepreneurship) I did understand that you don't have to come up with the solutions, you need to…at least what we managed to come up with, is a distinctive need, to be with a vector of solutions, and come and say – look, this looks promising, I can't convince you today as if… let's be fair, I can't convince you it will work OK? It is not true and not decent, not fair; but I can tell you that that (me) with this team, with these resources, this is the optimal team to tackle that problem."

Yet another interviewee demonstrates his indifference towards the type of business, as long as it fits the exploitation of his technical skills. This is the only case in all of the research where

a substantial amount of money was raised by the entrepreneur; it was the apogee of the internet/cellular hype:

> *(NT1): "Then 1999-2000 came, bubble years. So, at 1999 we started to understand how things work. We were working hard while every running nose was dreaming about an exit, so we said lets also do it; it means we dug into it consciously in thinking what the startup will be, and we identified the WAP[35] world which is the old cellular internet protocol, and we went into it…We raised a lot of funds from the best IVCs in the country and developed a very nice product…but that WAP world went nowhere…so we folded everything up and went back to being a software house. We started from nearly nothing."*

In contrast to the previous case where funds were raised, the current entrepreneurship of the same interviewee did not raise funding, but relied on personal funds, and expects organic growth:

> *(NT1): "We are an old-style company, really working and getting paid for the work; we were profitable from day one. We never took a loan or raised funding or anything, and we will not grow exponentially; we grow very nicely every year, but you can grow 10%, 70%, 50% - we grow but organically and linearly. The company is profitable along the years, shows a steady growth over the years…We can go for an IPO which is a kind of an exit."*

Fundraising and managing money – Most of the interviewees did not raise funds, or raised a little amount, and run mostly on their savings (with one exception). An ex-missile boat officer that did raise funds described the process of fund raising from VC and private investors. This is not an FFF[36] type of fund raising common in small ventures:

> *(NL2): "We built a business plan, an economic plan for a year ahead, 3 years ahead, and we had a debate about what size of funding to look for. The easiest is to raise a small seed sum and try to produce a primary something; we followed the advice of many and went for a "round day" event."*
>
> *"Combined investment of most of the investment - most of the funding came from a VC fund and some from private investors which are not angels but just private investors that wanted to enter join the venture."*

[35] An obsolete cellular data technology
[36] FFF = Friends, Family and Fools

Another interviewee describes the process of fundraising. The fundraising is done via loans and not by share offering and capital investment. The issue of fund-raising goes hand-in-hand with the lean management attitude that is described in the next paragraph:

> *(NLT1): "**We didn't raise funding**. The initial development in the first two years and a little more and that's it. **We are self-sufficient**. The flexibility is accordingly – I cannot do something different if I want to lever up the inflow, if I want to develop something new, I need to raise funds. Within the budget limits we can do whatever we want. **The angels are still involved, some are relatives. They are with us and supported us during more difficult times when we needed loans**."*
>
> ***Lean companies, and its implication on management** – similarly to the previously described start-up companies run by Air-Force veterans, they prefer outsourcing a lot of the work. Note that there was a differentiation in attitude between various ex-technical personnel and ex-combat officers. Ex-combat officers outsourced almost everything and only managed, while ex-technical personnel did some of the core technical work in-house. The shortage of funding lead to modest facilities and bare minimum staff:*
>
> *(NS1): "Regarding the current startup – we have some kind of a garage; I more or less manage the whole operation, and we have a few labs for the engineers, each one has his own…there is at the moment a prototype for which I coordinate the testing, what will be done before what, and how we do it; accordingly we gather in the lab, if I need external guys or outsourcing I bring the outsourcing, product managers etc., I coordinate them. We meet to discuss the next milestone, do what we do, test, decide according to the results the next goals and that's how we proceed."*

Another interviewee describes a similar process of contracting and not hiring:

> *(NL2): "We had people that delivered services. One of them was a graphical designer, one an industrial designer, two actually. There was a lot of work, but no real workers in the company."*

It is common among the interviewed entrepreneurs to work without a salary. This is not particular to Navy veterans but was also observed in other services' veterans; this is simply what reality dictates, as one testified having worked for a long period without a salary, eating up his savings:

(NT2): "This is something that looking back I could allow myself - two and a half years to work without salary…"

Another interviewee had a similar story, with an elaboration of what leads to the situation of working for no salary. The interesting point here is that working with no salary was anticipated, and was part of the plan. The entrepreneurs knew exactly what they were delving into:

(NT4): "We don't have money; we built a budget that left us meagre salaries, we also do not reach the Chief Scientist[37] limit, we are 40%-80% below, but we built the budget top-down. We said first let's see what we need for equipment, then salaries so one of the things we do is really constant control. We operated almost a year without salaries."

In another company the outsourcing went to off-shore outsourcing, and budget limitations led to the hiring of Indian programmers:

(NS1): "So we hired a programmer, we realized we needed additional technical staff, we talked and searched the internet a lot, and we arrived at a few Indian guys that give programming services in India; we have been working with them for a month now."

Another interviewee brought out an advantage in his view of being lean; this is intertwined with a somewhat naïve view that he can handle any challenge, and that everything will eventually work out right:

(NS2) "I actually see it as an advantage (working lean M.M) …let me build everything, I know that every penny spent I made it. I mean guidance is nice, I like it less …it looks to me like a part of the challenge. One of the beautiful things I take with me is that everything will work out. We will do whatever is needed to make it happen. Why should I need somebody's feedback? I have my goals."

Yet another interviewee emphasizes the reliance on outsourcing, blended with a little arrogance:

(NL1): "Meanwhile I am the company and the company is me. I do everything in outsourcing… there is one more part time worker on half time."

One interviewee frankly noted the difficulty of running a lean company. In that case the company is practically fund-less, and there is a huge challenge in motivating the workers and

[37] An officer in the Israeli Ministry of Economics that can financially support emerging businesses.

sub-contractors to work on credit, or as commonly seen in startup companies, on shares issuing. He draws on his commanding experience as a naval officer to create motivation:

> *(NS1): "I have not raised funding yet…there is a challenge here, to motivate these guys despite the fact that they are not paid, they've already lost faith in the project because they've been working on it for 5 years already and they haven't seen a penny yet; so it was also a challenge to motivate people which is something you do on a daily basis in your job as a naval officer. Maybe a little different…but the tools are the same."*

But also out a somewhat sarcastic positive side of thinness - a practical reason for leanness is that a lean company is easy to shut down and move on to another business:

> *(NL1): "For me to shut everything down, sit cross-legged at home and think what the hell I need to do to solve this or that problem is cheap, ridiculously cheap, because I don't draw a salary, I am lean, lean, lean…This way – my way – is the only way; you need to be clear, you need to be only one person and everything outsourced."*

When asked whether it was not a rather lonely experience he said:

> *(NL1): "I don't need to worry about anybody, don't need to wonder if I am boring anyone, don't need to worry about salaries, or should I fire or not fire somebody, and this is nice and this is not nice – something with the organisational culture to do with it…I managed so well with the way I am now; when you said 'loneliness' I laughed, loneliness and that, yes this is the main drawback of it, but I am lonely by definition."*

In a previous quote an interviewee said they worked in garages, and at home. Another interviewee describes a similar case - they do not work in permanent premises; they work wherever they can – at home, friends' homes, coffee shops, abandoned offices, backyards:

> *(NLT1): "In the first stage we worked in the abandoned offices of retired companies or at an accelerator office. They are supportive and invite you to come and work in their premises if you like, but most of the work was at the offices or labs of the college. The working site changed all the time and we prepared it a few days in advance."*

A similar hardship was described by another interviewee with a technical background. Several issues are described here and on the explicit level is the lack of resources which results in

tough working conditions, and on the implicit level the lack of experience that drives entrepreneurs beyond their true abilities. Note that this interviewee is in the 40-50 years of age range, and has several startups on his CV:

> *(NT1): "(describing a previous startup, M.M) – I could have been a millionaire 20 times over with that startup, but it doesn't matter; we were very naïve to produce a consumer product – two people in a basement…"*

As a contrast – one of the companies surveyed is a more established firm with ~100 personnel, and that company resides in a high-tech park with well-appointed offices; a company that size cannot be run from a shamble. Another two companies reside in offices; however, I was not allowed in on account of business confidentiality.

Vision, structured planning and control – some differences were seen between subgroups within the Navy veterans; some were for planning and some against. Mainly ex-submarine officers were for. Some of the quotes were already presented above. Firstly, some ex-operational interviewees show indifference towards the business. They show a tendency to do whatever comes along, look for an exit through a buy-out, and just do the bare minimum to get a thing going:

> *(NS2): "We decided (the guys from naval academy M.M) that if we have some good idea we'll go out and work on a startup."*
>
> *(NS1): "At the moment the future strategy is exit, not to merge etc., some big company will buy you. "*

A completely opposite view was expressed by a technical veteran. This interviewee shows more empathy, talks about the success of the company and not merely his own personal success (author's emphasis):

> *(NT4): "In my view a success for a startup would be becoming a sustainable company that will operate and produce products, support families and provide real solutions to the market it operates in. Yes, I do look for (an organic growth M.M) this is what interests me. I want to grow some enterprise from zero when the financial issue is less the target, of course it is a mean and you can't survive without it, you must…but I can't tell you I do this because I want to be rich. If you tell me today that in 5-10 years there will be a company of 50 people that will make sales of 20 million dollars and will pay its employees and owners nicely and then, you know, it's enough."*

Another interviewee, ex-missile-boat, said that he did make a plan, realising it is needed to raise funding; not because he believed it is need to run the company, but because it is expected by investors:

> *(NL2): "We built a business plan, an economic plan for a year ahead, 3 years ahead, and we had a debate about what size of funding to look for. The easiest is to raise a small seed sum and try to produce a primary something; we followed the advice of many and went for a "round day" event."*

Yet another interviewee, ex-patrol-boat, expressed his dislike for methodological planning:

> *(NL1): "The minute I put an orderly plan on a Gantt[38] chart I cannot do anything. The minute I write myself a to-do list of 20 tasks I take out only, and if I do not write anything… in that part, the act of planning, not of doing, I do not work tidily; I want fast efficiency. I have this 'disorder' in my head. I do things in very much an orderly way, on a fanatical level; but with the infrastructure and long-term planning, setting goals it's a complete chaos. I have a board that does not know how to control me, and there is such a confidence level that they trust me and they don't want to control."*

Another interviewee, ex-submariner, presented a view which is more in line with the technical people than with littoral ships' veterans; this entrepreneur plans and documents his actions, and moreover attributes this to habits he acquired in his military service. It is interesting to note that he served in the submarines' flotilla, and this view is shared by another ex-officer from the same flotilla:

> *(NS2): "Mainly I put everything on paper, because I am used to doing things in my own order, and not with notebooks and scratchpads. This is something I carry over from service; how an operational need looks, how a specification should look, how to divide it into milestones. I feel at home with it. A lot of time I do it for myself and do not necessarily share it."*

Another ex-submariner adds to the planning methodology also using a methodology of some kind; note his use of an open-source planning tool, which is different from the simple technique used by the previous interviewee, but shares the process of planning and documenting (similar technique, different technology):

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[38] A bar chart that illustrates a project schedule (Wikipedia)

(NS1): "You see, there are nowadays a lot of tools for entrepreneurs on the internet; when you enter that world you read, you enter Google countless times a day, anything you want you ask Google; it is the entrepreneur's best friend. On Google you understand very quickly what tools are good for you, how many people are using what tools, which tool is good for international work. Apart from that, Trello[39] is a tool I read about on the internet before, and regardless we talked about it, we started by downloading it, looked at it; it is very user-friendly, and so we started working with it."

One of the companies reviewed uses off-shore out-sourcing, working with Indian software programmers; this in itself required the company to plan ahead, and document the requirements from the sub-contractor, probably because otherwise one cannot make a contract with a remote sub-contractor:

(NS1): "(About working with Indians, M.M) We first write a detailed document with as many mock-ups and insights and reviews and shots and explanations about each feature as possible; after that you isolate each feature into documents of that sort."

Disregard for planning is also demonstrated in the following quotation, which describes the growing process of the company which is not accompanied by pre-planning:

(NT1): "The company is growing very fast, and goes from a state of being a very small company to medium size, and now not so small, and it struggles to do this fast growing…meaning our organizational structure doesn't necessarily optimally fit our size. We also have left over accretion in our structure that fits a smaller company. It is also a huge effort to grow like that."

In the following, rather lengthy, quotation, one of the interviewees develops the explanation of why there is no need in his view to invest too much effort in pre-planning. In his view the combined technical and business challenge is much harder because it has more variables and uncertainties which make it harder to manage. This description, although not explicitly mentioned, is the philosophy that lies in the basis of the 'Agile' development methodology. Furthermore, there is an emotional aspect involved, in contrast to the indifferent attitude demonstrated by some of the Navy interviewees towards their businesses. Note again that he speaks about the prosperity of the company and not only his own:

[39] Trello is a web-based project management application

(NT4): "First of all, when you start an entrepreneurship…the scientific challenge is uni-dimensional at the end of it, you have a problem…, the business challenge is more multi-dimensional, meaning there is fear here, and when you start a company you by the end of it, let's say, your challenge is not to solve one technical problem or another, but the technical problem is associated with a more transcendental goal which is the survival, or prosperity, of the company."

The same interviewee also expresses his disbelief in too much pre-emptive planning, which he regards as useless. What he describes, without calling it by name is a 'spiral' methodology for development:

(NT4): "You see, progression of the development, in my view, is always a spiral; I mean you start with something, you correct, correct, correct, now you seem to go back to the beginning, but this is not so – you have some experience and you are a little better…I don't see the end (from the beginning M.M)."

Negligence of planning can be also implied from the following quote, that demonstrates, in my opinion, a typical case of an entrepreneur who starts a business in a field he has no knowledge about, and then discovers to his surprise that there is no profit there; in this case this is a company that started as a school books provider:

(NS2): "The regulation is very strong for good and bad. The marginal profit is negligible…From the start I say that I have no incentive to step into this market as a startup that should demonstrate some growth rate, or show revenues. I need to show my investors a multiplier of 12-30. In Israel I reach my limit very quickly. Why should I exert myself here? The selling is so slow. The state changes the rules twice a week; for example, once I created a content, I can't change it for four years. A mathematics book that comes out cannot be changed."

About daily managing the company – in the following quotes an ex-submariner interviewee describes his daily tasks. Several points should be emphasized about this quote: Firstly, the entrepreneur uses some personal technique to keep up with what is going on in the company which is a heritage of techniques he used, and probably acquired, in his military service. Secondly, there is no real team work; there are 'team' members who seem to work each by themselves, while the bigger picture is seen by the entrepreneur. Thirdly, this is learned from another quote from this interviewee, there are no company premises; each one of the engineers works in his own private premises:

(NS2): "I said we have 3 engineers – electronics, software, and mechanics. I think my technical background as an electronics officer in a submarine gave me a lot of tools to help cope with this task. I have a very broad view; I see 3 engineers with 15 years of experience, and still I contribute to trouble-shooting on the technical engineering level, despite the fact that I'm not an engineer. Also, on the project level and integration, I need to get inputs from the engineers and build the picture. The picture helps me also to create a project plan and I always control myself."

About following and controlling the development progress

(NS2): "Specifically here I crafted a project web; I used the technical knowhow I gathered in the military service, I talked with all the engineers, learned the product inside out for a week, and after a lot of talks with the engineers I built a project plan and I update it all the time; this is how I check what is the constraint that is built around some activities; I always think how to make it more efficient."

Note in the following quote from the same interviewee that he uses the term 'Sprint' which is associated with the 'Agile' and 'Scrum' development methodologies, but probably without being familiar with the philosophy behind it; it can be inferred from the fact that he notices that he tries to make sure the sprints serve the development purposes, while they should be *derived* from the larger goals and constraints:

(NS2): "In the world of programming a lot is working in 'sprints'; a sprint of a week, a sprint of two weeks that have a very definitive goal with specific features. I need to see that these sprints fit the larger milestones objectives. Once a week I do a debriefing here; it is called an entrepreneurs' meeting. It is very similar to a weekly debriefing I had with my commander to describe what I did last week and what are the goals for the next week."

Addressing the methodology used in development one interviewee expressed his indifference to methodology and structured planning and management. In his point of view all of this is a waste of effort unless a customer requires it; in that case he will adopt any methodology required by that customer. It can be implied from his remarks that he cannot adhere to a specific set of values and tools because these might conflict with customers' cultures. The wording suggests that he doesn't think highly of the customers' choice of procedures:

(NT1): "The development methods are derived from our customers which are military customers…we are obliged overall to develop with military procedures, QA

such as in the large military industry integrators…I would not have done it if I 'hadn't had to, definitely not ISO[40]; I would have had some, I guess if I were free to choose, free and happy, I would have used the more modern things such as scram and agile and their sort; I don't have the privilege at all, so it is nice…"

Another interviewee:

(NLT1): "We have now been operating for 4-5 years. I started it after I left (company name), and the guys that joined in also came from (same company name). We are now 4 people. ***We all sit here****…"We are a small team,* ***everyone except me is working on the development, and I do the rest*** *– marketing, talking with customers and the like. So,* ***the work is divided according to whatever everyone likes****; in some cases, two or more work together. It is fluid. We plan according to when we need to deliver. When it is more on a system level we plan together."*

The homeliness of the premises is evident, like a shared dormitory; however, it is not clear whether this is out of choice or compelled by budget limitations:

(NLT1): "We sit in a circle, there is a table in the middle, and when needed we turn back to face the centre."

That interviewee draws a similarity between the way he operates his company and his service in the Navy. Note that there is no reference to a specific type of conduct that can be attributed to the Navy, but rather a self-reference which reflects on the service in the Navy, demonstrating the independence of the interviewee inside the Naval 'institution':

(NLT1): "This is how I worked in HQ[41]; ***I decided what I wanted to do****."*

The above quotation is typical for Navy officers in service in the HQ, in contrast to those serving at sea. Note here the difference between serving in the flotilla and serving in HQ, which is shared by both submarine officers and surface boats officers. Also note the difference in passion involved in each of them. Note that what he depicts is both a classical and not a classical total institution because of several points: 1) the seclusion of the physical environment and literal isolation from the outside world when under water, 2) the complete blend of personal and public environments, 3) complete control over every aspect of time and

[40] International standards organisation
[41] Headquarters

conduct, 4) strict regulations and formalities while on and off duty; and on the other hand: 1) the lack of segregation between officers, NCO's[42] and soldiers, 2) having mutual enemies – the real enemy, the sea, and the submarine itself, 3) the comradeship of a military unit in service which is different from boot camp.

Note also the parallel lines that can be drawn between the submariners' attitude and the ex-Air-Force officers' attitude in the aspect of debriefing. It is important because of several reasons: 1) it lowers the power distance and hence the 'total institution' effect as a lower rank has a regular opportunity to criticize his superiors, 2) it helps in sharing the responsibility between everybody, and it has a motivating effect as everyone can contribute regardless of rank and position. The relevant end effect is a lowering of the classic 'total institution' picture. Moreover, one should remember that the naval officers' service in all the units is completely voluntary; all the interviewees volunteered to service.

> *(NS2): "**I wanted to be in the army in the best place I could achieve**. Like most in my settlement, with no prior experience I went to flight academy sorting and at the end of the sorting I was rejected. It was Friday, and I got a letter from the naval officers' academy asking me to start on Sunday and that I should be in it."*

Another interviewee:

> *(NL1): "Seamanship is the love of my life, so upon drafting I went directly to the naval officers' academy."*

In the same vein, another submarines officer noted:

> *(NS1): "I drafted with a purpose to do the best I can."*

Continuing with the former interviewee, he emphasises the positive nature of his service:

> *(NS2): "I made progress in the submarines flotilla, and **I had an awesome service in that unit**."*

The situation described in the following quotations lacks narrative substance, but rather depicts the atmosphere in the submarine which is related to the 'total institution' aspect. The point that contributes to the narrative is the change of positions from the flotilla to HQ:

> *(NS2): "A submarine is a very intimate unit, small, with almost no ranks (external signs… M.M); the command margin (==power distance M.M) is very, very low. Most of the time there is no uniform, **everybody wears civilian clothes**; during sails your commander who is a Lt.Col. and you and your soldiers are wearing civilian*

[42] Non-Commissioned Officer

*clothes and **you don't see ranks**. You talk freely most of the time. **No salutes and the military stuff** you imagine. **I felt it was like a small factory where one comes to work**. I, as an officer, had soldiers much older than me… the commanding net is a little different and does not necessarily rely on experience, and not on ranks because ranks are often irrelevant. The feeling is more of motivating a team of workers…the 'officers' and 'soldiers' terms are not part of the lingo… there is much more eye-level stuff, a lot of consulting with and learning from your soldiers; they teach you a lot and **it is different from other places in the navy such as missile boats** "*

And when changing position to a HQ post:

*(NS2): "When I came to the HQ **my position was not occupied which is very common**. **Now the position I held does not exist, not occupied**. How do you manage? You manage…There are a lot of topics that need attention, especially in our unit that expanded rapidly and human resources did not always follow at the same pace. More submarines came, you needed more crew, more training, more planning and managing, and resources are scarce."*

The following quotation, which is typical, demonstrates the lack of continuity (=tradition) in the Navy:

(NS2): "I had no overlapping (in the HQ position MM); and my position was manned half a year after I left."

The following quotation also repeats itself among all the ex-Navy officers – the fact they have the freedom to do almost whatever they believe is important, with little or no guidance from higher echelons:

(NS2): "You promote what you believe is important…sometime some higher ranks want something specific, but in the end, what is of interest to you gets promoted; this is what you will do and what you present. Your span of responsibility is so large, and you deal with so many topics that nobody can be really updated on everything and control you."

The next quotation demonstrates that operability is the top priority; which implies that the short-term view is preferred to the long-term view. This is also mentioned by another interviewee

(NS2): "Operability is above everything regardless of what it is. ***The long-term projects, the tests are very nice, but operability is top priority****…you should do everything you can to make it happen, this is what moves this whole thing."*

An interviewee from the submarines attributes the strictness and orderly conduct to the British Navy and German Navy traditions on which the Israeli Navy submarine flotilla is based. This is similar to the British tradition which lies in the foundations of the Israeli Air Force and was described earlier:

(NS2): "I would say there is professionalism in the flotilla, on a very high level. In my opinion it comes from the countries we work with; I ***mean everything is rooted in the British and German navies, I mean all the working methodologies and procedures…This is only in the submarines****. The simplest thing – I repeat every word my commander says to me, this comes from the British navy. Our first submarines were British so all the methodologies were built around that. Today there are German things because we have German submarines, but the methodologies, the way you look at things is British…****some of the commands are in English****."*

In the following quotations the interviewee again analyses the similarity he sees between the submarines culture and the Air-Force culture; this is further amplified by his description of the debriefing processes that take place in the submarines:

(NS2): "The unit is very meticulous; ***I wasn't in the Air-Force but I believe it is very similar, I mean everything is under procedure****. There is no such thing that there is no procedure. When going to sea there is no speech apart from the mess, where talking is free. Everything revolves around commands and procedures, procedures I work with my soldiers that are on shift, procedure of back reporting,* ***everything about procedures, orders and orders****."*

He suggests that the similarity to the Air-Force stems from similarity in the deadly hazardous type of operation:

(NS2): "In my opinion it all stems from safety. I mean, in a submarine every silly thing can cause…I believe this is true also for aircrafts. My enemy is not external, it is simply the submarines itself…hydraulic pressure, gases, high power, explosives. Soldiers at the lowest level are responsible for such importance…it is enough that one of them did not close a valve correctly and everyone dies, it's that simple."

Another similarity to the Air-Force is in the continuous debriefings, that was elaborated upon when discussing the Air-Force interviews:

> *(NS2): "**All day long you debrief events**. You debrief your crew, then there is section debriefing and then officers debriefing. All day long. It begins with speaking with all the soldiers, and I have an interest in what everyone has to say."*

Another interviewee stressed that although he used outsourcing, he has not given up the quality of the product, which in his view is the basis of a good company. This point of view is also one of the foundations of the 'Agile' methodology, despite the fact that this interviewee despises methodology and organisational culture (this can be observed in other quotations):

> *(NL1): "One of the first things I did in the company was hiring the services of establishing a quality control system, from day one of the company, before we started anything. Why such a system? – because it should be done that way; if you start working properly you don't need later on to do back-dating[43] and reverse engineering. I cannot tell you that I comply a million percent, that there is no more to be done and I can't be tidier… "*

Another interviewee pointed to the risky nature of his enterprise which is involved with financial analysis and the evaluation of companies, and the competitive environment they work in; their ties with the customers are strictly business, there is no partnership here as was commonly perceived in Air Force companies:

> *(NT2): "They [the customers, M.M] are like I said beforehand, they have alternatives to change us, we have head to head competitors, we can be exchanged, not easy but possible, and they have other alternatives."*

One of the interviewees analysed in a nut-shell the boundary conditions that funding constraints impose on startup companies, and how it practically affects their way of conducting themselves. The development of the business is far from optimal; it is dictated by funding issues and diverts the entrepreneurs' focus to **survival**:

> *(NT4): "In a startup you have very stringent financial constraints; therefore, **your objective function is not scientific and not technical – it is economical**, and it causes many times' splits. I will give you an example, if somebody had come to me today and offered 10, 5 million dollars I would have sat with my partner and we*

[43] Back-dating is an illegal act where options to shares of a company are falsely dated to a date earlier than their original issuing date which gives them a higher value.

*would have developed a product; we would have written a work plan and would have done everything by the book, a laboratory demonstration, simulations, first article visibility, prototype, engineering prototype, zero series, all this stuff OK? But**, if someone comes to me and says instead of 5 million dollars you have half a million, then you can't have product development as your objective; I mean there will be a product in the end, but your problem is raising the next funding. You must produce value not a product…**Now, sometimes this script, I also saw it in startup companies, goes to absurdity; I had a CEO that used to lie to his investors… The level of boldness that I've seen, it was very bold, and that is what the economic consultation does."*

I will now try to discuss the following aspects of the findings:

- Is there commonality that typifies the organisational culture of Navy veterans as entrepreneurs?
- If such commonality exists – does it draw on service in the Israeli Navy?
- If so – can the assimilation be related to a 'total institution' condition?

Firstly, I will look at the last point - there is undoubtedly a consensus that service on a marine vessel has the potential to constitute a 'total institution' environment. The closed environment, long periods of physical isolation from external influences (especially on-board submarines), with strict control over every activity around the clock, no border between work/public life and private life, a strict hierarchy (more prominent in littoral ships) are the exact prescription for a 'total institution' setting. This was already thoroughly discussed in chapter 2; a specific discussion of the total institution in the context of marine vessels can be found (Zurcher 1963, c.f. Bierly 1995, Dennett *et al.* 2014, Theotokas *et al.* 2014, Dunn 2015). I start with commonalities between the interviews; in the next step I shall demonstrate sub-cultures within this group:

***Lean companies* -** All the interviewees run Lean entrepreneurships; they either raise limited funding that is not sufficient for salaries, or raise none at all. This causes some hindrance, but by no means discourages them from continuing the enterprise. Some interviewees raised the question of legitimacy – how do you convince investors to fund you? How do you persuade people to work for you, sometimes without a salary? You need to build a legitimacy base, and military service is one of the tools that can be used for that end. When you fail to do that, or are reluctant to put in the needed effort you find yourself working alone; this is justified and

wrapped up in an ideology that working alone is better. Hence, they work in garages, draw no salaries and still continue.

Outsourcing **-** All of them outsource a large portion of the work to subcontracting; this is common in startups and was observed across all the interviews, not only in Navy veterans.

> *(NL1): "I do everything in outsourcing… there is one more part time worker in half time."*
>
> *(NLT1): "…two and a half years to work without salary"*

No structured planning and management **-** They don't plan too much, although some do to some extent, and this will be discussed below. This lack of planning occurs both before the establishment of the entrepreneurship, and during its conduct. Some of this is due to lack of experience and knowledge, and some of it is because they believe they don't need it. A typical attitude is displayed by one of the interviewees:

> *(NL1): "The minute I put an orderly plan on a GANTT chart I cannot do anything. The minute I write myself a to-do list of 20 tasks I take out only, and if I do not write anything… in that part, the act of planning, not of doing, I do not work tidy; I want fast efficient. I have this 'disorder' in my head. I do thing very very orderly, on a fanatic level; but on the infrastructure and long-term planning, setting goals it's a complete chaos."*

But there is also another quite opposite example by another interviewee:

> *(NLT1): "We built a business plan, an economic plan for a year ahead, 3 years ahead."*

Naval service planning legacy – Although they tend not to tie themselves to their Navy backgrounds, one of the interviewees mentioned that he uses skills from his commanding experience, and generally they do not use planning and managing tools, a practice that can be traced back to military service. Two reasons may be the cause of that: 1) there are no such consistent tools that are applied across the navy, so each draw on his personal experience in his flotilla; 2) they don't have confidence, or good experience, with the tools they used in their service. It can be seen in the interviews that each one developed an individual method for conduct in HQ, but all operational officers commonly demonstrate mainly short-term planning versus long term planning. This individuality can be also seen in their rejection of the web of inter-support between ex-Navy veterans; they seem to appreciate the support, brotherhood

and loyalty of the ex-Navy fraternity, but do not value it as having a significant contribution for their companies' success.

No specific type of business – Although there is a remarkable presence for medical devices companies among the surveyed entrepreneurships, they do not care too much what the business is about, and they don't care too much about the business. One cannot find words of affection, or any emotion for that matter, regarding the companies. The linkage between the personal self and the business self is weak. Being an entrepreneur is a thing they do, it is not a part of their personality. Some of that attitude might be attributed to the motivated nature of the interviewees; naval officers' academy has a high threshold of acceptance and low probability of successful graduation in almost any naval force. This occurs even in less prestigious military academies; see for example Yu's research into Taiwanese cadets (Yu 2014) which demonstrates their motivation, and relates it to several factors such as economic consideration, patriotism etc. Furthermore, Popper and Mayseless (2007) also relate motivation to the future success of cadets as leaders. Hence, in a nut-shell: success is sought regardless of the field. Note that this is in contrast to the typical Air Force veterans for whom it seems that they show a need to excel and merely succeed business-wise, but it is in line with Signals Corps veterans' characteristics which will be discussed in section 3.2.3.

Business first, no urge for innovation, no fear of competition **-** They do not look for innovation; they plunge into existing markets in which competitors already exist, and their hoped-for competitive advantage is minor – doing better or more cheaply something that somebody else is already doing. Most do not have an urge to be the leaders in the field, just to make an impression.

> *(NT2): "…we have head to head competitors, we can be exchanged, not easy but possible."*
>
> *(NT4): "We started asking ourselves what application does the market need, I mean, since we were in (many things, M.M) before, we did a lot of things, we do not have a single domain we went with, the title is signal processing."*

As mentioned earlier, it emerges from the research that **three distinct sub-populations** can be categorised within the ex-Navy veterans:

- Littoral ships ex-officers
- Submarines ex-officers
- Technical ex-officers

Before I elaborate upon the differences in observation, one should note that there are obvious differences between the technical personnel service environments, littoral ships environment and submarine environment; the difference in the service environment is both in the physical and cultural environment (which also stems from the physical environment). Furthermore, each goes through a different educational path upon drafting, due to the different types of tasks – one is more academic while the other is more command oriented. Additionally, there is a difference in age between the technical officers and operational officers. Although they serve a similar period of obligatory service the technical personnel tend to voluntarily extend their service period a little (which is also why most of them are demobilised as Majors, while the operational officers are usually demobilised as Captains), they tend to continue their studies to PhD and beyond which also delays their going into business, they sometime join other established companies before they start their own, and also they tend to be serial entrepreneurs. Being a serial entrepreneur means you keep starting over new things and that is why they are more in the 30-50 years of age bracket. One ex-technical officer considered entrepreneurship to be a luxury for people of his age. A similar reference to age was made by a Signals Corps veteran and shown in the next section, but this one says it in a negative way:

> *(NT4, on entrepreneurs, M.M): "The distribution is bi-modal[44]; mostly they are like us – people in the second stage of their career, entrepreneurship is a luxury, I tell you if you want to see entrepreneurs more in the sense of…to be an entrepreneur at the age of 21 before you are committed is small wisdom. An entrepreneur at the age of 35 with 2 children is the real thing, without a rich father, these are the men…"*

The **operational officers**, those that were interviewed, plunge into business straight away so they are quite young (although older than entrepreneurs worldwide.) Operational officers of an older age were not available for interviewing because they are scarce; they serve until a much older age, and then they probably do not become entrepreneurs. Moreover, they are reluctant to being interviewed.

- Their vision about the company's future can be divided to two groups – The veterans with operational backgrounds are looking for an exit, while the veterans with technical backgrounds do not talk about an exit but are looking at organic growth in a business that is sustainable and provides subsistence for themselves and their employees.

[44] Meaning the distribution has two centres of mass at two different ages.

- In agreement with the previous point, the technical people are more planning oriented; at least at the starting point they look further ahead. This does not mean they change the business scope on the fly as the business' needs call for. Between the two extremes of the technical personnel's planning orientation and the littoral ships' reluctance to plan, the ex-submariners are more planning oriented than the surface ship officers, both before establishing the business and during its the daily operation. This can be seen, for example when, they outsource – they prepare requirements, tasks, contracts and monitoring of the outsourced contractors.

When trying to assess the option that Navy culture is imprinted in the Navy veterans one gets an answer that is 'probably not', at least from the technical personnel on the declarative level. This is supported by the observations, for example in the words of one interviewee (author's emphasis):

> *(NT1): "You know sometimes **I don't feel** that this is… **That there is a mind-set that I brought from the Navy and I take it onwards**. If anything, because of my role (in the Navy, MM) I was exposed to how a project is managed, more than one project from more than one company, I no longer remember all the companies… and this is an exposure of a completely different type [from military M.M], I have barely spent time in the Navy, I was most of the time in industry."*

Regarding the organizational culture in the Navy, one interviewee described his service in HQ, (also quoted earlier in relation to another topic):

> *(NLT1): "This is how I worked in HQ; **I decided what I wanted to do**."*

Another interviewee elaborates upon the disorganised type of work and its roots:

> *(NT1): "We as **the Navy [in contrast to the Air-Force M.M.] did not really copy from the American Air Force**, in the Navy, if you remember, the first days of Yohai Ben-Nun[45] and all those sorts, it was half commando, half … you know, **you steal a boat from here, a boat from there**, Aliyah Bet[46], ..**you build some wreck**, you put on it hundreds of people and you bring them to Israel, **this is the way the Navy began**, and then I say…, **so there will be here something less organized, arranged**, since **you are looking for what is shared, organized, arranged, and I say that in***

[45] One of the first Israeli navy commanders

[46] Aliyah Bet, or Aliyah B, since Bet is the second letter of the Hebrew alphabet, was the code name given to the illegal immigration of Jews into the land of Israel when it was under the British mandate during the years 1934-1948.

the Navy you will find what is complementary*…I think that the Navy learned during movement and not from somebody else."*

(NT1, about the discontinuity in positions occupation) "…They have no choice, who could they put there? The project began and there are no people, I am with experience, I came in two years earlier, I am one of those with the most experience…, there are no people, the team is ten times the size of what was before…They brought people from the missile boats, and also lieutenant colonels who had some idiotic position in the missile boat and they are stuck in the army and they are dragged until their pension and are hated…"

(NT1, about the lack in mentorship and guidance) "…Yes, and also ***our understanding as young people is that those above are not the address***[47]*, so you don't have a choice…* ***this was definitely my feeling, that there was a void.*** *The project went from zero to a billion dollars, before they created the billion dollars it was not there. There were a few people who wanted budgets, and then suddenly approvals [of budget M.M] began to happen…"*

The contrast between the organisational culture on-board vessels and in the HQ can also be observed in the following quotation:

*(NLT1): "****On the missile boat there is a clear hierarchy****, it is like the infantry; very clear who is in command, because it cannot work any other way."*

It seems that he sees a different picture when regarding the work on the shore:

*(NLT1): "…****What I have seen in HQ is ordered work****, maybe they didn't realise that, but in retrospect with my experience as a developer the development body worked nicely.* ***The operational side was less ordered****, and operational research was a small body with a lot of tasks."*

*(NLT1): "…****When I left nobody debriefed me to get a lesson; neither was I asked during the project****. When something of the sort was done it was on a personal basis when someone showed a specific interest. "*

In the previous section a submariner noted that *"operability is top priority";* this remark in conjunction with the above mention about disorder agrees with a cultural study of the US armed forces (Haynes 1998). Haynes describes the type of service in the Navy, with relatively short leaves on shore which are predominantly used for *"technical schools or technical,*

[47] Meaning – they don't have the answers

budget, or manpower-oriented program offices. There is little room in a Navy officer's career path to study the finer points of naval history and naval strategy" so they tend to have a less broad view and their point of view is based mainly on their personal experience. Since their personal experience is mostly operational this is their primary focus. This suggestion might not fit exactly the situation in the Israeli Navy but it seems that there is a common result which is a shorter-term view, adherence to common practice rather than looking for innovations; and the innovations stem more from an operational need rather than from a structured longer time scale view.

Regarding the type of hierarchy on board a missile boat, a technical interviewee said that in his opinion what adds to this type of conduct is the unusual difficulty of the service:

> *(NT3): "Typical Israeli navy vessels have 3 times more missions than other navies, with about a third of the staff for the same mission. The density and length of shifts leave one breathless."*

Hence, in his opinion, life on the missile boat makes it hard to maintain operability without a strict hierarchy. This does not explain the different culture on submarines on which the life is even tougher, so I doubt that what he describes is the true reason, and I attribute it more to tradition[48]:

> *(NT3): "…On the vessels the commanding hierarchy is extreme; the captain has no name except 'captain', you are not allowed to look him in the eye. The officers are segregated from the sailors; however, despite eating together in the captain's quarters the distance between them (the captain and the other officers) is clear."*

In fact, this is one of the common sea narratives, and it is an ethos which Hester Bloom (2008), while regarding 18th century navies (mostly British), also describes: *"The ship's captain was an absolute boss, against whom there was little recourse; action against a tyrannical captain could be judged mutinous and punishable by death. Well into the middle of the nineteenth century, until a successful reform effort driven by sailors themselves, captains had the authority to administer corporal punishment in the form of flogging. Such was the brutality of this practice that sailors routinely compared flogging victims to chattel slaves and captains to slavemasters.";* this appears on many biographies of seafaring men, see for example an excerpt from Dana's memories as a sailor (1868, p. 19): *"The captain, in the first place, is lord paramount. He stands no watch, comes and goes when he pleases, is accountable to no one, and must be obeyed in everything, without a question*

[48] *"When the Captain comes by your position for inspection, don't blink and don't breathe!"* (Zurcher 1963)

even from his chief officer. He has the power to turn his officers off duty, and even to break them and make them do duty as sailors in the forecastle. Where there are no passengers and no supercargo, as in our vessel, he has no companion but his own dignity…" Fiction and non-fiction literature revolving around this topic is abundant. The reasoning behind this is the fact that a captain's position was traditionally occupied by members of distinguished families, sometimes being a relative of the fleet owner also helped, and in general the captains, petty officers and sailors all came from different backgrounds and classes (Fury 1998, pp. 79, 96). This tradition was copied from the class-oriented behaviour of the British, Spanish and Dutch etc. into the micro-cosmos of the ships. The segregation between the classes was obvious to all the involved sides (McLeod 2010). The current culture aboard ships has is roots somewhere in the 16th century (Garcia 2014) at the time of longer ocean-crossing navigation, when the roles of 'Captain', 'Navigator' and other ship members where more formally created; of course they had already existed for centuries, but at that time they were distinguished more clearly from ownership of the vessel, and more formal education and training toward these roles were crafted. The culture that has evolved over the centuries is a combination of the hardship of life at sea with its peril: work at sea meant virtual incarceration; shipboard life constituted a binding chain of limits: limited space, limited freedom, limited movement, limited sensory simulation, and limited choices of leisure activities, social interaction, food and play, all of which necessitates that everybody work together as a team (they are 'in the same boat' literally). All the while there is a hierarchy on board, many times a micro cosmos copied from the classes on land. In that culture, insults addressed by a crewman to a master or mate, because they represented a kind of verbal mutiny, were considered an attack on the social order of the ship. This could obviously result in fragmentation of the crew (Rediker 1987, chap. 4).

While going back in time to the roots of sea-faring culture, it should also be mentioned that because of illiteracy, knowledge was mostly relayed ear to mouth as OJT[49], so eventually more than just knowledge was related but also stories and lores (Rediker 1987, chap. 4). This can be also traced in the quotes of the interviewees when describing the way, they were ushered into their first positions.

The discussion above is of relevance to our analysis because Israel is practically part of western civilisation, and the Israeli Navy drew on the British, Italian and German navies in its evolution.

[49] On the Job Training

A look at the cultural aspects of sea faring culture that developed in Western Europe is also a glimpse into the roots of Israeli Naval culture.

In spite of the hinted criticism the bottom line when describing the service experience in the navy is positive, and described in a positive manner. Part of it might be attributed to overcoming the obstacles the organisational culture puts in front of the officers:

> *(NLT1): "…All of operations research was one and a half persons, compared to a large section in the air force. We were 3 persons in the branch, and in* ***an interesting period*** *– introducing new systems that were developed in-house;* ***an interesting period in which I had a lot of work****. "*

Another interviewee expresses similar experience regarding the service on a missile boat and the life on it:

> *(NL2): "Sometimes the relations are less friendly and more authoritative, but nevertheless very good and close relations. You are with the platoon all day; depend upon the type of officer you are… still most of the day you are with the platoon."*

About drill process that inscribe the duties:

> *(NL2): "…The duty is very clear… very well-defined duties that are trained outside, and on the job training on board."*

This clearness of duties he contrasts to the work in the startup company:

> *(NL2): "…Working under pressure and in uncertain conditions, in a small group with an unclear hierarchy (because we are all partners) is not a small challenge."*

Another interviewee describes a service, on a small patrol boat, that is a little different than service on a missile boat. It sounds like a situation that is somewhere between a missile boat and a submarine – there is less power distance than in a submarine, and unlike a missile boat, but the regulations and strictness is similar. However, on a small boat the officer is the top of the chain of command so the burden of responsibility is much heavier:

> *(NL1): "You are alone at sea, you and your crew, and you need to stay alone. There are regulations and this and that, but you are alone at sea and the bottom line is that everything is on you…* ***a missile boat is not exactly the opposite****… after naval academy when you go to a missile boat you are one section leader of four, and there is the ship commander.* ***The missile boats are considered a place with more***

***discipline and regulations and distance between officers and soldiers; on my small boat it was much less so**."*

One of the ex-submarine officers described the type of work he did in HQ similarly. The interesting points in the following quotation are that he did get from his service the cultural imprint of planning, exerting methodologies, building a structure that can be carried on after he left. However, when he took the position there was nothing for him to rely on either from a values/methodology aspect, or practical working tools which he had to develop by himself, for himself, according to his own liking, not necessarily compatible with the Navy's values (if such existed). Moreover, although he continues to use planning tools in his company, he uses free tools that better suit his needs and does not continue using the methods he used in service. It should be noted that after demobilizing he graduated with an MBA so he probably better understands his needs and has a better scope of what the industry has to offer. So the emphasis is the negligence of the Navy to support a young novice project officer with tools and methodologies that suit the needs of the force:

*(NL1, about the position in HQ): "…When I came to HQ I replaced another officer. **I was left no tools** (for managing MM). See, when you are a weapons officer you deal with dozens of projects… dozens if not hundreds of people, each with his own expertise, each project in a different stage. It takes months until you remember everything, so I devised something that will also remain as some kind of a better organisational conduct, and a system for tasks management… my successor used that system, but I don't know if his successor used it…. I had to work with people from north and south, and you adapt a methodology to yourself. So, **I developed software for project management in the service, and I put in a few algorithms that seemed relevant to me**. So, I have some experience in project management."*

(In the enterprise) "…We mainly use Trello[50] as a management tool. … There are a lot of tools nowadays on the internet for entrepreneurs. When you get into it you read, you Google countless times a day, everything you want you ask Google. It is the entrepreneur's best friend."

Another technical navy veteran, with a long tenure after demobilising, detaches himself from the navy, puts the space of time between himself and the service, and there is no hint of fondness when he speaks about his service experience (my emphasis):

[50] A free, internet based, task management tool

*(NLT1, about methodology of development and management): "…You might say I was using Agile[51] in the 1990's, this was not yet called 'Agile', and was also a part of incremental development. All the time a startup runs ahead and should know to move and not to be stuck on what it thought at the beginning…. **I, from my perspective, again, do not know whether this is the Navy or not the Navy, but to say that I work today like I worked even 10 years ago, this is not even true, certainly not 25 years, when I was 22**."*

Another opinion is demonstrated by an ex-submarine officer. In his view, he received tools in his service that he uses today. These practices he uses are more at the superficial levels of culture, but they imply lower levels that are based on values and beliefs: leadership, adherence to the mission, dedication:

*(NS1): "Also hiring a programming team man, when you start from zero is very very difficult. So yes, I think the conduct is very challenging on the management level. On one level it is handling the personnel, on another level it is analysing, and I felt it also before – in any topic where one has no technical background one will have a very hard time coming and managing a technical startup. **You need to apply to the chief scientist, prepare patents applications, you need to handle technologies; without technical knowledge or the technical background you absorb in the military service, because you see how things work, you live it on a daily basis; I don't think I could have done it.** So firstly, I talked about managing a team, secondly technical knowledge or background, analytical skills that you absorb from trouble shooting problems in the submarine. These are the central tools in my opinion."*

As seen in the quotation of a submarine officer, in many aspects the culture of the submariners might be closer to the air-force than to other navy flotillas. This can be seen in the value level and in practices. The formal power-distance in the submarines is much lower than in littoral boats, although the informal distance is similar, in the sense that there is no question of who is in charge, and what the chain of command is despite the fact that there are no ranks and no uniform during operations.

Another point is the debriefing process; one of the technical interviewees described a debriefing session he attended of an operation that involved a missile boat, submarines and

[51] Agile is a methodology for rapid prototyping of projects.

commandos. In the session an NCO from the commandos criticised an action by the missile boat commander; the commander was offended and there was uneasiness in the room. The commando man didn't see what was wrong because he is was used to the idea that during debriefing one should say what one thinks regardless of rank, which is not wholly acceptable in the missile boats. That kind of debriefing is common in the submarine flotilla and in that point, it is similar to the Air-Force's debriefing culture. This is what he described, and he also points out a true point about the difference in the nature between aerial operations that take hours and naval operations that may take months:

> *(NT3): "The commanding distance makes it difficult to express criticism, and do true debriefing. The situation is better in the special units; it creates negatives vibes when Special Forces operate together with the regular navy –* ***since a soldier in the special units is accustomed to criticizing an officer when he criticizes vessel officers it is considered as crossing a line.*** *Also, the length of the missions which can take weeks and months makes it difficult to effectively debrief the actions and extract lessons. This is in contrast with aerial operations which are shorter and the cycles of learning are much shorter."*

Another interviewee marks another difference between the nature of aircrafts and ships that may explain the cultural difference between Navy and Air-Force officers. The same observations help in understanding the difference between ships and submarines subculture and the kinship between submarines and aircrafts:

> *(NLT1): "I believe that in the Air-Force, in the end, it is the aircrafts. An aircraft that goes in the air must be checked exactly by the procedure. A boat is different because it does not crash easily; it is quite hard to sink a boat. On a boat, OK, you forgot something, it is hard to sink; in an aircraft – a little miss and it crashes. I think that somehow this is the basis of it all…in the army – the navy is like a startup, it is small and tough on budget, no time for overlapping and always the need to improvise."*

In all the interviews there seemed to be a dissonance between the service at sea on board vessels which is strict with a chain of command, command, regulation, seclusion for long periods while at sea, versus the service on land at the HQ. This dissonance echoes the naval tradition of abandoning restrictions when anchoring at harbour after a long sail (c.f. Lee 2013, Beaven 2015 with many citations therein).

A similar case of variety of sub-cultures within the US Navy was observed and studied (Ban 1995, chap. 1) and great diversity was also observed there, first of all with the organisational structure that is adapted to the various missions and commands which are several orders of magnitude larger than the Israeli Navy. One noticeable difference from the Israeli Navy is the importance of formality in the US Navy and the consciousness of ranks and symbols. Also, the US Navy values stability and tradition, and management style is more "by the book". This is quite different from what emerges from interviews with Israeli naval officers, but this is not the main point, which is that despite the US Navy's tendency to do things "The Navy way" there are a variety of sub-cultures despite the much tougher control and the officers at HQ are considered "birds of passage". Three distinct sub-cultures were suggested for the US Navy within the battle forces excluding HQ (Wilson 1989, St. Andre 2014): *"The United States Navy has at least three organizational cultures each symbolized by the kind of shoe the officers wear. The 'black shoe' navy is the navy of battleships, cruisers, and destroyers - ships of the line, built to protect the sea lanes and bombard enemy shores. The 'brown shoe' navy is the navy of aircraft carriers and carrier-based aircraft. The 'felt shoe' navy is the world of the submariners (they wear cloth shoes to reduce noise and so help defeat enemy listening devices)"*. Thus, the findings in this research support previous research in another Navy.

Another issue that affects the possible imprint of Navy culture is also carried on after demobilisation; veterans are networked after their discharge upon the beginning of the process of establishing the company and operating it. Navy veterans who were interviewed are networked by two strong nets that support them in the initial steps of entrepreneurship:

- 'Lighthouse' net – a net of veteran naval officers, already mentioned above, who voluntarily serve as mentors to younger naval officers in their first steps in the world of post-military service.
- 'Talpionet' – a net of veterans of a prestigious outstanding technical military program that is not particular to the navy, but it so happened that all of the technical interviewees are graduates of this program.

Thus, on top of the presumed inscription of military service there is also mentorship that continues the naval path in the case of Lighthouse net; note how the tradition of the service is observed in the interviewees' words.

> *(NS2): "I was in the (Lighthouse) program half a year, finished it recently. I was in contact with some Lawyer in Haifa. I noticed that in every conversation the language became 'naval' and naval language was intermingled with the current*

business world. No doubt you will find with me a lot of proverbs that are common in the Navy."

(NS1): "There is a project called Lighthouse; it is a project for naval officers' academy graduates with mentors who are graduates of the academy of several years back. They are teamed with officers who are right out of the service. Fifty percent of my business I owe to them and that project."

(NL2): "I was offered once to come to one of their (Lighthouse M.M) events. Specifically, at that time I couldn't make it; clashed with something else so I couldn't come. So, I haven't used their assistance although I was offered."

In the case of Talpiot graduates there is no specific reference to networking but it is common knowledge and I used that net to look for interviewees.

Hence, the bottom line of the above discussion is as follows: ex-submariners seem to follow the cultural tradition of their flotilla and maybe some naval tradition that is inherited from the English navy and the German Navy. Israeli Navy tradition seems less powerful than the flotilla's tradition. Ex-surface ships' officers show little to no reference to Navy culture – they do not use naval jargon, nor do they commonly use tools that may be ascribed to their service. Furthermore, they don't seem to share common values and believes which are particular to them and not shared by entrepreneurs in general. Again, this might be attributed to the lack of imprinting power of the service experience, or the lack of common culture. My opinion is that the type of service on ships is very close to a total institution, with the reservation that these are staff and not inmates, so it does not seem likely that the officers do not carry cultural sediments from the service. It is more likely in my opinion that there is no common culture to be shared, and each flotilla or even ship has its own 'personality'. This is supported explicitly by some of the interviewees. As for the ex-technical personnel, they seem to completely disband after the service; they put the navy experience behind them, and the cultural aspects they share are not an inheritance of military service but rather they are acquired from other sources, some from companies they worked while in service, some from places they worked after the service, some from personal experience. My personal experience when speaking with these interviewees is that if I hadn't known beforehand that they are Navy veterans I wouldn't have guessed even after interviewing quite a few.

To clarify the picture, since there are sub-populations, and many types of service (which is in itself a typology of the Navy) I will try to summarise it in the following diagram:



Figure 20 - Compare cultural aspects of Navy populations

And regarding the impact of service in the Navy on what he did post-service, one of the technical interviewees simply said:

> *(NT4) "Indeed 6 years in the navy but it's not from the submarines or the commando;* ***I did 6 years and went on****."*

3.2.2.3. NARRATIVE PERSPECTIVE – FINDINGS, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

Generally speaking, the interviewed population displayed three different types of narratives :

- A negative type of contamination narrative with what might be called a salvation, rebirth, or breaking-free ending when taking into account the discharge from service. This was apparent in elite technical personnel.
- A positive type bildungsroman narrative was evident in submarine veterans.
- No-narrative, neutral story was presented by littoral boat officers.

I will start with the technical personnel. Note in the following quotations the discontent with the situation in the military service; the dissatisfaction is both on the organisational level and the personal level. Also note the personal point of view that leads to conflict with the higher authorities (my emphases):

> *(NT1): "This is a period that began "Sa'ar 5[52]", and this was a really big startup, this is the reason for* ***chaos****, there was* ***no methodology*** *that came beforehand,*

[52] A type of missile boat

*there was **no work procedure** that came beforehand. The Navy was small, with a negligible effect... I remember when this project was approved, it was more than a billion dollars, suddenly whole staff was established, a brigadier general is added to the topic, **which was not beforehand, and therefore in my perspective this was something**… Even if you grow in a significant manner in your forces of development… the methods that worked previously work the same now… **The Navy, its developments were marginal, there was a little project here and there, but not projects of such scope**."*

*(NT1): "I was also a startup guy in the army and **this created many conflicts for me with commanders**."*

*(NT1 ,Describing one of projects he was involved in) "They just developed a card with a CPU, not something great, **I came and explained that this project was superfluous, it needed to be closed**, just pay them all that they deserve with the profits that they planned and still it would be cheaper to be closed…, a child, a deputy, a graduate of Talpiot, but this is about all his education, and argue with them whether it is necessary or not necessary to close the project… **The result was that I was simply promoted to scare everybody and then I was made responsible for the rest of the systems**."*

(NT1): "So I had managers I did not appreciate, with the exception of [name]… but as a method, when the commander scolds down, I did not live well with this, I did not have any problem arguing with the commanders and there were many commanders I did not appreciate, the result was that I did not learn there how to manage people, perhaps I learned how not to manage people."

It is interesting to see the point of view of the operational officers on the missile boats; in his view they work by the book because that is what this type of work requires, but this attitude does not suit, in his opinion, the flexibility needed in development programs. Note that this is in contrast to the approach expressed by Air Force and Signals-Corps veterans (Signals-Corps findings are covered in section 3.2.3):

(NLT1): "The members of the missile boats - everything was written in blood, everything was heavy. When you need to manage a project, you need flexibility; you need the ability to move things."

Another ex-technical officer describes his frustration with his service. He feels like a second-class outsider in the organisations, despite the fact that he had volunteered to serve in Navy from the many options he had (author's emphasis):

> *(NT4): "You see, **as a technical person**, it is one of our biggest problems in the military, it is also one of the reasons I quit, **you are always a stepchild; I mean the military at the bottom line is an organization of fighters**…really the fighters are the most and it is obvious, and it is manifested in the true things, I mean as a technologist you are second class. Look at yourself versus a pilot…in the organization that is called the air force. I felt that someone who had been several years at sea, and sailed, and vomited on the deck…, it is true I went occasionally to operations, but I was already 3 years in another organization before I joined the navy so **I came as an outsider**, therefore **I can't say that I am truly a navy man**… I was parachuted like a prince, not in the good sense of the word, into the navy; there was no socialisation; I was told – this is the section, nice meeting you, **this is** also **what you have chosen**, now get to work."*

In the following quotation one of the ex-technical officers describes why he had chosen to become an entrepreneur. The important point in this quotation is in what it lacks – it has no reference whatsoever to the military service in the Navy; his reference point is his alumni from the elite technical training venue (author's emphasis):

> *(NT4): "The dream of becoming an entrepreneur goes with me for many years; part of it, I admit is on the level of competitiveness. **A lot of my alumni-mates became entrepreneurs, and many made big exits…I personally remained a small employee and I envied it**. Maybe 10 years back it was more the money issue, **today it is less the money, and more the true challenge; with all due respect an employee does not really cope with the world fully.**"*

When analysing the interviews with the ex-operational officers a common issue arises – no events are mentioned when they describe their service; they describe various aspects of what is actually the organisational culture in the vessel, however there are no events that are connected to a timeline, and hence there is a difficulty in capturing a narrative. However, there are two events that are common for all of them which are volunteering for naval service and the transition from service at sea to a position in headquarters. There are no direct quotes that relate to that transition, yet there are hints to the reaction to that transition. The

examples that follow actually belong to the part that discusses culture, but are presented here for the purpose of demonstrating the reaction to sub-culture differences within the Navy.

For example, consider the following contrast between the inductions into the force when serving at sea:

> *(NL2) "In the last 5 months of naval officers' course you get to be attached to one of the senior officers in the flotilla, and you are under his command… All you need to know you learn from him, both about the daily routines and the atmosphere and the spirit of the navy."*

And the 'induction' into the service at HQ. Presumably at this point in the service the officers are not considered novice anymore, despite the fact they have no experience at all in the type of task they are expected to fulfil, note that in contrast to the negative tone notable in the HQ description by the ex-technical officers the tone here is clearly positive, despite the fact the position he fulfilled was not manned when he took it and was not manned for a long time after he left, so there is no continuity but this does not affect his personal feelings (author's emphasis):

> *(NLT1): "I entered an established need right when system assimilation was needed… There is always a shortage in the manning of positions…**I was accepted nicely**…most of the guys there were ex-missile boat commanders[53] and they put me into business. **I mingled in very quickly**… **very quickly my opinion was counted**. …**Somebody replaced me several months after I was discharged**…this is always a matter of shortage…I was already in South America on a track. **When I came I didn't replace anyone**."*

Similarly to the discussion of practical aspects, three distinct sub-populations can be categorised within the ex-Navy veterans:

- Littoral ships ex-officers
- Submarines ex-officers
- Technical ex-officers

Ex-technical officers exhibit a distinctive narrative, while it is difficult to find a leading narrative in operational officers; actually, it is unclear whether there is a narrative at all. At any rate, the picture depicted by the technical officers is negative while the operational officers adopt

[53] Practically it means two degrees higher in rank Lt. Col. versus Captain.

positive tones, almost completely opposite in their nature, i.e. redemption versus contamination types of narratives. The difference can be found in their views of the organisational culture in the Navy which is very negative in the case of the technical personnel, as well as the contrast between operational service and HQ service in the case of operational officers. Most surprising is how technical officers regard the higher echelons of the Navy. Some of the expressions they use show doubt and disrespect toward their superiors.

Hence, in the case of technical officers there is a clear contamination type narrative which can be typified as 'Rebirth' (Booker 2005, chap. 11, Porter Abbott 2008, chap. 4), I will elaborate upon it shortly but before that - one might consider, in the case of the technical personnel, other typical narratives such as 'Escape' (Tobias 2012, chaps 4 & 5), which is similar to 'Break Free' with more pronunciation of the successful escape from tough guardians (e.g. films 'The Great Escape', 'Papillion'). Another comparative narrative is that of a 'stranger in a strange land' – a 'prophet' narrative that follows the Jesus story, some other old testament prophet stories etc.; the common point is the estrangement of the person to the surroundings and his attempt to make it better, to educate and enlighten his surroundings, typically with no success.

Other biblical stories that resemble the Rebirth narrative are of course the Resurrection of Jesus[54], and Ezekiel's Vision of the Valley of Dry Bones (Book of Ezekiel, chap 37). The Rebirth narrative is preferred over others because it captures better the transformation over three phases: the starting phase, the dark phase, and a phase of coming back into the light. Numerous stories carry this narrative: 'Pinocchio', 'The Sleeping Beauty', 'Snow White and The Seven Dwarves', 'Cinderella', Dickens' 'A Christmas Carol', 'David Copperfield', Dostoyevsky's 'Crime and Punishment' to name just a few of the many. Contemporary, for example, are the 'Rocky Balboa' films series, 'The Champ' (1979), etc. Interestingly these are mostly situated around a heroic comeback of sportsmen.

A basic sequence of a Rebirth is basically as follows (Booker 2005):

- A young hero or heroine falls under the shadow of the dark power.
- For a while, all may seem to be going reasonably well. The threat may even seem to have receded.

[54] The narrative of the Dying-and-Rising of Gods is common in ancient near-east religions and infiltrated Christianity as well as other religions.

- Eventually the threat returns in full force, until the hero/heroine is seen in a physical or spiritual imprisonment akin to a living death.
- This continues for a long time, when it seems like the dark power has completely triumphed.
- Finally comes the miraculous redemption, focused on a particular figure that liberates the hero or heroine.
- The hero or heroine is brought into a glorious light.

Let 'us compare this with the timeline described by the ex-technical officers:

- They learn in an elite technical setting.
- They voluntarily draft themselves to service in the Navy hopping to contribute and utilise their abilities.
- After a while they start realising the organisation is not working as they believe it should, they are limited in what they can do, they have little support from higher echelons, they develop frustration over the dissonance and keep serving for several years with this feeling, waiting for demobilisation.
- When the time comes, they do not volunteer for another term but discharge themselves and become entrepreneurs.

An example of the 'Dark' period can be found in the following quotation. One should again remember that all of them volunteered to serve in the Navy, and had some knowledge about the positions they were about to occupy. The disappointment is very evident in the following quotations, and it is very clear that it stems from a dissonance between the pre-service expectations and real-life service. Similar quotations describing the technical personnel service can be found in the previous section describing cultural aspects (author's emphasis):

> *(NT4): "I can tell you in what way **it causes despair**; it is also the reason I kind of left this field (his research expertise field, MM); I dealt with oceanography, both in the section and also my master's degree is in oceanography; it is all very fascinating, but **the problem is that on the scientific level you don't close the loop**, because how are you going to do experiments in oceanography? I really had the feeling I don't close the loop…the physics doesn't speak to you in the end… you remain unsatisfied on the scientific level…as the great theoreticians say – physics is an experimental science."*

The most noticeable deviation from this structure is the absence of the fantastic rescue. The rescue comes via both the passage of time and the hero himself, who liberates himself. If time can be personified as the liberating figure then the rebirth circle is complete by the book. As one of the interviewees said – being discharged from the Navy for him was like being hatched from an egg. This type of narrative has two turning points – from good-to-bad upon drafting, and then from bad to good when being discharged; the combined turning points makes the total a 'Resurrection' story rather than a simple contamination narrative (Gillespie 2015). Thus, from my point of view, this can be taken as a narrative archetype for these ex-technical officers.

In the operational officers' quotations', it is difficult to directly find a narrative. There are a lot of situational and atmosphere descriptions, of emotions that are implied from the description of the service; however, there is neither action nor a time line that emphasizes it, besides the changing of positions between the boat and the headquarters. Hence, in the case of the operational people there are two or three relevant events – being drafted to the Navy, changing positions from service on a boat to service in the HQ, and sometimes demobilisation is mentioned as an event. The reaction to these actions may be used as significant points when looking for a narrative.

The immediate applicable narrative that comes to mind is 'A sailor returning to shore', or a sailor on leave, assuming it is intended that he go back to sea. This narrative has lots variations which are also applicable to land soldiers returning from war. Each particular case is based the conditions that are encountered upon returning, and the personal reaction which draws on the personal strength of the dissonance. Various films are based on this narrative, such as 'First Blood' (1982, aka. 'Rambo') and 'Coming Home' (1978) which are timed in the Vietnam-war era. The dissonance of culture between the services at sea and in the HQ is at the heart of the various traits that can be implied from the quotations above:

- The service is much less dangerous.
- The institution is less total – the premises are in the middle of the city, a definite segregation between work time and private time, no strict and definite rules, but rather you create the rules as you go along.
- Instead of managing/commanding people you manage processes, plans and products.
- There is much less personal contact because one is in contact with a widely geographically spread unit, and most of it is between peers and not between officers and subordinates.

- Power distance is lower, and a young officer will be at the bottom of the hierarchy, versus being close or at the top on a ship.
- While on a ship the majority are operational personnel (officers, PO's and soldiers) in the HQ there is a mass of technical officers; though they regard themselves as second best.
- The reference to time is different – while at sea you live from shift to shift, operation to operation and from going to sea to back to shore. At the HQ the vision is longer term, and even much longer term when the issue is the building of the force.
- There is a lot of work with civilian industries that are not subject to martial law, but to civilian law, and are of a broad organisational culture spectrum. As a by-product - authority and sanctions/punishment tools are weaker and there are less management tools.
- At sea you don't compromise a mission you just do it. At the HQ you might find yourself in a position where you need to compromise between quality, cost and timetables.

The narrative of a 'Sailor returns to shore' is a centuries-old narrative or ethos (Foulke 1997, Lee 2013, Beaven 2015) that is shared across countries and continents, military and merchant fleets. A part of maintaining the 'Sailor Identity' is the encouragement of licentiousness. That might explain the conduct of operational officers in HQ which is regarded so negatively by the technical officers. The roots of that tradition lie centuries back; seamen have always lived a divided life between sails and leaves, when on shore leave, they had a short time to adapt and catch up with what was going on. Anyway, they knew the time on shore was limited and tried to make the most of it. Many of them did not leave the harbor premises, which created sailor towns in parallel to the wider city (Fingard 1978, Beaven 2015). This lack of awareness and information about what was going on the outside in some cases led seamen to spend their money unreasonably, investing in useless or unprofitable enterprises. The result was many disappointed, frustrated, poor and desperate men by the end of the leave, yearning to go back to the more familiar environment aboard the ship. This description in itself resembles a total institution description where ex-inmates have difficulties in adapting to the outside world after release from jail (Petersilia 2001, Pratt *et al.* 2006, 2010, Anderson-Facile 2009). In some cases the seamen had parallel life on shore with more than just shore leaves, and they could maintain a semi-normal life on shore (Hammar 2015). Hence, this tradition of service on shore after sea service in our case echoes the somewhat loose conduct of operational officers, and since they are the tone-setters at the HQ – this culture prevails over the HQ. The operational

officers feel comfortable in this culture, but for technical officers it is more difficult to adapt. So, I believe that what one observe here two phenomena – the first is the prevalence of the "sailor identity" during a transition between a sea faring position and a shore position, and the preservation of the cultural traits that are particular to the type of service – surface ships versus submarines. This conclusion draws on two pieces of evidence:

1. The difference in the perception of the organisational culture of the Navy's HQ between the operational officers and the technical officers. This cuts the population into the operational officers' sub-group and technical officers' sub-group.
2. The difference in post-service organizational culture between surface ship officer and submarine officer veterans. This cuts the operational officers' subgroup into two sub-subgroups.

Although research about seamen ashore is rather scarce, due to lack of information, research supports the stability of narrative identity, especially the parts that support making sense of the past (Harding *et al.* 2017). An explanation of this centuries-old phenomenon by Elizabethan and Jacobean Admiral William Monson is as follows (Monson 1703 quoted by C. Fury):

> *"Whether it is the sea that works contrary effects to the land, or whether it be a liberty you feel ashore after you have been penned up in a ship like birds in a cage, or untamed horses when they are let loose; certainly it is neither birds nor horses that can show more extravagant lewdness, more dissolute wildness, and less fear of God, than your carriage discovers when you come ashore and cast off the command your superior officers at sea had over you .... He that could as easily reduce the ordinary seamen to civility and good behaviour ashore ...were more than a man ..."*

In contrast to the type of service on a ship there is a period of service in HQ, which is of different nature from several perspectives: 1) it is not a closed environment but situated in the middle of Tel-Aviv, 2) there is regular contact with civilian industries, 3) the work is less structured and the officer has a lot of degrees of freedom to promote what he believes to be necessary and work the way he likes. This is similar in nature to the HQ service of the littoral boats' officers and technical officers, but it seems that each population seems to adhere to the culture that was imprinted in their first positions as young officers.

In our case, the contradiction between the shipboard organisational culture and HQ organisational culture creates a dissonance that has to be bridged. I suggest that a possible bridging is adoption of the 'Sailor identity' which allows a navy officer to take lightly what goes on ashore, while it emotionally detaches him from situations and events, like saying - 'I'm not really a part of it, I'm a sailor and my true place is at sea where I'll be going back soon'.

3.2.2.4. CONCLUSIONS REGARDING NAVY VETERANS

To wrap up, the main points regarding Navy veterans that were demonstrated in the findings are as follows: Firstly, they cannot be considered a homogenous population, but rather should be regarded as a mixture of three distinct populations as emerged from the interviews:

- Surface ship officers
- Submarine Officers
- Technical officers

Each of these population exhibits a distinct organisational culture and grand narrative that typifies it. There are commonalities in some of the traits between these sub-groups, and also commonalities between the organisational culture attributes commonly found in entrepreneurs and startup companies in general, which is of course anticipated. However, two main characteristics unite them as a group, and distinguish them, for example, from ex-Air-Force officers:

- They don't care too much about what the business is about. It is the business per-se that ignites them. They will close everything and move on to a better position in a blink of an eye. There is no emotional connection to the enterprise, no need to lead in any business parameter.
- They do not care too much about planning. In, fact they regard planning as hindering a startup operation, and do it only when they have to e.g. when they are presented with some planning by a customer, or when trying to raise funds. The ex-submarine officers show more tendencies to plan, but it is far from being as meticulous as the planning done by ex-Air-Force officers, for example.

Secondly, as depicted in Figure 20 above, when trying to extract the relevant organizational culture in the Navy it seems that there is a multitude of organizational cultures within the Navy, and at least the operational officers experience two completely different organizational scenes with different organizational cultures during their service.

Thirdly, similarly to the discussion above, when analysing the narratives in the interviews two subgroups can be dissected, each with its own grand narrative:

- Technical officers share a grand narrative of a negative attitude with respect to their military service, of a Rebirth or Resurrection type. The positive ending to the narrative is the discharge from service. In that narrative the service might be paralleled for example to the time Cinderella spent with her step mother, or the biblical story of the valley of the dead bones. Hence the bottom line is a negative experience.
- Operational officers do not exhibit a clear canonical grand narrative. A grand narrative might be implied from the time line they presented of their military service – the majority of spoken time was dedicated to time spent on board and the experience gathered there. The service on shore was reported like in shorthand, without 'thick' description. It seems like something imposed on them. Therefore, I believe that this echoes the centuries old 'sailor-ashore' or 'sailor-on-leave' image, which is actually a characteristic of what is referred to in literature as 'Jack Tar' (Parnaby 2006, Berger 2009, Conley 2009, Glenn 2010). The practicality of that is that when they are in the HQ they are on a sort of a vacation, and as such they are relieved of duties that are so dominant at sea – like hierarchy, regulations and Navy organizational culture in general.

So, the operational officers seem to share a common narrative, but exhibit different organisational culture traits from their surface ship colleagues. Keeping in mind that a major part of their training is done together in the naval officers' academy, it is a clear indication that the narrative is only a partial influence, and that the service experience has a unique contribution; that contribution might be attributed to the organizational culture, with total organization typology being a part of that culture. It is obvious from the discussion of the last chapter that the naval version of the total institution might take on several different flavours depending on the type of service. Service on surface ships and submarines definitely belongs to the total institution classification (Goffman 1957, Zurcher 1963, Bierly 1995); however, the service in the HQ does not really answer the typology to qualify it as a real total institution. So, in addition to the different narratives and service career paths, the different sub-groups in the population also underwent different types of total institution experience. So again - it is clear that each group has a leading distinct narrative, which stems from the service experience, and although all the interviewees were discharged after HQ service, with a similar

type of service, each sub-group has a different combination of narrative, organisational culture, and total institution trail.

3.2.3. FINDINGS AMONGST SIGNALS-CORPS VETERANS

3.2.3.1. PARTICIPANTS DEMOGRAPHY

Three Signals-Corps alumni were interviewed (out of ten who were approached); broadly outlined profiles of the participants' and their companies' follow below:

Table 6 - Signal-Corps Participants Demography Summary

Company size	1-9 employees	10-49 employees	50-100 employees
	3	-	-

Military rank	majors	captains	lieutenant
	1	2	-

Years of service	5-9 years	10 years and more
	3	-

Age	30-39 years	40-49 years	50-59 years
	1	1	1

Education	PhD	MSc/MBA	BSc/BA/LLB
	-	2	1

3.2.3.2. ORGANISATIONAL CULTURE ASPECTS – FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION

Noticeably, and contrary to the interviews with air-force retirees, who also strongly revealed the founders' attachment to their companies, the Signals Corps' retirees show a lot less emotion towards their entrepreneurships; two of the three seems almost completely indifferent, and one was more likely to show emotions (maybe because he invested his own family's money in the enterprise.)

At least the interviewees showed a tendency to communicate before drafting, and joined the telecommunications industry after discharge. Only after spending some time with the communications industry where they dispersed into other fields.

They feel comfortable in uncharted lands which might be supported by their service. During the service there is no feeling of heritage, each one had to map new terrain and define for

himself his goals and missions, and was super-ceded by an officer who had to take over the job again and make it his own.

About establishing and running a company, post service versus service this is what they portray (author's emphasis); note the lack of hierarchy that is less stringent than hierarchy in the military:

> *(SC3): "You see, **in the beginning there is consensus**; when you form a company – if you do not agree on what you are going to do then what's the point? **It is consensus by definition**. After the company is established everyone has his responsibility; for example, in the technologies area I have the last word. If somebody else has a responsibility on a topic than his word is final in that topic; **you do not have to reach consensus on everything**. It's not necessarily the opposite, it's just that each one is responsible for something, and usually takes someone with him… **it is impossible to work in a situation when everyone pulls in a different direction, it is not needed to discuss everything and reach a consensus on everything**."*
>
> *(SC3): "In the current company **there is hierarchy in theory**; I mean there are people who work, there are people who manage. **Everybody is talking with everybody un-theoretically**. Also, most of the **people here** are guys that worked with me in three previous companies, **they know each other**, I don't need to say much; I know everybody's' wives and children, I know what everyone can or cannot do, and **people here are not organizationally tight**, I mean they don't need to prove themselves, they do not need to fight for their place, so there are no tensions here, no politics. I find it very comfortable; it reduces a lot of the bullshit from the workload."*

Another interviewee talks about the profound difference between a military type project and his civilian project (author's emphasis):

> *(SC1): "A project like XXX **you need to think 10 years before about what you want to do, 10 ahead**… The design considerations are different. You design a communication that might be manufactured in hundreds of thousands, **every $10 is critical, not to mention $100. It is a process of long years and you need to keep backward and forward compatibility, you need to think of issues much broader than an entrepreneurial project**…You better think about everything, and you also*

have the time to do it, ***and no one competes with you****. No one is going to develop a communication device to compete. The only thing that can happen is that the older devices start to break down.* ***You have time to think things over, go slowly****, in small steps.* ***In the industry now rapidness has become almost the most basic issue****…Entrepreneurship of large systems is much more difficult than a small project. To bring up a city is a little bit more difficult than bringing up a house; there is civil planning and engineering, roads, infrastructure etc.; there are less people that know, can, and want to do this."*

Another interviewee talks about the loosely-structured decision-making process, and again emphasises the crucial point of rapid development:

(SC3): "It is not a democracy in the sense that everyone votes, and yes, no and maybe; you decide and go on, there is no second chance, it's a startup company, five people, there is no room for processes, you know, everything should move on very rapidly, decide and progress, someone is on it... I come from a doctrine school (i.e. the Signals Corps, MM) of 'design correctly and do what needs to be done.'"

(SC3): "I have a significant role here, I really have freedom; I love being in these vacuums, I don't like stencilled roles. Here I have something that is adapted from zero; I bring it all up, how it works, how the guys work, how the operation functions, and how the technological product will function. So, I am really attracted to these vacuums and such a project that is both technically interesting, also a personal challenge, and an active environment…"

Note the similarity between the vagueness of the job requirements in the military and the lack of it in the company. Clearly this interviewee is in his comfort zone in this fuzziness (author's emphasis):

(SC2): "In our field of operation ***there is no regulator; it is not a regulated area****;* ***however, there are criteria you need to stand up to****… Today we stand up to, not formal regulation because there is none, but we do work in an approved way. We believe that if banks do things in a certain way, we better do the same because firstly regulation will surely come sooner or later, and secondly we use information,* ***there is personal private information and we don't want it to be exposed****; so, there is a lot of information security involved in this business."*

On his place in the entrepreneurship, and maturing as an entrepreneur:

*(SC2): "… **there is a point where you stop being technical and you go more into the realm of organizational politics**. I myself have a very good position and I don't want to lose it. I feel very attached to the production floor, I know very very well what happens on the production floor; **I very much love the dirt of the production floor**, not in the sense of getting dirty – but in the sense that **I am good with technology, I love technology and I'm having fun with technology**. … **That is my character; now, that takes me on a venue** – that is an insight I got over time. **It takes me on a path that stays in the technical area**."*

They tend to do only the bare minimal planning as can be seen in the following quotes (author's emphasis):

*(SC1): "In the start-up my thinking is more like product management, we thought that to solve the problem we needed a, b, c, **later on** it turned out that d, e, and f are needed, so **we start planning**. **I didn't analyse the problem**, did some specifying (which later on became more detailed)..., **I didn't plan**...**Order is important, it formed in the second startup, and it was not always like that**; the significance I attribute to order, I roll the time linearly.… **I'm not familiar with methodologies** such as Agile. **It does not suit me to plan everything and only then move to the next step; I don't think it's worth it**."*

Another interviewee:

*(SC3): "My goals are, **the idea is, to try to define a much as possible and do preliminary work to be ready**. Some of the things I recycle, some I take out, in some cases **I didn't see the future clearly enough** so I need to define them under pressure."*

Daily conduct of management is not consistent and tight, it is played by ear:

*(SC2): "**We have periodic meetings**, weekly or bi-weekly, **what we decide**. **Usually** these are meetings between me and the CEO, me and the marketing VP. **Once in a while** there is a wider forum, **some meeting you don't** do on a weekly basis, and **some management meetings include all** the five founders. Cyclical meetings are better from a conduct point of view because that way you don't forget things. On a practical level everything is done electronically, everything is in the cloud."*

When it comes to raising funds, they collect whatever they can, and similar to Air Force veterans they run lean companies, holding in-house only the essential kernel of workers and

using subcontractors thereby minimising the company's liabilities. Instead of salaries workers are offered positions and titles.

> *(SC3): "What happens in reality is simply **you manage to raise some amount that will suffice for some period**, if you work in a manner that you try everything then you are obliged to incur a large flow of expenses. Usually you start in reality and then you reach a point when you are in a budgetary pit and you need to raise more money under terms you didn't intend to, or fire people. So, **at some points it is better for the company to have a small kernel, and you can hire and fire personnel per tasks; therefore, I prefer a small team."***

Another interviewee:

> *(SC1): "I started looking for technical people, anyone who can do the development, and tried to attract them, for free, voluntarily. I check the, what is called, co-founder, which is a code name for somebody who is willing to work for free, and from that point you are partners."*

Another interviewee:

> *(SC2): "This March (2015) we decided to go for a funding round; it was what is called FFF – **friends, family and fools**. So now some money was raised and now I'm actually getting a salary, and we work for salaries…The invested funds are from our families, of all the founders, also friends; we are not going to burn that money, to throw it away. On the practical level we have control on an hourly level over the subcontractors; the work is not very wasteful. In house there is much stringency on that point; you have to be very lean, efficient, hungry, and fast, this is the out-working mode today. We don't have offices, we work from home."*

Again, because of the tight budget, outsourcing is preferred to hiring:

> *(SC2): "…As of now **we have small subcontractors**: there are programmers; the company itself is comprised of 5 people that do everything: CEO, product, CTO/R&D, and legal issues. Subcontractors are a graphic designer, text writers, testing, and information security."*

In the following quotation note the lack of emotions regarding the entrepreneurship – but rather a cycle of forming a company, running it for a short while, and then selling it or just leaving it for the next company; strictly business, minimal emotions involved in the process, a detachment between the person and the business entity.

*(SC3): "After 5 years **I left**, and after some period I did all kinds of start-ups. Finally, I established a start-up that made wireless. I raised money from VCs, and the company developed some products… At some point **we sold the company** when I was there and I won… For me it was a boring area… **I transferred the company and left**... After that **I established another** company… **About a year ago** I met an entrepreneur… so **I joined** him."*

This is his reasoning behind his jumpy conduct; the interest is in the excitement of building something new and materialise it. There is no interest in organic growth:

(SC3): "The companies, the moment they become… you need to sell them. I don't believe in large companies; I'm not interested in working in a large company and managing people; it both bores and appals me. So, when a company reaches a point when it has a value I can realise, sell it, I sell it. No sentiments. What is of interest to me is the beginning, I mean to start something from scratch, to build the technology and the market, that is what interests me, and then, when everything is established, to maintain the company, operate, manufacture and sales does not interest me "

Another interviewee also talks about uncertainty in startup companies versus large companies, and he talks about it fondly:

(SC1): "I was involved in a small startup. In the large companies everything is ordered, you know exactly what will happen tomorrow, and what is going to happen in a month, all you need to do is try to make it better, improve, and advance without mistakes. It is not entrepreneurship…Today I'm involved in several startups; each one half-assed."

And how it differs from the type of projects done in the military:

(SC1): "None (of the startups, MM) resembles a system, like projects I did 20 years ago (in the military, MM). There cannot be a related conduct because then I had to think and plan 10 years ahead, and here…If I didn't specify what was needed, I couldn't have added it later on, very complicated."

Although it can be looked at as describing the operational conduct of the company, I rather look at the enthusiasm that underlies the following quotations, as opposed to the lack of it in other interviewees from the Signals Corps, and also the reasoning behind this kind of conduct:

(SC2): "It is a very innovative domain, why am I like this? It is a combination, a combination of things: entrepreneurship – I am part of the founders of this thing, I am a small founder, but I am a founder … there is ***an opportunity*** *here,* ***a leap****… **I am responsible for many things**, and I need to deliver results. My conduct is very entrepreneurial, because I deal with where ...and how .. and what…* ***if you wait for someone to tell you what to do it doesn't work, cannot work… it is a startup where everyone does everything****."*

About exiting versus organic growth one interviewee said that he prefers organic growth, which is unlike the other Signal-Corps veterans; note the apologetic tone for not wanting to go for an exit, which is the bon-ton of the startup community. It is as though he feels ashamed (author's emphasis):

(SC2): "Right now our vision is technological and weird; it is not a vision of founding a company and selling it. The vision currently is of building something that works, gives a service and does well. You don't do it with an intention to sell; you do not do the minimum for passing... It can't work like that, you can't do the minimum to be bought - the market is hot, there is competition; you need to do the best you can with a vision that it really will work and will be really good, and only then might you get real propositions for acquisition – when there is real value in what you do…We don't intend to go for an IPO[55] right now."

The interviewee SC3, whose opinion can be traced back in previous quotations, take an opposite stance, and emphasises his **lack of interest in organic growth** and said the goal is to sell before it gets too big; this can be interpreted in a way that the challenge of building a valuable company is more important than it being a big boss. However, note that even he regards organic growth as a real company (author's emphasis):

(SC3): "I will stay two or three years. If everything goes well within three years ***I will sell it****.* ***The adventure is to make a product out of nothing****, bring it to the market, build partnerships with powerful enough partners that will take it to the market and make a real company out of it.* ***What do I need a real company for?****"*

About the difficulty of starting a company as a veteran one interviewee described the challenge of being an 'old' entrepreneur. Noting from the above quotes the difficulty of raising funds, working without salaries; funds are reserved for paying subcontractors, etc. one can

[55] Initial Public Offering

understand that there are times when the entrepreneur is not getting paid, however his rewards are intangible (notice the ending phrase):

> *(SC1): "Even if you did a standard service, without volunteering for more, you start learning at 18, add 4 years at university and 6 years of service, you find yourself out at the age of 28. It is another age; you might also be married with children by that time. Also, in the case of the Signals Corps, the market is comprised of a few large companies that produce complex products, not only systems.* ***It is not kids' stuff****."*

This is similar to the point of view of a Navy veteran, but here it has a tone of bravery rather than weakness which was expressed by the Navy veteran.

Regarding the prospect of how service in the Signals-Corps imprints itself on the veterans - it is difficult, if not impossible, to infer the psychological mechanism that guided their reaction, and how much of that was inscribed in their character. As in the classical castaway narrative, there are two distinct categories: one in which the protagonist is transformed by the encounter with the exile, and one in which he is not. It is not a classic 'total institution' case which has been very extensively researched and there are some more broad indications about the exile imprint; it is of course a total institution that enables the creation of an exile, but the conscripts are given a lot of freedom to develop their environment and their identity. Nevertheless, from the end results, I suggest that to some extent they carry the scars of exile. This can be observed in the common practices and beliefs they share. (The uniqueness and differences from other corps' practices will be elaborated upon in chapter 5.)

Note also the similarity, from the practical behavioural perspective, in the current conduct of Signals corps veterans – the lack of loyalty to a specific company. They tend, at least in the small sample of the research, to be involved simultaneously in more than one company, trying to make the best of the current company and moving on without looking back, and the experience of being thrown into an 'exile-like' situation - terra incognita where one might to lose one's identity, adopting quickly to a new situation, a new playground with new rules, a new language and the need to adopt a new vocabulary, new players, while being conceived as a leader. Exile manipulates one into observing one's culture from the perspective of a process of translation and self-translation. The 'exile' situation is compelled, forced upon the conscript as part of the military organization being a total institution; it is not a direct

implication of the total institution but rather an outcome of being stationed in a position, both physically and hierarchically, without being able to resist.

Involvement in many projects – again remembering that the population size is small, one can see that two of the interviewees (a third one has rather shorter tenure as an entrepreneur) have had an experience with quite a lot of entrepreneurships. They are both involved simultaneously in numerous entrepreneurships, and they exploit the possibility of the entrepreneurship, relatively rapidly moving on to the next one. It this process it is not significant whether it was successful or not; if it were successful then great, but time is not wasted on an enterprise without an exit prospect.

They don't care about formalities – They don't look for an official title in the organisation, even when they themselves are investing their own capital in the enterprise. What they do look for is to hold a position in which they can contribute and affect the way the organisation acts. It is as if they prefer making their moves behind the scenes, or it might be they like to avoid responsibility; they favour considering themselves guides, instructors or mentors. They don't have formal offices, they have a working place, and some of the work is done at home, in coffee shops or wherever. In hindsight this might be the reason why it was harder to find Signals Corps veterans to agree to be interviewed.

Assortment of management methodology[56] – In the same vein as the previous point – they don't ascribe much importance to methodology or an orderly, defined organisational structure. They themselves are willing to do whatever is needed for the benefit of the organisation regardless of their formal position, and sometimes the organisation is fluid enough not to have a formal position title. Each one develops his own 'managerial attitude', and it is not based on the military experience, is any – it contradicts it.

Minimal planning – They don't spend much time on planning; when they have some idea, or when they join a group, they go directly to prototyping based on gut feeling and experience. This might be a result of several possibilities:

- They don't hesitate to drop a project when they don't feel comfortable with it, so the cost of failure (in cash at least…) is not heavy, and they can afford it.
- They have confidence in their abilities – they have sequences of success,

[56] Methodology here is not in the context of this study, but in the context of product management, project management, system engineering, etc., such methodologies, such as 'Waterfall', 'Vee model' 'Scrum', and 'Agile' were mentioned earlier.

- They feel comfortable in unknown circumstances, and maybe they even like it that way. This might be attributed to their military experience that puts them in similar situations.

'Unfaithfulness' to a company – as mentioned earlier they don't get attached to their organisations; they don't hesitate to leave them or sell them. They don't look forward to organisational growth or a romantic view of 'bringing it up' like offspring. What they look for is profit opportunity and maybe a personal adventure; after leaving that they immediately start another enterprise. They don't look to take the money and indulge themselves, rather they continue living their lives - they don't drive fancy cars or buy extravagant house (although they can afford to) they just move on to the next challenge.

Eclectic selection of fields of interest – it can be seen from the career history of interviewees that they don't have a tendency towards a specific technology or line of business. They are involved in banking, communication, cellular applications, whatever suites them at the moment; everything is acceptable.

Support team – A prominent characteristic of the conduct of these ex-Signals Corps veterans is their typical hectic nature; they are involved in several ventures simultaneously, they do not follow the enterprise for too long a period. They are only interested in the portion that suits their character, or what they believe are their strong points. In that aspect they resemble the role of what might negatively be called 'mercenaries' or more positively 'pacemaker', 'pace-setter', or 'rabbit'; they are short or middle-distance runners who pull the long-distance runners for a limited period of time, but are not part of the real race, just a sword for hire. They are the support team, producers, stage masters, directors etc., and less the lead characters of the show.

Fund raising & Lean companies and outsourcing – in these aspects the characterisation is very similar, if not identical, to the former typology elaborated upon in previous chapter, so there is no point is repeating the analysis, just to point out the similarity.

All that being said, it should again be pointed out that: firstly, the sample population is rather small, and secondly all of the interviewees actually wanted to be drafted to the Signals Corps, the case here might be that, at least partially, the common characteristics should be attributed to a predominant characteristic that preceded the draft, and should be credited to the imprint of military service.

3.2.3.3. NARRATIVE PERSPECTIVE – FINDINGS, ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION

In the same vein as with the Air-Force and Navy retirees, I looked for the meta-narrative and typological plots in the founders' stories. In the case of Signals Corps retirees that task was more difficult because the sample size is very small - only three persons agreed to participate in the research; the reason being that the body of Signals Corps retirees is smaller, and many of them prefer to join already operative enterprises. As one of the interviewees summarised:

> *(SC1): "**The large companies** (in the communication industry, MM) **recruit the veterans of the Signals Corps**…who else can they take? They take their buddies - the Lt. Colonels, and they bring the Majors etc. So there is a migration, it seems to me, I don't have statistics. That is why **there are fewer entrepreneurs from the Signals Corps**."*

To compensate the small body of evidence the quotations brought up in this section are more elaborate in trying to capture more nuances of the narratives. Firstly, I will demonstrate the informants' views about their conscription process and the type of service they had, and try to point out the meta-narrative that may well summarise it.

This is what an interviewee shared about his service experience:

> *(SC3): "A project (in the military, MM) takes an engineer and one or two practical engineers; this is the order of work. You build a working prototype, and when it works properly you usually take it to industry, give them product file, and they do the production."*

Another interviewee:

> *(SC1): "During my service I was involved in a project that was initiated before my time, I brought it forward and procurement was done after my time by other officers; I was already in another job. It takes years."*

Despite the noted differences in the type of projects in the military, and the span of expected life-cycle, there is yet experience to be learnt and imported from these projects to the realm of startup enterprises – and it is the magnitude of resource needed to bring-up a project to the level of a prototype (author's emphasis):

> *(SC3): "In the military you work in small teams, and you believe everything is possible; the advantage of the military is that you are still a kid that doesn't know what is not possible. You are young, you don't know what is not achievable, and you think that everything can be done, and once in a while you try. I look at things I did and maybe I would have done otherwise, but you get experience in bringing*

up something to a product level, with a team of two-three people within a year. Usually a development cycle in the military is a year or two, not more, and then you follow the production, but the development is done by a small team in a short time, with not many people around, and with no support or infrastructure. This is what you learn to do."

The first stage of service for all the interviewees was being stationed as a communication officer in some remote battalion. A theme that is recurrent in all the interviews is of being sent to a job in a distant place, a job with no clear definitions, surrounded by non-supportive personnel, for whom the conscript himself was a kind of curiosity.

In the words of an interviewee which also capture the feeling of treading in terra incognita:

*(SC2): "**In the Signals-Corps your first job is in the field**. I believe you need to do a lot of it, but I don't see it as one of the major milestones of the service, although it is very good. **I came to the battalion, I was the first there in that position, I defined that position; I was very independent because the job was not defined.** After officers' academy I went over there, was shown to my office, they gave me a rifle; I sat with the battalion commander and he said to me – firstly you have to learn what we do, you know nothing, go out and learn."*

"…People are looking at me and don't understand what I'm doing there; I don't know what to answer because I myself came to discover that… From that point it developed. There was no cast mould, so I needed to come over and define it – what is my role as an engineer in an operational unit."

This type of event follows the known and ancient 'Castaway' narrative; it reminds of the scene when Roinson Crusoe meets Friday for the first time. A thorough analysis of this narrative may be found for example in (Hoffman 2001, Booker 2005, Perry 2010); it is also termed 'Voyage and Return', and 'Exile', according to the order of events and their intensity or severity (for example, in some cases the emphasis is on the journey, in some the circumstances that led to exile, in some the exile period, etc.) In the castaway narrative the protagonist is detached from his natural environment and is transferred, either willingly or unwillingly, to an alternative environment in which he has to survive in conditions new to him. In the context of total institution, a castaway narrative carries with it also type of total freedom which is in contrast to the total institution concept and the limits are imposed by 'force major' rather than society; hence a better selection in the context of military service would be 'exile' narrative.

Although actually a plot and not a narrative - the voyage and return plot is a story that has the exile narrative as an underlying theme. In that plot the hero or heroine travel out of their familiar, everyday 'normal' surroundings into another world completely cut off from the first, where everything seems disconcertingly abnormal." In the classic castaway theme, in addition to experience of passing over to another world that it is strange and unfamiliar – the protagonist is trapped in it, cut off from the familiar world they have left. Our research case studies do not completely follow this thematic guideline, and it is limited only to the professional extent.

Interestingly, this plot lies in the basis of many of the beloved childhood stories (e.g. the Lion, the Witch and the Wardrobe, The Wizard of Oz, Through the Looking Glass, Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, Peter Pan, Robinson Crusoe, Gulliver's Travels, etc.) The meaning of this is that one can assume that there is a reasonable possibility that an average conscript will be familiar with these stories and aware of what they communicate. More complex voyage and return plots portray a voyage that is more sociological than physical (e.g. Mark Twain's 'The Prince and the Pauper' and 'A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court')

The narrative follows the following general guiding steps:

- Anticipation Stage and 'fall' into the other world – The hero is young, naïve, bored, drowsy or reckless, 'something happens' and they are transported into a new world.
- Dream Stage or Initial Fascination – At first the hero is excited or fascinated because the new world is puzzling or unfamiliar, but it not a place where they feel at home.
- Frustration Stage – Gradually the mood changes to frustration, difficulty or oppression, a shadow begins to intrude, and becomes increasingly alarming.
- Nightmare Stage – The shadow begins to dominate, and it poses a serious threat to the hero's survival.
- Thrilling Escape and Return – Just when the threat is closing in, the hero escapes, returning back to where they came from. The question is posed as to how much the hero learned from his experiences; have they grown, or was it all 'just a dream'.

The "Castaway" narrative usually takes place in either a deserted, unknown and hostile territory (e.g. the Bible's story of Joseph in Egypt, Jonah and the whale, Homer's The Odyssey, Daniel Defoe's Robinson Crusoe, Robert Louis Stevenson's Treasure Island etc.) that involves a survival struggle, or a magical, fantastic, mysterious place that can even be close by, or a journey to some place beyond the borders of the charted known realm (e.g. Jonathan Swift's

Gulliver's Travels, Lewis Carroll's Alice's Adventures in Wonderland, H. G. Wells' The Time Machine, etc.)

Note the difference between the castaway and the "Quest" or "Adventure" narratives (Tobias 2012, chaps 7 & 8). In these themes the protagonist has a purpose; while in the castaway exile is impelled upon him. See, for example, the differences between the Voyages of Gulliver, versus the epic of Gilgamesh or Orpheus. In our cases the interviewees wanted to be drafted to the Signals Corps. In their words:

> *(SC2): "I asked to serve in the intelligence or signals corps and not the air force or navy."*

Another interviewee (why not the air-force):

> *(SC1): "I learned for 4 years, wasn't that much interested, and hadn't enjoyed it. After that I decided I wanted to be a pilot, I passed the screening, went to flight academy and was rejected at the flights stage. I was sent to HQ and saw everybody with flight wings and said I don't want it. I followed a friend's recommendation and went to the Signals Corps."*

Another interviewee (why not the air-force):

> *(SC3): "**I 'didn't come by it** (to the Signals Corps, M.M.) **by mistake; I knew this is what I' was going to do**. When I drafted (after finishing my studies) I decided I wanted to go to telecommunications, and I knew I should go to either the Signals Corps, or the Air Force or Intelligence. **I understood that in the Air Force if you are not a pilot you will always be in second place**, so I refused the offers from the Air Force."*

However, their 'exile' to a field service was not anticipated and perceived as an exile to a strange land, as can be observed in one of the quotes. The dream and fascination stage can be observed in the following quotation that conveys the almost surreal feeling the interviewee had during some periods in his service:

> *(SC2): "…People are looking at me and don't understand what I'm doing there; I don't know what to answer because I myself came to discover that…"*

An almost opposite opinion about his drafting is presented by another Signal-Corps alumnus; for him the first experience was what he liked and the next stage was a culture shock:

> *(SC3): "**After officers' academy I wanted to do a field job**, and unlike most academic reserves I went to be a company commander and was a general's*

communication officer. After that I served in HQ and learned it. It was quite a culture shock, after serving in the field to sit in a room, read books, and work with engineers."

In this section I will try to connect the loose ends between the exile narrative, identity and total institutions. In my opinion (which I admit is not supported by a large body of evidence) reflections on the 'exile' experience that Signals Corps veterans experience in their induction to the corps can be seen in the veterans of the corps. It can be seen in their willingness to jump in on new unfamiliar topics without planning much ahead and relying mainly on their background survival record.

Can this be attributed to a process similar to a total institution situation? Morgan (Morgan 2006, chap. 7), following Plato's 'The Republic', imagines organisations as 'psychic prisons' - using their power to exercise a measure of control over their members, and even over their own creators. This metaphor is relevant not only to a specific narrative; it is rather related to the whole understanding of an organisation as a total institution to some degree, as I suggested in the preceding chapters when I discussed the concept of the total institution. Specifically, exile was associated with the total institution by Goffman (Goffman 1961, p. 321), where he described asylums as places society exiles people to. Hence, the exile narrative is not only intertwined in the Signals Corps veterans' stories, but it also emphasises the fact that at least part of their military service was under conditions that resemble total institution circumstances. So, based on comparison with a similarly well-researched situation, it might be deduced that a total institution situation is involved in adopting the 'surviving-and-exile' imprint.

From the narrative perspective the place of exile in story telling is closely related to the 'scene': the stage *"where the action occurs, where characters are formed and live out their stories and where cultural and social context play constraining and enabling roles."* (Connelly and Clandinin 1990, Welty 1990). Exile is associated with the suffering that follows the detachment from a place. The 'scene' can be either a physical or metaphorical place or both (Hay 2013, Kinane 2017, chap. 1). In our case both cases are relevant as the service was both geographically and organisational remote. As also suggested by Palmer (2016), the issues in the 'Castaway' narrative do not concern the physical location but with the subject's powers and weaknesses, with working in and the domination of nature, the other force-major, and when men are involved - with masculinity.

By and large, exile is closely linked to loss of identity, and replacing old identity with a new one. This inter-connection has been discussed by many. Malkki (1995) from an anthropological point of view, reminds us that throughout history exile was a capital punishment; It might be a punishment for one's individual delinquency, or *"only one aspect of much larger constellations of socio-political and cultural processes"* which are very relevant to this day. This is also reflected in canonical literature from the old and new testaments, Orpheus, the Homeric epics (Perry 2010), to modern day' science fictions novels (e.g. Heinlein's Stranger in a Strange Land.) A crucial point is the individual's recognition of his state and the manner by which he tackles it. Barna (2012) discusses the psychological mechanism that drives the exile narrative in writers, as a search for refuge in the new environment. The result of the process can be muddling in 'exileness' and keeping on being a refugee, or adapting to the new environment by accepting it and building an alternative new identity.

Eva Hoffman (2001, 2013) discusses the exile situation from a linguistic perspective. In her view, exile *"involves dislocation, disorientation, and self-division. We have come to value exactly those qualities of experience that exile demands—uncertainty, displacement, and the fragmented identity."* Since a great many artists found themselves in exile the inner processes, although individual and intimate, were reflected in a lot of fiction and non-fiction works. From contemporary times one might look at Adam Mickiewicz, Kurt Vile, Stefan Zweig or Max Brod, to name just a few where the influence of their refugee state was strongly reflected in their body of work.

It is of interest to note that the castaway narrative stands in sharp contrast to the total institution assumption that was assumed beforehand as the starting point of this research. On the contrary – the period of 'induction' into the service, the first period in the actual service after officers' academy is almost a rule-free realm in which the conscript has practically a boundless realm of possibilities, and very little guidance; a world without rules. At least at that point is was quite a surprise to find such an unexpected situation. It is of interest to deduce from the reviewed cases what type of epilogue typifies the ending of the conscripts' voyage: have they grown or just left it behind as a bad experience. It seems that all the informants share some kind of indifference to the environment they operate in, as long as they are accompanied by people they know. However, the sample size is small, and moreover – such characteristics can generally be found amongst entrepreneurs (Cardon *et al.* 2005, 2009, 2013, Clarke and Holt 2009, Thorgren and Wincent 2013), so no conclusion can be drawn on that point.

Another narrative, or perhaps better described as a typecast, that comes to mind from the stories that take place in the post-service period is a '**Mercenary' narrative**. Mercenaries' narratives are as old as history, and some recent studies of mercenaries' narratives may be found (Head 1982, Urban 2006, Simpson 2010, Fancy 2016, Spencer 2016). Adapting one of the official contemporary definitions of mercenaries to our case one can say that a mercenary is someone specially recruited in order to engage in a conflict, he does in fact take a direct part in the action, is motivated to take part in action essentially by the desire for private gain, and in fact is promised by a party to the conflict material compensation, they are not a part of the conflict, not controlled by any party of the conflict, and take part only in the conflict and nothing beyond. The mercenary narrative touches base with the castaway narrative on the point of masculinity; both of them capture different perspectives on Signals Corps veterans in different periods in their lives, and of course their professional lives, but the there is a common denominator which is masculinity.

From the quotations of Signals Corps veterans', it seems that they indeed come for a limited time, with definite entry and exit points, they are in for the money they don't take emotional side besides the romanticism of success and adventure, they are 'The Man'. Thus, the supposition seems adequate enough to portray the typology of these veterans.

However, although not always so over the ages, the mercenary typecast is generally considered with negative connotations; see for example the French Foreign Legion, the Russian Wagner's troops, ISIS militia, or Frederick the Great's Prussian army *"composed for the most part of criminals, paupers, foreign mercenaries, and unwilling conscripts-an unruly mob"* (Morgan 2006, p. 32), etc. This is not the case here, and what more, mercenaries are typically the carry-out persons whereas the interviewees here are in leading positions. The mercenary narrative or typecast suits better hired CEOs more than founders. This narrative is on the romantic side, as for example it is intertwined with a 'Noble Savage' narrative in the story of 'Lawrence of Arabia', and quite a lot of contemporary 'super-hero' sequels, e.g. 'Guardians of The Galaxy', where each of the characters is some kind of a castaway, yet a hero, with some specific mission to accomplish, and move on for another heroic mission. As a matter of fact, the ubiquitous super-heroes' characters has created a particular narrative by itself (Beemer 2011). Interestingly, the superhero narrative **always** involves a traumatic event in the character's past, which is not un-similar to the 'castaway' narratives of the Signal-Corps veterans.

3.2.3.4. CONCLUSIONS REGARDING SIGNALS-CORPS VETERANS

To summarise the total picture for Signals Corps veterans, I may conclude that the Signals Corps veterans share a common 'exile' master narrative that stems from the initial part of the military service, when they were drafted and were sent to do their first service position in what was equivalent to the desert from their perspective. The periods of service in technical positions in HQ or engineering units doesn't have to have a master narrative; however, it does imprint organisational culture. Interestingly, each of these veterans seems to take with him something else – two of the three continue in the same area while the third consciously takes an opposite course from military culture, but the end result is that all three share the organisational culture's common traits, and a master 'Mercenary' narrative in the entrepreneurship part of their career post service. As a group they share some common distinctive organisational culture traits, that might be traced back to the military service from both negative and positive perspectives: they do not plan too much, if at all, they do not care for hierarchy or titles, or what tasks they carry in the organisation, they do not care what the type of business is (as long as there is business), they don't hesitate to plunge head first into fields they are not familiar with (although they prefer ones they know). In their organisations there is little formality, they are lean and modest, and like most of the surveyed startups they rely mostly on their own resources, which are mainly reserved for paying subcontractors, while they draw small salaries or none at all.

From the point of view of the total-organisation it seems that the description of their service is quite the opposite. It is true that they are thrown into the cold water without a life jacket, but in effect they are given almost complete freedom to mold their new position as they deem fit, which seems to be a regular practice in the Signals Corps. In my opinion this 'Exile' narrative probably contributes to the high self-confidence they exhibit, which encourages them to go into unfamiliar business fields with very little planning. In fact, it might be the case that this lack of planning is actually beneficial, because one might lose his confidence if in the process of planning, he anticipates all the obstacles and hardship.

Regarding the Corps' organisational culture, they realise, and easily distinguish, the differences between the type of organisational culture needed in the military service, which they not criticize but are rather confident of its suitability to the military requirements, and the organisational culture need for an enterprise. They adopt and apply a culture that follows the vein of the military such as the low power distance, working in small groups with low

barriers between the personnel, ambiguous boundaries between the formal position's responsibilities and definitions, willingness to delve into vacuum situations and create a 'scene' that is unprecedented in the sense that it does not mimic something that exists, or a project in the current situation on a structure they are familiar with (such as the military service, or an experience from a former company they worked in) but is moulded according the situation as needed; they simply do what is required. The main difference is in the time perspective; they think short term while the military thinks and plans long term, and the products they conceive should not necessarily cover all based only the essentials that will make it a profitable business. Borrowing from Mosko's institution versus occupation (Moskos 1977) – in the military service they acted as an institution and in post-service as an occupation. A word of warning is required at the end of this analysis - despite the internal consistency the interviewees share within their own stories, and among themselves, this is all under the caution that the sample size is small, and might not faithfully represent the Signals Corps veterans' population at large.

3.3. RESULTS SUMMARY

As an endnote to this chapter I would point out again the main achievements of the research, but before I would like to recap again some weakening points in the reported results. I will try to point out the most important ones:

- It should be noted that the military unit in which one served (in the Israeli military case) is influenced by social back ground, education, physical build and abilities, health, technical inclination etc. While this does not weaken the strength of the military service background's influence, or at least correlation, to certain cultural characteristics as demonstrated in the above results, or as a predictor of certain typical preferences in organisational conduct, it does makes the assessment of the sociological and psychological process that carry his character to the realm of entrepreneurship more complicated to analyse. The point made here is that it is easier to correlate these typologies than to directly infer the influence.
- The author served in the Air-Force, so there is a question of subjectivity in cases when a moral position might have been made, or whether enough pressure was applied in interviews with ex-Air-Force personnel.

- The process of choosing participants for the study might also have some influence on the results. The main tool for finding founders with specific military background was using the LinkedIn social network; naturally, it means that the selected population is comprised of persons that present themselves as having that military back ground. It is not far-fetched to presume that this population will be positively biased in regard to their military service.

Taking into account all the above points, I believe that the study results are satisfactory from the research methodological viewpoint, and provide a sound basis for the conclusions presented and elaborated upon, and further discussed herein below. The main achievements of the research and its results are:

- Gathering enough raw materials for analysis, by locating and interviewing 20 founders who are veterans of the Air-Force, the Navy and the Signals Corps.
- Analysing the data using narrative analysis, and extracting information required to substantiate the initial assumptions regarding the relationship between the military back ground and organisational culture.
- Identifying some organisational culture traits of companies founded by military veterans, and some characteristics of the military units, and observing some commonalities and differences among them.
- Identifying common grand narratives in the stories of the interviewed founders, which seem to be related on one hand to organisational culture of military unit, while on the other hand have the potential to explain the imprint of that culture of founders' values and conduct, and through that on the organisational culture in companies they found.

4. DISCUSSION, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The main question I raised at the beginning was - does the founders' military service influence organisational culture in companies they establish after demobilisation, and if so - how? I argued that service personnel carry an imprint that remains from their service's culture; later on, when they might become entrepreneurs, which imprinted culture contributes to forming the fingerprints, or marks, that these entrepreneurs subsequently leave on the culture in the organisations that they found. In the study I tried to put these arguments to test and look for evidence of the imprints that the retirees carry over to their enterprises. I hypothesised that evidence of service in various military commands (navy, infantry, intelligence, etc.) will manifest in the current organisational culture. Moreover, I suggested that that the process of adapting the typical idiosyncratic military culture is related to 'identity theory' and 'total organisation' theory.

The quintessence of the results is that, in general, veterans of each military command exhibit a typical common grand narrative regarding their service, are exposed to a certain level of total organisation effect, and show common organisational cultural attributes of which some are unique within the group, and some common with startup entrepreneurs in general.

Veterans from different commands share common organisational culture features in the deeper levels of values and beliefs; Navy and Signals-Corps veterans do not seem not translated that to a common pragmatic conduct, while Air-Force veterans demonstrate prominent commonness also in practical aspects. Furthermore, from the common narratives shared by them it seems that typifying culture might be related to the type of service and the narrative they experience. In the case of Air-Force veterans it seems that organisational culture is contingent on the Air-Force organisational culture; contingency is also seen in Submarine veterans, while other veterans show insubstantial relation to the military culture, or an out-right rejection of that culture.

4.1. REVIEW AND RESULTS SYNOPSIS

The previous chapters debriefed thoroughly each of the commands' veterans; the following section focuses on the commonalities and differences between these groups of veterans, the difference between the forces and the influences they have on servicemen.

I tried to typify the organisational culture both in the examined services and in the entrepreneurships that were formed by their veterans; I tried to look for consistency between

the organisational culture of the specific services (Air-Force, Navy, and Signals-Corps) and that of the organisations established by their veterans. Using narrative analysis, I tried to follow the processes that support either the adoption or rejection of the military organisational culture by the entrepreneurships formed by the veterans. For that to succeed some preconditioning was required:

- There should be observable differences in organisational cultures between different military arms.
- There should be observable differences in organisational cultures in organisations formed by veterans of different services.

If such differences are observed they might be explained by looking at differences in the type of military service, and the way it might imprint its culture on its veterans. For that purpose, I tried to assess, using the same data of narrative analysis, the level of 'Total institution'ness' of the service, and a grand narrative that can be used to generalise and characterise service path of the veterans of the different services. This was in hope that the scent of the grand narrative can shed light on the process of adoption or rejection of the military organisational culture.

The following table summarises in a comparative fashion the main issues described and discussed above per each population. This section focuses on a comparative discussion. As seen in the tables, I try to point out and discuss differences between veterans of different services, which in my view is more interesting than commonalities, and try to clear the reasons behind the differences. Similarly, but with less emphasis I will discuss similarities between them:

Service Type / Characteristics	Signals-Corps	Air Force	Navy		
			Technical officers	Submariners	Surface ship officers
Cultural traits	**Low** emotional connection with the entrepreneurship	**High** emotional connection with the entrepreneurship	**Moderate** emotional connection with the entrepreneurship	**Moderate** emotional connection with the entrepreneurship	**Low** emotional connection with the entrepreneurship
Business type tendency	**Highly** technical	**Highly** technical	**Highly** technical	**Moderately** technical	**Moderately** technical
Business vision	**Exit** after development phase	**Organic growth**	**Organic growth**	**Don't care**	**Exit** as quickly as possible
Organisational structure	Vague, distributed, but coordinated	Well defined	Vague, distributed, but coordinated	Centralised	Centralised
Planning and managing	Planning and managing by instincts	Structured, methodological planning and managing	Planning and managing on the go	Structured planning and managing	Planning and managing on the go
Regard time scale	Medium term	Long term	Medium term	Short term	
Focus	Focus on end results	Focus on process	Focus on end results	Focus on end results	
Grand master narrative	Exile, Castaway	Bildungsroman	Rebirth, Resurrection	No clear grand narrative; 'Sailor returns to shore' fits to some extent	
Service culture imprints	Taking what is needed	Copying the service culture	Opposing, Contradictory, Service culture denial	Taking what is needed	
Perceived total institution level of service	low	Medium	High	High	Low
Socialising Agents	None	Veteran NCO's and Systematic organisational processes	None	Veteran NCO's and junior officers	Junior officers

Table 7 - Comparative findings summary

As can be noticed, in every compared category there is at least one population singularity. In the populations I have chosen to deal separately with the difference between Navy technical officers and operational officers, and between submarine officers and surface ships officers

4.1.1. PROCESS OVERVIEW

As discussed above, this research started using a quantitative study approach, and along the line of research changed to qualitative approach using narrative research. The changed was mostly due to the small sample size available for research, which made the results very shaky from significance point of view, and in addition the large diversity within the population which made comparison questionable.

The narrative approach proved itself useful at providing insights both into the organisational culture of the current companies, the organisational culture of military, and the process by which the military service might have influenced the servicemen. From that perspective it was a good choice. On the negative side - this choice led to a cumbersome research process because automatic text analysis tools, such as Atlas.ti, where quite limited when used in Hebrew text (that has improved since the start of the research), also the need to translate the quotations to English reduces their punctuality. Although the analysis was done I Hebrew, the quotations presented in this document loses some of the effect because of lack of adequate translations to Hebrew (and on top of that military…) slang used by the interviewees. Moreover, the translation took a lot of effort to accomplish.

Another point that should be kept in mind when doing narrative research is the enormous amount of data. A typical interview would result with 20-30 pages of transcription which should be written and analysed. One should be prepared to make that effort, and choose wisely the size and identity of the participants; each participant's analysis takes an effort that is better not used to nil.

4.1.2. THE RESEARCH QUESTION RESPONSE

The research question discusses the potential influence of military service background on the organisational culture of companies established by veterans. It is definitely clear that organisational culture in companies established by veterans of different military forces can be diversified to some extent in accordance with the founders' military back ground. There is a question of the extent of the military service influence versus other influences. I maintain that this is also clear based on the following observations:

- Veterans of the Air-Force coming of diverse background, of any aspect, exhibit post-service uniformity in organisational culture of their companies.
- Furthermore, they show distinct difference in organisational culture from Signal-Corps veterans which also come from diverse background, similarly to the Air-Force veterans. The most reasonable and probable explanation to that difference is the difference in the military service.
- Similarly, and in a complementary logical path: Veterans of the Navy, while coming of homogenous background, exhibit post-service diversity in organisational culture of their companies in relation to the service path within the Navy. Here, again, the most apparent explanation is the different military service experience.
- Furthermore, there is multitude of supportive evidence regarding the socialisation process and assimilation (or not) of the military organisational culture through mechanisms such as Total Institution that is reflected in the common narratives exhibited by veterans of the same forces. So, I believe, there is no doubt the military service experience has a profound impact, which is different for each military branch, and its imprint is revealed in the organisational culture of the companies established by veterans.

4.1.3. DISCUSSION OF THE RESULTS

As discussed earlier (paras. 2.6 and 3.1), the significance of the results in qualitative is not readily obvious in qualitative research. Limitations such as the size of researched population, and methodology of analysis are apparent. What can be proclaimed in favour of this research is that the size of researched population is on par with similar studies using similar methodologies; also, the extensive interviews and vast raw material substantiate the conclusions presented in this research. Hence, the author considers the research conclusions to be adequately substantiated, with a satisfactory level of confidence.

4.2. RESULTS SUMMARY

4.2.1. FINANCING

It seems common in the ventures that were surveyed to raise funds from friends, family and angels. However, it seems very common for ventures in their pre-seed, seed and early operation to use own funds and those of friends and family, and maybe turn to angels when more substantial funds are required. In Israel a common option is joining an accelerator

incubator which can be government funded, privately funded, or a combination thereof. This is common for various reasons:

- In early stages the funding is relatively small and funds can be raised without giving up a lot of equity (and control of the venture) which happens when raising funds from external sources.
- Traditionally venture capital funds (VC) do not tend to invest the small amounts needed at seed and pre-seed stages; it requires investing a lot of small amount and management becomes in-efficient. Also, at these stages the risk is tremendous and beyond the scope of VC's. It should be noted that there is a growing tendency on the part of VC's to go in as early as seed for various reasons, but it is in special cases (when legitimacy factor is huge…)
- 'Signalling' – This term refers to the case when a new venture raises funds at seed and/or pre-seed steps from a VC. It is usually regarded as a mistake because when the same VC refuses to next stage of funding it is considered a death-kiss to the venture because in negatively-signals a failure to some degree; this consideration usually outweighs all other aspects (Singerman 2012). Therefore entrepreneurs (if they have sense, or are well advised) usually reject that option and turn to other sources such as family and friends, and angels.

This is common both globally, according to OECD report (OECD 2011), and in the Israeli startup scene (Temkin *et al.* 2013). From this perspective there is no obvious support for using military-back ground as a major basis for legitimacy; legitimacy is based in these early stages on more intimate acquaintance between the founders and the financiers; military-background-service in that case is part of that intimacy and not specifically proclaimed by the entrepreneurs in roadshows.

4.2.2. PLANNING, IMPLEMENTATION, AND CONTROL

There is much controversy regarding planning in small businesses and entrepreneurships, and how much they contribute to the business success (see for example a summary by Castrogiovanni (1996)); usually the larger the venture the more deemed needed is the pre-planning. Most startups, however, are advised to prepare planning prior to kick-off. Notable examples to ventures that started without planning are Apple, FedEx, and IBM PC operation. Empirical research reveals that pre-planning is one of smallest factors having effect on startup

success (Schwenk and Shrader 1993); to put it bluntly – total catastrophic entrepreneurships having awful ideas can be beautifully planned, to no avail. A newer empirical research (Chrisman *et al.* 2005) has found out that planning do contribute to the probability of success, but up to some level beyond which it begins showing detrimental effect. This is attributed to over-planning leading to rigidness and adherence to a pre-prepared course of action is a dynamic environment full of unknowns and un-certainties which is the playground of new venture, especially innovative ones. These findings are further supported by a meta-research by Brinckmann *et al.* (2010) who recommend, based on experience of businesses, that the best option for new businesses is to do basic pre-planning and make incremental changes and adaptations to the plans along the progression of the business, the reason being the uncertainty factor at the beginning of the road. Pre-planning is definitely recommended for already established businesses that seek to expand. Interestingly, and counter-intuitively, they have found that planning has even lesser effect on performance in cultures that tend to avoid uncertainty (based on Hofstede's UAI[57] dimension of culture, e.g. Germany and France). They suggest that this may be attributed to treating deviation from the plans as a threat, and instead of adapting the plan the 'threats' are dealt with, were as in cultures with less tendency to avoid uncertainty they are accepted as opportunities, and are used as a leverage for the business. In an earlier research Shane (1993) found that in countries with high UAI, managers tend to do more planning and rely and adhere to it to handle uncertainty; Shane considers this a limiting factor. Comparing Israel's Hofstede's UAI gives the following picture:

[57] Uncertainty Avoidance Index

Figure 21 - Hofstede's UAI parameter for OECD members plus Singapore and Taiwan (Hofstede *et al.* 2010 and Hofstede Centre Web Site)

Based on Shane's findings and Figure 21 it is expected that Israelis will demonstrate tendency for extensive business planning. Indeed, it seems that all the surveyed companies did some planning, however IAF's retirees showed more extensive planning, and some gave a direct reference to their military service. Yet, there is an innovative population of IAF's retirees that demonstrate a mutual tendency for more extensive planning in a certain way, at least for the engineering design part of planning; since the only common characteristic of that population

(other than being Israeli entrepreneurs) is a common military service, this is most probably might be attributed to the common military background.

So, objectively, planning is good up to a point, but most entrepreneur are not really aware of this fact and basically each takes a course of action based on a mixture of experience, culture, external guidance, or demand from funding sources or customers.

Table 8 - Planning and control methodology

Military background	Typical business planning and control	Typical development methodology
Navy	Little business plan, loose control, with inter-differences dependant on type of service	No formal methodology, but might be described as Agile in some entrepreneurships
Air Force	Generally detailed planning and tight control	Linear, waterfall model
Signals-Corps	Sketchy planning as needed	No formal methodology

In most of the organisations surveyed in this research pre-planning seems less important than learning on the move during the implementation; this is done using control mechanisms such as water-fall development model.

From the research results it seems that entrepreneurs are either unaware of planning and control methodologies or aware but choose to use their existing toolbox instead of applying the best-suited approach for their venture. When conscious choice of method is selected it is usually a linear type 'Waterfall' or 'Vee-model'[58]. These models suit very well the case were a *specified* product or service is required and the project involves more development and engineering and *less research*, and is very common in the development of military programs[59]. Naturally the methodology behind these development models has diffused into the civilian market and is also a very common practice in civilian projects. Military graduates became accustomed to using them, and companies working with the military have developed their

[58] Quite well explanation regarding these models may be easily found in sources such as Wikipedia

[59] The extent to which these models have dominated the field of military projects that may be observed by the multitude of fundamental standard and handbooks issued by the USA Department of Defense and the various commands and agencies that reference and recommend them. The traces of these can be back many years back from the following examples: (*DOD-STD-2167A, Defense System Software development* 1988, *MIL-STD-498, Software And Development Documentation* 1994, *NASA - Systems Engineering Handbook* 1995, *Naval Systems Engineering Guide* 2004, *Systems Engineering Primer & Handbook (3rd Edition)* 2005, *NASA Systems Engineering Handbook* 2007, Pennell, L. W. 2005)

conduct around them. The downside is that as the process continues it becomes harder and harder to change the course of action, thus as a concept it is not very flexible and not suited to cases when the goal to be achieved is not clearly defined; in other words, the applicability of these models to innovative entrepreneur ventures is highly questionable. When discussing with Air-Force veterans their choice of planning approach it is regarded, occasionally with pride, to be "The way we did in the good ole' time when we were in service".

4.2.3. LEAN COMPANIES

It is obvious that all the surveyed companies carry a very modest and lean conduct; most of it is might probably attributed to lack of funds. This commonality can also be related to Hofstede's dimension of 'indulgence versus restraint'; all the interviewees, no exception, are very well trained, educated, and experienced persons that passed a very fine selection in the military, yet, they prefer to living on a tight budget, some not getting salary for a considerable period of time, to a very-well-paid secured employment in an established company, for the benefit of some future low-probability success. This characteristic is common among entrepreneurs, as can be seen in various studies (Cardon *et al.* 2009, Chen *et al.* 2009, Watne and Hakala 2013).

4.2.4. OUTSOURCING

This trait is in the same vein of the previous 'leanness' attribute. Almost all the surveyed enterprises used out sourcing in process of producing their product. They prefer this method of conduct for several reasons:

- Obligations to personnel puts burden on the cash flow. It is not economical for young struggling company to create long-term employers-employee contractual relations in a stage where there is no steady income. Usually these companies focus on one product (or pre-product) and they need expertise for a limited period of time at some points along the development process; personnel are not needed full time.
- The need to rapidly put out a quality product usually needs expertise in several fields which is not practical to attain in the realm of financial and temporal scopes of startup companies. The solution is keeping the core knowhow and integration in-house and contact sub-contractors. The contracting is sometimes done shares offering and not by payment.

The only exceptions to outsourcing are two more mature companies that prefer to employ vertical integration and keep every aspect of product in-house. One company was founded by Air-Force veterans and another by Navy veterans. Even these companies do only the design in-house and use sub-contracting for production on large scale.

4.2.5. FOCUS ON PROCESS VERSUS END RESULTS, AND EXIT STRATEGY

This is also related to Hofstede's dimension of 'long term versus short term orientation', and the previous discussion of planning and control discussed earlier in para. 4.2.2. It is clear that for Air-Force veterans the road to achievement is of no less importance than the achievement itself. They invest time in planning and rigorous management and control, which echoes the organisational culture of the Air-Force. This is in contrast to veterans of other commands, and according to some studies less suited for startup enterprises. It probably suites better enterprises that involve bureaucracy such as medical devices, or safety related enterprises. Fields such as such require providing rigorous validation of the development and validation of the end product, and needing to follow the documentation trail. This suite well the tendency to look for organic growth of the business which is common to Air-Force veterans. Most, if not all Navy and Signal-Corps veterans show tendency for exit strategy as soon a possible. There might be some differences between expressed causes for this strategy: some for simple wealth, some for prestige, some for lack of interest in managing a 'regular' company and the excitement of building a new entrepreneurship, but the bottom line is they want rapid success; exiting by either M&A[60] or IPO[61].

4.2.6. BUSINESS TO BUSINESS

All the interviewees, with no exception, regardless of type of military service, preferred working B2B versus B2C. They feel more confident when they know for certain who the point of contact is for making the decisions. From my point of view, it points to two characteristics: Firstly, they are accustomed to big organisations and are not afraid of them, which is natural after serving some years in hierarchical military organisations. Secondly, they might feel less connected to the end costumer, especially young costumers, which might be attributed to their age – most of them are in their 30's and beyond; they have more in common with

[60] Merge and Acquisition
[61] Initial Public Offering

executives in other companies, and need a mediating agent between them and the end costumer.

4.2.7. HOMOGENEITY

A point that emerges from the study is that of the Air-Force and Signals-Corps veterans display internal group-homogeneity both in the organisational culture traits, narratives and traces of total organisation in service; this is in contrast to the inter-group diversity of the Navy officers. Despite sharing uniforms, and of course naval service, the Navy should rather be considered as a mixture of several sub-cultures (para. 3.2.2.4); however, they still might be typified for example by their low interest in the type of business, and their less affinity to planning.

The evidence in this research are in line with similar research in the US Navy (Bierly 1995) which is of a much larger scale, and probably more diversified as it comprises of more naval disciplines than the Israeli Navy. Bierly describes the diversity in culture between submariners, navy pilots, and boats. Results in this study, detailed in the previous chapter, which are in line with Bierly's study, attribute much of the difference to difference in the risk–averseness diversity, and different mission types; Bierly also attribute it to different training, different histories, and different heroes and heroes 'type'. Within this diversity there is also sub-diversity between boats, which somewhat mitigated due to constant movement of crew between boats which is less typical in the Israeli navy.

4.2.8. NARRATIVES

The first fundamental question that was raised in the research objective is whether there is a narrative in the stories of the interviewees, and I believe that there is strong evidence that indeed there is a narrative, and more over there is a common master narrative that is shared between veterans of the same military command, and even a branch within the command. This provides a basis for a further inference regarding the influence of the military service on the organisational culture of enterprises, which will be elaborated in the following sections.

I follow here the line of Porter-Abbott (2008) who claims that what defines a narrative is representation of a series of events, or even a single event, where the representation involves recounting of these events. The retelling of the event is clocked in a warped timeline which is not necessarily chronologically sequential, but is rather driven by the internal logic the narrator gives these events. The end result is a timeline that might be compressed at places while being stretched at other points. This flexibility enables the narrative to effectively

compress an idea using highlighted actions along a contextually relevant timeline that gives the sequence of events their internal reasoning. It thus a very efficient tool for conveying ideas; so efficient that some researchers maintain that it might be genetically imprinted in the human brain similar to a natural language theory (Chomsky 1957, Jameson 1981, Lyotard 1984, Young and Saver 2001). A main tool for conveying the logical construct is what is presented and what is silenced in a story, the emphasis of points, and the sequence of events lead unconsciously to a patterned way of thinking; the dynamics of events provokes a certain predetermined interpretation. This conditioning is strong enough, such that one might claim that *"coming to narrative is a necessary feature of human development"* (Young and Saver 2001). Also, in a way one might assert that the way total institutions affect personal constructs by changing these predetermined patterns of interpretation.

Thus, looking at the interviews, or more concisely at the quotes – is it plausible to maintain that they carry a kernel of narrative, the presence of which is one of the asserted foundations this research.

Table 9 - Military Master-Narratives

	Master Narrative	Narrative Perception
Air-Force	Bildungsroman	Positive, conversion, redemption
Signals-Corps	Exile, Castaway, Superhero	Positive, survival
Navy technical officers	Rebirth, Resurrection	Negative, an escape
Naval commanding officers	No clear grand-narrative; 'Sailor returns to shore' fits to some extent	Neutral

The most profound effect-of-service is experienced by Air-Force veteran officers. It seems that they complete a conversion cycle from objection to serve in the Air-Force (typical to many interviewees) to adoption of the organisational culture of the Air-Force including all its levels from the most explicit organisational structure and methodologies to values and beliefs. This phenomenon is a well-recognised adaptation process to a total institution (Czarniawska-Joerges 1992, chap. 7) (c.f. Goffman 1957, 1961, Karmel 1972, Scott 2010). From the point of view of the Air-Force it is a perfect score; in my opinion, generally it has a negative un-intentional effect on the Air-Forces officers as it might cause Air-Force veterans to be captured

in a paradigm that hinders them from developing an organisational culture that is better suited for the organisation they found, or a lighter effect is unconsciously limiting themselves to founding organisations for which such culture is suited, i.e. organisations in which they are comfortable with the field of operation and organisational culture.



Figure 22 - Motivation to Serve Vs. Service Experience

Two inferences can be made based on the above diagram

- Comparing the three types of Navy veterans which share similar starting points of finely selected and volunteering personnel can display very different service experience, and different grand narratives. Jumping the gun a bit, I will note here in below that they also demonstrate different levels military culture imprint.
- Comparing Air-Force veterans to veteran naval officers show similar positive service experience, albeit very different, almost opposite starting points: navy volunteers versus reluctance to serve in the Air Force. The enormous gap is bridged by service experience as projected in the grand narrative of the Air-Force service which transforms or converts the conscripts to the Air Force organizational culture by applying normative-control type of total organisation (elaborated herein below.)

It is of interest to note that 'redemption' is a classical American narrative (McAdams et al. 2001, McAdams and McLean 2013). Hammack (2008): "Americans engage with a master

narrative of redemption as they construct their life stories. That is, a collective narrative that emphasizes the possibility of individual redemption, because it is foundational in American discourse (both historically and contemporarily), tends to underlie individual life stories that Americans construct. In this way, narrative engagement for many Americans results in the reproduction of a master narrative through the construction of the individual life story." This type of redemption that leads to salvation of the individual is not a foundation in Judaism, and is a contemporary import from Christianity, whereas in Judaism salvation is of the entire nation and an individual trait. In its religious context redemption is also associated with 'sin'. This observation may be out of the scope of this study but might be interesting to research further on, as some interviewees of the Air-Force spent a significant period of time in the USA as part of their service, and all had interaction with US organisations.

A possible source of difference the Navy and Air Force is straightforward and stems from their missions, as one Navy veteran noted:

> *"…the length of the missions which can take weeks and months makes it difficult to effectively debrief the actions and extract lessons. This is in contrast with aerial operations which are shorter and the cycles of learning are much shorter."*

There is a question here of why do people with shared narratives exhibit similar cultural, behavioural characteristics? Does the narrative reflect the process by which they were imprinted – similarly to 'Total Organisation' assimilation? Is the narrative descriptive in nature, simply taking note of the process, or is it the narrative that is the activator? This goes back to the similar earlier theoretical discussion (para. 1.2) of whether organisational culture is functional or interpretational; it is most likely both points of view are correct and intertwined. Maybe the answer to the question lies in the conflict is expectations between pre-draft and post-draft experiences. This can be learnt to some extent from the narratives portrayed by the interviewees. It might be enough to look at the flavour of the narrative – is it negative in nature or positive in nature

4.2.9. THE MILITARY AS A TOTAL INSTITUTION

In the entrance to the study the concept of total institution was suggested as a possible reason for the imprint of military culture in veterans, if such imprint is actually detected. One of the aspects that this research looked for is whether there are resemblances or differences in organisational culture between the military commands where entrepreneurs served, versus the organisational culture in enterprises established by them as veterans. Based on the

narratives presented by the interviewee I will try to assess whether there are traces of total institution in their service.

Note that many Air Force veterans used the verse 'like we used to do in the Air Force', while no veteran from Navy or Signals-Corps expressed so explicitly his bonding to the service heritage. Also note the two possible ways people may take to enter the military total institution; one is drafting and randomly selected (=air force) and the other to volunteer (=navy, and especially the submarines flotilla). The case of the Signals-Corps is somewhere in between, namely, one does not volunteer for that service, but in the case of academic reserve graduates a request to serve in Signals-Corps is usually granted. Hence, service in Signals-Corps is not imposed on conscripts, but as interviewees said – what they really wanted is not to serve in the Signals-Corps but rather avoid serving in the Air Force.

So here is the big question – given the fact that Air Force veterans interviewees were drafted to that force rather against their wishes, Navy veterans interviewees volunteered to the Navy, and Signals-Corps interviewees wished to serve in the Signals-Corps, certainly there are pre-drafting differences between the populations. The differences are both explicit – the motivation to serve in the particular service, and implicit – why that motivation exists; although not searched in this study, one may assume that similarity, in particular motivation, might hide similarity in values. This leads to the question of how much of post-military-service characteristic behaviour can be attributed to pre-drafting personal attributes, and how much can be attributed to service inscription induced by processes of the likeness of total institution. Or is it that population that enters the service with strong will is less while population that has no pre-drafting preferences more easily influenced and more likely to adopt the service cultural imprint.

On the other hand, how can one expect that conscripts drafting to the services they wished to do not adopt the cultural aspects of the service; is it disappointment?

One example against is the case of Submarine officers. These officers possibly share pre-drafting values as missile boat officers, however, they demonstrate attitude regarding the service which is similar to that of the Air Force veterans; post service they tend to run their business in a methodical manner which is prominent with Air Force veterans, although they do not share the longer time view of Air Force veterans that strive to build businesses to last and grow organically.

Note the difference in close barracks versus open service (institution versus occupation), the socialisation process in recruiting and accepting into service.

Note the difference in the existence or absence of a 'community', or a surrogate community of Talpiot graduates.

Goffman mentions the attitude towards work as one major implication of the total institution. As opposed to regular organisations where authority of the workplace is kept within strict bounds and the incentives are e.g. payment, in total organisations the incentives to work are different and are related to punishment-payment mechanism (Goffman 1957). Oddly enough it is reminiscent of Mosko's occupational-institutional theory (Moskos 1976, 1977, 1981) discussed in paragraph 1.31.3.

From the point of view of this research the army service may fall into a total institution category when the circumstances develop to that end either intentionally or unintentionally. For example, the service in a submarine definitely resembles a total institution, a service in a closed military compound may resemble a total institution depending on additional factors like the homogeneity of the conscripts, the type of discipline, how closed it is to the outside world etc.

On the other hand, the application of total institution theory for our research topic should be done carefully because unlike the classical point of view of the inmate that the theory usually takes, in our case the relevant point of view is that of the personnel. The interviewed veterans are stuff and not inmates, however in most cases they are staff in an institution without inmates. This point of view was less researched (Armstrong and Griffin 2004, Lambert 2004, Lambert and Paoline III 2008, Crewe *et al.* 2011, Thurston-Snoha and Mora 2011, Bierie 2012). The only cases where there are 'inmates' is for the navy headquarters, where the staff is in some intermediate state – the officers of captain and major ranks are lower in level, hence considering them 'inmates' might be exaggerated, but neither do they handle inmates, they are the operational level of the organisation. The same rank on a boat is the commanding staff; so, is there significance to that difference? Some of the research suggests that organisational support to the staff in total institutions helps reducing stress; in the research cases of prisons the stress is mainly due to the friction between staff and inmates.

Thus, it seems that the Air Force tendency to influence his staff to adhere to his norms and way of working and conduct; this can be observed in the behaviour of Air Force veterans even after demobilisation. The navy people express more openness to absorption and adapting

culture they are exposed to during the service and onward. See for example a quote from a founder of company that provides training platforms for companies that employ multitude of personnel; he is not interested in what the company does (i.e. the content of the training of the end user) other companies provide the content that utilises his platforms – these companies are his partners. When they apply as contenders, they do it together:

> *(NS2): "I am not really a content manager; I have cooperation.* ***My aim is to stay as far as I can from content****; I do cooperation with training companies in country."*

So, there are several objective factors that should be considered in this discussion: firstly, there are the two possible ways entrance options the military - one is drafting and randomly selected for one of the commands (e.g. most of the air force conscripts) and the other to volunteer (e.g. naval officers, and especially the submarines flotilla). Secondly, there is a spectrum of military barracks in the army from an enclosed submarine or a ship at sea, through closed barracks, to an open service as in headquarters. Additionally, there are subjective external factors that depend both on the organisational culture of the specific military unit, and internal ones like the type of service either as a commander or subordinate (usually both) which affects the level of totality of the organisation as conceived by the conscripts, and described in their narratives. As can be seen in the comparison table below there are differences between the characteristics of the population and organisations which influence the level of total'ness of the organisations:

Veterans Population / Characteristics	Signals-Corps	Air Force	Navy Submariners	Navy Surface Ships officers	Navy Technical officers
Drafting	Expressed will to serve	Compulsory	Volunteers	Volunteers	Expressed will to serve
Typical type of barracks	Closed bases in the first assignment, and an open base on the second assignment	Closed bases in the first assignment and an open base on the second assignment	Isolated at sea & closed base on first assignment, and an open base on the second assignment	Isolated at sea & closed base on first assignment, and an open base on the second assignment	Open base
Organisation control	Impelled assignment, but almost total freedom in daily routine	Impelled assignment, total control over professional conduct under supervision of higher hierarchy	Total control in every aspect	Total control in every aspect	Assignment with consent, little control over professional conduct
Type of service	Technical command, project management	Technical command, project management	Operational command, project management	Operational command, project management	Project management
Estimated level of totality	low	Medium	High	High	Low
Estimated level of professional totality	Medium-Low	High	Low	High	High

Having described all that, it seems that the total'ness of the organisations have small effect on the imprint of the organisational culture. If any, the influence is negatively correlated: the more the organisation is total the less is the organisational culture imprint. My assessment of the relative totality of the military organisations and the level of organisational culture imprint is summarised in the following graph:



Figure 23 - Organisation totality vs. Organisational culture imprint

A possible explanation for this phenomenon is looking not at the classical definition of total institution but an alternative projection of it – a professional total institution which applies what Etzioni coined, in the early 60's, as 'normative control' (Etzioni 1975), in which *"in which the individual contributes his or her commitment because the goals of the organization are basically the same as the individual's goals"* (Schein 2004). Etzioni developed his institutional theory circa the time frame when Goffman developed the theory of 'total institution', Goffman was familiar with his work, shared ideas with him, and actually admits he borrowed the terminology from Eztioni's work which started as a research in Kibbutzim in Israel (Goffman 1961, pp. 16, 22 & 161, in footnotes). Thus, they look at actually the same topic from two slightly different aspects: one more from the point of view of the individual and his motivation to contribute to the organisation, and the other more from the point of view of the organisation and the way it affects the individual. This view is echoed in Scott's (2010) revisits of the concept of the total institution. She proposes the concept of 'Performative

Regulation' which suggests that a professional total institution is an organisation that impels its members to do things in a certain way dictated by the organisation, while other aspects of life are less controlled; as far as military service is free (they are not!). This resembles Morgan's (2006, chap. 7) image of organisations as 'psychic prisons', mentioned above, using their power to control their members.

This categorisation makes the correlation more understandable. However, it leaves one anomaly which is the differences between characteristics of ex-surface-boats officers and ex-submarine officers. At face value it seems they share many commonalities from point of view of a total institution, thus what makes the difference? The figure below summarises these relations and inconsistency:



Figure 24 - Organisation professional totality vs. Organisational culture imprint

To get more insight into the difference between surface-boats officers and submarines officers' type of service a few more naval officers were approached; they are outside the research population and were asked only to refer to that specific difference. The following points came up:

- The missions of submarines a significantly longer: they are on the order of magnitude of weeks versus the missions in surface boats which are 2-3 days.
- The diversity of missions in surface boats is much larger. In submarines it is more of the same routine. Also, the level classification of submarines operations is much higher;

usually the crew does not have regarding the mission and have only the routine tasks to keep.

- In submarines, very similarly to aircrafts, there is little to none tolerance for mistakes; this is true both to a combat and just a simple drill. The margin between life and a disaster is very thin.
- Although both are isolated, on a surface boat you can always go out on board to take a fresh air breath and fill the wind and sun; there is no such privilege on a submarine were the only time you have limited privacy is in the toilet.
- All the points above create a very tense and dense atmosphere; there is simply no room for mistakes. Perfect alert and sharpness are a must. On top of that one must be nice, otherwise life would be intolerable. Officers that are chosen to serve on submarines are selected accordingly to match these characteristics. An interesting point that demonstrates it is that regular submarine crew men, during their course, are seen going all the time in perfect 3-abreast, and singing songs even in late stages of the training.

Additionally, while in the Navy's submarine force the socialisation agent, the bearers of the cultural traditions are what are called in slang 'Jack Tars', 'old Surly Jack Tars', or simply 'old salts' combined with junior naval offices, the induction into surface fleet seems to rely more on just junior offices.

Thus, the bottom-line is that the long endurance missions plus the very short shore leaves, the type of mentorship acceptance, with the character of the mission and the air of danger make the submarine a total institution of a higher level than a surface boat. As one of the officers said – *"it changes the DNA of the personality."*

Therefore, after the above discussion Figure 24 can be adjusted to look like this:



Figure 25 - Adjusted Organisation professional totality vs. Organisational culture imprint

The surface boats officers still present an anomaly, but less significant.

Note that the above discussion holds for small submarines of the type in service in the Israeli Navy. In larger submarines the characteristics might be different.

Another point brought out is there is difference between a large missile boat and a small patrol boat. In the small boat usually, there is only a single officer, and the crew is usually less technical in nature, as there is less sophisticated equipment on board, and more fighting inclined. The conduct is something between a naval vessel and a regular military unit. On missile boats the petty officers are more knowledgeable than the officers. I did not see a difference between these two types in my interviews, but that may be because of the limited sample size.

4.3. RESEARCH SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this research was to demonstrate through narrative field research commonality and differences of features of entrepreneurs with different military service background. It was proposed that the organisational cultural imprint of the service would be carried over by the retirees to their own enterprises. Moreover, is was suggested that this cultural imprint might be related to the nature of the military service, and that traces of the imprint process would be evident in grand-master narratives that might be shared by the veterans. Furthermore, it was suggested that such process would be a result of 'Performative

Regulation' influence of a 'Total Institution' type of organisation that can be attributed to some extent to military organisations.

The scope of the research is very wide, and strives to cover both organisational culture observations, interpretations, attempting to analyse processes that might have led to the current state of affairs, and on top of that comparative review and assessment between several populations. Therefore, the literary review covers a lot of topics; a lot of theories seemed relevant at the beginning of the research, and were reviewed; some proved of less relevance (e.g. identity theory, but are still presented for completeness.

The starting point is examining organisational culture, and recognition of the profound influence that founders have on its establishment and development. The literature review elaborates upon aspects of organisational culture from sociological, psychological, and anthropological perspectives. Along-side these perspectives, usually, there are distinct study and measurement methods, each with its base of followers. Leading theoretical baseline texts on which to rely for these topics are by Schein (2004), Martin (Martin 2002a), and Hambrick and Mason (1984).

The next step is the recognition of the diversity in military culture, which is both elaborated upon in the literature review, and analysed in the narratives of the interviewees from various military branches. The connection between the diversity of military culture and organisational culture in entrepreneurships is, of course, in the essence of this research, hence, the extensive literature review.

Once the possible link between organisational culture and military culture in the background of the founders has been established, the research sets out to explore the specific diversity in organisational culture among companies in Israel founded by veterans of various military branches, the diversity in military culture among branches in Israeli military commands, and the possible relations between the two, possibly finding processes that might lead to these relations.

The research follows the route of interpretive paradigm, and qualitative research methodology. While interpretive paradigm is called for by the research essence, the convergence to qualitative method was reached after trying quantitative methods, and realising they are less fitted for the type of study due to scope and depth of data required, and the diversity of researched population, that

From ‘grand-theories’ point of view, the most important theories for this study are the **‘Total Institution’** theory, created by Goffman (1957, 1961), and **‘Social Identity’** theory, developed by Tajfel (1974). These two well established, and influential, theories seem to provide the best theoretical foundation for explaining the findings of this research, most importantly the process by which conscripts go into the army with a certain personality, with a certain set of values, beliefs, and behavioral characteristics, and leave with, either or not, another set. Using narrative research, which was selected as the research method, helps capturing the process that goes over these conscripts, and also helps elucidating encapsulating the process into a more concise typology, that help when one wants to compare many processes described by many words. They point to various levels of the totality of the military branch of service, and the adaptation process that follows it, as possible candidate for adoptions or in-adoption of the military identity traits, of which our focus is on the organisational culture ones that might have follow on in post-military-service entrepreneurship.

Of the various qualitative methods, this research uses narrative research to capture in a single instance both the past (military culture and total organisation), the present (organisational culture), and the possible link between them (grand narrative). This was achieved by multiple analysis of the collected data; firstly, for digging out the organisational traits, and secondly to capture the narrative.

The bottom line of the research, elaborated upon expansively above, is that there is no doubt that the different populations that were studied, exhibit different organisational culture. There is also no doubt that each exhibits a different narrative, and experienced a different level or flavour of total institution. The question of whether the simultaneous differences are simply correlative, and are there because of reasons such as pre-drafting sorting process, personality similarity that draws people with similar personality to the same type of military service, is more difficult to answer. I believe the answer is positive because of two main observations:

- Diverse population drafted to the Air Force, usually with negative attitude, demobilise having distinctive cultural traits, and grand narrative
- Homogenous population drafted to the Navy with positive attitude exhibit weaker cultural traits, but a similar grand narrative

In my mind the common narratives, being a reflection of the military service experiences, mark the effect the military service can have on its conscripts.

Yet, there is another interesting question: while some of the differences are explainable to some extent as elaborated upon herein above, some attributes, such as fund raising, are shared both among them, and with other startups globally, and follow the conventions of startup companies worldwide. What can explain the **commonalities** that seem to contradict that explanations? why differences in power distance are minuscule? why is fund raising, and the careful handling of expenditure almost identical? this despite the highlighted differences in background? I maintain that this not really a surprise; all the characteristics of an organisation, or any community for that matter, are a compromise and an equilibrium between the founders' initial intentions and the business environment. This is not new and discussed in organisational behaviour textbooks (Schermerhorn, Jr. *et al.* 2010, chap. 17), specific discussion regarding organisational identity is also available (Martin and Siehl 1983, Ashforth and Mael 1989, 1996, Callan *et al.* 2007, Ashforth *et al.* 2008). It seems that it depends upon the level of commitment; some traits are easier than others to change and adopt, commitment to their adoption has less profound, long-term, effect on the company. Hence, in such cases it is easier for the founders to give-up their own 'culture' and 'identity' in favour of imposed external ones, for the benefit of moving the company forward; it's a fair trade-off. Some characteristics are imposed on the founders by the capital holders; they (e.g. venture capital funds) follow their own narratives, and since they hold the power, they can impose a certain behaviour on the young, sometimes impoverished, fund famished companies. Also, as for the similarity in power distance, a reasonable explanation might be the small size of the companies; probably as the company expands it has effect on power distance.

The most notable differences are in the work methodology, and short-term versus long-term perception. As one of the ex-Navy (NT1, in one of the quotations in para. 3.2.2.2) noted – he doesn't care what development method he follows, as long as the customer is satisfied; on the contrary side, an ex-Air-Force (AF4, in one of the quotations in para. 3.2.1.2) – although he regards the company and the customers as partners, he follows development methodology *"as we did in the Air-Force"*. As is the case for work methodology, this seems for Air-Force veterans important enough to adhere to 'old-times'. In both these cases these are more internal holdings, in which when a company chooses a path it is harder to change course; also, since they are more internal, they are less exposed to and influenced by exo-company

pressure; hence, the founders are free to choose to follow their beliefs and values, and the background influence is more clearly recognisable. Moreover, it seems that in Air-Force veterans the attitude towards the company is more emotional, almost as an 'alter-idem'; they are less prone to give-up their identity, and they do so only when it is absolutely necessary, while other veterans take it more easily. Taking it momentarily to a normative discussion – this is not necessarily in their favour; as discussed above already in the literature review, over-planning, and adhering to a certain path might not be beneficial for start-up companies that sometimes need the flexibility to change: change focus on product, markets, customers, stages of development, etc., as one of the Navy veterans (NT4) interviewee called it – it is a multi-dimensional task that should mostly be focused on cash flow and survival.

Another correlated outcome from Air-Force's veterans imprint, and this is an assumption that is hard to verify in small companies, is that they will probably prefer to work with their kind – other Air-Force veterans, as it eases the stresses between conflicting cultures within a company. This tendency is harder to verify, and in large and mature companies will probably decay over lingering more in the upper echelons levels, as predicted by Hambrick and others (Hambrick and Mason 1984, Hambrick 2007, Finkelstein *et al.* 2009).

Thus, on the basis of a relatively modest sample, the findings demonstrate that some similar practical aspects of organisational culture and common narratives are shared by veterans of the same military command, and other distinguishes them from one another. Veterans of the Air Force are more pronounced in their uniqueness in terms of organisational culture, redemptive grand narrative, and mentorship-like socialisation process.

4.4. Recommendations for further study and Author's retrospective reflections

Some main further studies come directly to mind as a contingency to this work: the first one is sanitising the pre-drafting conditions from the influence of the military service, thereby giving a picture in which, the true effect of the military service is purer. The second on is comparison between Israeli entrepreneurship scene compared to other countries. Because of military service, most entrepreneurs start their entrepreneurship journey at an age when they are already in point at life when they have families to support, and also a military service experience; the natural default expected behaviour at that point is getting a steady well-paid job that utilises the previous experience. Yet, some chose differently, and prefer to follow

entrepreneurial path; this make for a somewhat different career path choices and selections. Thus, it should be interesting to compare the cultural aspects of Israeli entrepreneur versus entrepreneurs from other countries.

Yet another path of study, which is related to the first one, is the prevalence over time of military culture traces. For that purpose, more seasoned companies should be researched with enough data base to make multi-variate analysis possible, which is needed to neutralise other effectors.

I started this research with a question in mind regarding the influence of military service of entrepreneurs, and tried to avoid the judgmental normative question of whether there is a preferred result that I would like to see; I wanted to achieve results that might have viable usage for people in the entrepreneurial business - like investors, entrepreneurs, employees etc. Quite at the beginning, one of the interviewees had told me that he would have liked to see typical veterans of a certain military branch at the design stage, and of another branch at the implementation and integrations stages. No doubt, there are strong stereotypes regarding the different army forces; this could be observed in the interviews with Air-Force and Signal-Corps veterans who tried to avoid drafting to the Air-Force. However, looking back at the results I believe I don't recognize a clear pattern of success that might be attributed to a certain veterans' population. Partly this is of course due to the fact that those unsuccessful are harder to be found and interviewed. It seems that as a reflection of their socialisation and cultural assimilation process, the path these veterans choose to take, ensuing their service, matches quite well the tools they accumulated during their service, in addition to the pre-emptive conditions such as personality, identity, and other unknown factors such as age and family status. Furthermore, the Air-Force, which is considered less lucrative prior to drafting, is letting out alumni that are on par, considering success, with veterans of other army branches; they might be of less broad spectrum of field of business, but this is not necessarily a drawback.

So, what should be the preference from the military point of view – taking in a large diverse population and culturize it to a certain mould, or taking in a more homogenous population and give it more freedom to retain individuality? From the military stand point, it seems that all the military forces try to do their best towards the first end of homogenising the incoming population, for obvious reason; however, the Air-Force seems to do it better. Thus, there is a

secondary lesson that might be learned here for the military: set the Air-Force method as a model for socialization.

Annex A – Interview Questions

- Please describe briefly main relevant interesting points regarding your life before enlisting – were you a member of a youth movement? How did you do in high school?
- How did you come to serve in the military in the command you served? Did you volunteer? Did you have any preferences or rejections towards specific services?
- Did you get higher education prior to service? What did you study?
- Describe the timeline path of your service; How were you accepted into the service? What did you do in the army? What positions did you hold? How were you promoted? What was your rank? Where did you serve (physically)? How were you trained? How were your relations with your commanders and subordinates? Were you succeeded in your positions by anyone, how was that transaction done?
- If you were in a manging position - what was the methodology you used for planning, operating, managing the subject under your responsibility? Have you used tools and methods imposed by the military or did you need/prefer or were allowed to used your own methods? Was there a 'military way' of doing things? Force guidelines?
- Why and how did you discharge?
- What is your position regarding your service? Are you satisfied? Disappointed?
- How did you start the enterprise? Did you work as an employee elsewhere before becoming an entrepreneur? Why did you become an entrepreneur?
- How did you raise money? From whom?
- Did you hire employees? How did you recruit them?
- Is there a clearly defined organisational structure with clearly defined responsibilities?
- Who makes decisions and how are they made? Is there a structured way of convening and discussing things? How often does this happen?
- How do plan and maintain the planning and executions in the company? Do you use specific methodologies or structured tools for planning and managing (e.g. MS Project, Trellis)?
- Where is the company situated? Where do you work? How and how often do you contact each other?
- Do you have customers? Partners? Subcontractors? what is your relations with them?
- What is your exiting strategy for the company?

- Do you see or feel that the military service had or has any effect on your conduct? Do you use methods or lessons learned from your service either explicitly or implicitly? What do you carry on with you from the military service?

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