

STUDIES IN PHYSICAL CULTURE AND TOURISM  
Vol. 17, No. 4, 2010

ANDRZEJ PAWŁUCKI  
University School of Physical Education in Wrocław, Poland

***PSEUDO-SPORTIVUS* IN A BIOPEDAGOGUE'S VIEW**

**Key words:** extreme sports, sport pedagogy, sport ethics.

ABSTRACT

Sociological expositions of causes of extreme activities – usually risky and degenerative – are commonly included in the logical category of *sport*. Although they have very little in common with the social order of sport legitimated with humanistic morality (in the Olympic sense, in particular), these explanations are permanent topics of scholarly discussions within the area of sport. Few point to the fact that extreme physical activities violate, first of all, the moral qualities of existence, becoming attributes of incidental murderers. If the ideological model of sport assumes rigorous preservation of a moral order, then extreme activities cannot be part of it. They are a threat to the axio-normative order of the sport community. From Florian Znaniecki's theoretical perspective they can be regarded as causes of cultural disorganization. Seeking the causes of excesses of *Homo physicus* involves two tasks: the theoretical one consisting of studying his *pseudo-athletic* role; and the practical one consisting of critical analysis of the excesses using the language of moral ethics of personal dignity. The latter is particularly significant in the educational process as a humanistic instrument of self-defense against the subjugation of students' minds to the ideology of postmodern moral relativism. This task can be accomplished thanks to a new branch of humanistic reflection in sport pedagogy known as *bio-pedagogy*, whose objective is critical assessment of boundary situations created by *Homo physicus*, in which he intervenes into his life in a non-medical manner risking death.

Sociological expositions of causes of extreme activities are usually included in the logical category of *sport*. They are classified as *sport* although they have very little in common with the social order of sport legitimated with humanistic morality in the Olympic "ethical sense", in particular. Few point to the fact that extreme physical activities violate, first of all, the moral value of existence, and are attributes of incidental murderers. If the ideological model of sport assumes rigorous preservation of a moral order, then extreme activities may not be part of it as they

consciously violate this order<sup>1</sup>. Generally, all liberal

---

<sup>1</sup> I would like to remind a certain philosopher from Warsaw, who has been arguing that sport has nothing to do with morality (but with generating income), that even if all athletes were dishonest, honesty – following Kant – would still be a moral ideal. I should also add here, although I know that it is not right for a philosopher to comment on an epistemological problem, that it is important to learn from other philosophers, who by rejecting discourse stereotypes in ethics reveal differences between epistemological

experiments ignoring moral humanistic regulation in the name of an allegedly more legitimate principle of diversity lead to cultural collapse. They are a threat to the ethos of sport community. From Florian Znaniecki's theoretical perspective they can be regarded as causes of cultural disorganization<sup>2</sup>. Seeking the causes of excesses of *Homo physicus* involves two tasks: the theoretical one consisting of studying his *pseudo-athletic* role, and the practical one consisting of critical analysis of the excesses using the language of moral ethics of personal dignity. The latter is particularly important in educational practice as it provides teachers of sport with arguments in their dispute with students who uncritically accept unconstrained liberalism.

#### TEACHER OF SPORT: A PEDAGOGUE'S RELUCTANT STUDENT

It should be stressed that it is the pedagogue who takes upon himself the task of ethical interpretation of forbidden acts. It is, however, the pedagogue's illusion that the teacher of sport would agree to consider his opinions grounded in the logic of ethical values in the process of students' moral development. The pedagogue cannot count on the teacher of sport. Critical education, which legitimizes the student's emancipation, is merely the pedagogue's wise recommendation, which has no appeal to the teacher. It reminds me of a certain school sport instructor who accounted for *intellectualization* of the technical and tactical *sense* of his students. However, he expressed his surprise on being informed that the *intellectual development* of the students' sports mind should

also raise the moral culture of sport as an inalienable component of sport education<sup>3</sup>.

In this context the social function of the educational relation of the second degree (at the level of a pedagogical academy) towards the educational relation of the first degree (cognitive and moral transformation of the student's personality from anomie to autonomy) fails to be fulfilled<sup>4</sup>. Whatever is recommended by the pedagogue in his ethical discourse upon human physicality and his reviews of performances of a cultural being known as *Homo physicus* is not regarded by the teacher of sport as a call of duty. The more I experience such situations, the more I am inclined to think that educational practice can dispense with academic pedagogy, or at least that the teacher's pedagogical knowledge is not the necessary condition for carrying out his educational activities.

What is then the teacher's perception of students' good? How does the teacher understand his duties? These questions require an *analytical examination of the teacher's educational role*. The pedagogue should have rebuked the teacher (in the way a teacher writes a note to a student's parents) for failing to do his homework or, more specifically, for failing to accomplish his academic task consisting of making constant efforts to develop his educational competences. The teacher of sport does not do his homework! I seriously doubt whether he even owns a collection of professional resources on physical culture at home. A doctor is obliged to prove his proficiency to a physicians' chamber, but a teacher does not have to account for his pedagogical wisdom in front of any kind of teachers' authority. Moreover, a physician must prove his ethical competence in stating the absurdity of parliamentary resolutions on legalization of euthanasia (unless he plays in the same team with liberal politicians); whereas a teacher of physical culture does not even seem to notice that the postmodern near-death physical truancy of his students obliges him to protest against it ethically and publicly. The sport instructor – an idealess manipulator of human

---

Warsaw learned lessons from Professor Śliwko from Lublin, he would understand that epistemological universalism reveals the truth about sport which cannot be perceived by an adherent of empiricism because his cognitive sense (not to be confused with his mind) has been captivated with data on the reality of individual beings. So he cannot tell others that one can see all, who cannot follow the rules of epistemological universalism (see Kosiewicz J., *Prolegomena do rozważań o sporcie zachodnim i spirytualizmie* (Prolegomena to studies about western sport and spiritualism), *Studia Humanistyczne* 2009, 9, Kraków AWF).

<sup>2</sup> See F. Znaniecki's notion of destructive factors as causes of cultural disorganization in *Cultural Sciences: Their Origin and Development* (University of Illinois, 1952).

<sup>3</sup> It refers to a case of an academic researcher conducting a scientific experiment in a sports school.

<sup>4</sup> On sport education as a social relation of the third degree see A. Pawłucki, *Osoba w pedagogice ciała. Prawo pokoju olimpijskiego* (Person in Pedagogy of the Body. The Law of Olympic Truce), Olsztyn 2007, OSW, wyd. 3.

physicality – is not worth any consideration at all. No one holds him accountable for anything until he has displayed his anthropological and technological ignorance. No one inquires about the sport instructor's ethical wisdom because no one cares about his moral reasoning and proper conduct. The teacher of sport is a reluctant student of the pedagogue of sport. The sport instructors I know would not even think that they should be equally familiar with pedagogical thinking and training methodologies.

Thus the pedagogue can only hope he would be given a chance to guide some individual reflective teacher who is eager to accomplish his educational task accounting for the role of anthropology and personal ethics in *biopedagogy*, or as I wrote earlier, in *pedagogy of values of the body*.

#### PEDAGOGUE AS ANTHROPOLOGIST AND ETHICIST IN ONE

The teacher and the pedagogue go their own separate ways. The latter still hopes that thanks to his guidance the former will make the world more human, and that the idea of moral dignity of a person will not only be adhered to by the pedagogue but also by the teacher and by the student. I admit this set of causal relations (in the sociological sense) is a highly idealized framework of educational bonds leading to the transformation of the student's personality into a personal ideal. The pedagogue can hope that the educational relation of the second degree will take place on the individual level (*causally*, like between a doctor and a patient, or a coach and an athlete) and the educational relation of the first degree, i.e. an individual relation, can be established *doing the pedagogue's ethical and anthropological bidding*.

Why is the pedagogue authorized to stand one stage higher than the teacher and two stages higher than the teacher's student?

The pedagogue does not have to justify his presence among academic humanists as he follows the same scholarly and methodological principles as other academics seeking the truth about the common good, validity of ideals and significance of ideological systems. In the network of academic relations the pedagogue is among equals. Pedagogy as a science about culture is a part of the humanities

alongside normative ethics. Each pedagogue is a co-author of scholarly humanism.

This pedagogue appears different when he addresses the student via the teacher with the intention to shape the cultural destiny of the former. The pedagogue interferes with the relationship between the teacher and the student since he is obliged to demonstrate to the teacher the axio-normative order of life in which the student must participate in accordance with the accepted ideological model. The pedagogue is always of service to someone. In each social formation there is a relation between the subject and the authority, i.e. between the pedagogue and the teacher and the student. Whether we like it or not, the student does not belong to the teacher, and the pedagogue does not belong to himself. When the pedagogue opposes one authority, he still remains in service to another. This is his fate. The pedagogue always belongs to someone and only imagines he belongs to himself.

The teacher remains in a similar relationship. He does not belong to himself either and only imagines he is responsible to himself. In fact, the teacher is held responsible by the social formation in which the educational process takes place. The teacher does not appoint himself and introduces himself to the student as a private person. He is an official appointed, and if necessary recalled, by society to make the next generations aware of the accepted model of life and the idea of common good.

The student does not belong exclusively to himself either. Whether he likes it or not, he must work his way up to gain access to the world of mature adults and become equal to them (in the sociological sense). At the beginning of this way an *emancipated* student may be unable to grasp the sense of his own destiny; he may not even be able to understand his own *fate*. It is up to the teacher to utilize his pedagogy gained from the *superteacher-pedagogue*. The pedagogue commences this educational cycle once he makes the teacher responsible for the student's cultural way to autonomous and mature adulthood manifested by right choices of values and actions in accordance with the ideological model of life.

The relationship between the teacher and the student is a direct one, while between the student and the pedagogue (super-teacher) an indirect one. The student never gets to know his teacher's teacher. The student does not know that such

a relationship exists in the first place. In a similar way a child in a family experiences the presence of its grandparents. The student has no idea who had taught his teacher, who he had been, what he had thought, what he had given the teacher, and what choices he had thought were the right ones. The student does not reflect on this relationship. However, the way his teacher is and what he thinks about the student in view of the latter's future adulthood has been already determined by his cultural and educational *grandparents*. For the student the *pedagogue* is a cultural grandparent as much as the teacher would be a *cultural parent* to him.

To make the student aware of the value of life in a community based on an axiological foundation derived from natural law that the moral value of human life is the highest value in human existence, his teacher must be convinced of the same idea during his own academic preparation. But this is not enough. Also candidates for *auxiliary super-teachers (pedagogues)* should be convinced of this idea earlier. They are academic lecturers involved in the education of the teacher, who always follow the same pedeutological interpretation and consider the idea of human moral dignity as the ultimate value<sup>5</sup>.

The three are joined by the same common good, although their social positions are different. In other words, the same idea of good must bind this educational triad together. If this condition is fulfilled an inter-generational narrative sequence takes place. The three speak the same voice as they all originate from the culture of the same good and they all strive, directly and indirectly, to share this good and determine the student's mature participation in the adopted axio-normative order.

The biopedagogue is a *super-teacher* directly, i.e. he is the teacher's teacher, who:

- 1) justifies ethically the ideal of moral dignity of a person as the ultimate value, which provides human life with a humanistic sense, and reveals

the source of the true knowledge about the good of life derived from the principles of natural law, from which he also makes his normative judgments<sup>6</sup>;

- 2) by using his reason produces an anthropological proof about the validity of one's (student's) attainment of the ideal of moral dignity as the ultimate outcome of education.

In other words, before giving this proof to the teacher, the pedagogue must prove to himself that the ultimate ideal is "human", i.e. can be achieved by anyone who intends to develop *himself by himself*.

The theoretical concept of man, which explains the causes of man's transformation, makes the teacher aware that the final transformation of man's personality – postulated by the pedagogue as the ideal of moral value of a person – is an attainable effect of a real cause. It does not matter the teacher feels that this transformation into a perfect person is causally impossible; or that one cannot *cause* changes *resulting* in one's sanctity, or that there is no such power to accomplish this goal. No other theory of man explaining the causality of human transformation leads to such an effect: maximization of one's humanity (with an ethical assumption that one expresses his humanity the best way with his actions). Even if the teacher reminded the pedagogue that not all intentions could be put in practice, or that no man were a miracle worker, the pedagogue – confident about his source of the truth about the man's cause – would reply that it is through intentions, no matter how ambitious or difficult, that man can find power to realize his goals. However, to avoid accusations of practicing the magic of anthropological naturalism, from which many a pedagogue of new education or anti-pedagogue has already generated rules of natural and spontaneous personal transformation, the pedagogue would add that his anthropology of a person (a thoroughly anti-naturalistic theory) gives rise to the truth about man as an effect of his cause, i.e. a truth about man's subjectivity manifested by autonomous management of his spiritual, personal and physical transformations.

<sup>5</sup> In following a postmodernist fashion manifested in customary liberalism pedagogues from my academy decided to open a program for prospective teachers propagating extreme individualism of "adrenaline junkies" (as the program students call themselves). It is a case of an academy with a humanistic mission which promotes liberal courses with ahumanistic content. Some components of the curriculum, such as military-style paintball or survival skills, are explicitly anti-humanistic.

<sup>6</sup> In fact, we cannot derive normative judgments directly from natural law, as postulated by Leszek Kołakowski, but we can at least establish positive law boundaries; *Czy Pan Bóg jest szczęśliwy i inne pytania (Is God Happy and Other Questions)*, Kraków 2009, Znak, p. 222.

If a pedagogue proposes his ideal of humanity, he must, first of all, justify its validity with axiological arguments and then reasonably deduce the theoretical framework of man's causality of *changes close to the ideal*. The pedagogue must then expose his ethical and anthropological background from which he derives his normative judgments and expository statements.

A pedagogue who can do it successfully, but also, who can convincingly justify the theoretical validity of the anthropological truth about the cause (within a personalist paradigm) and of the ethical truth about the universal good of moral dignity of a person (within natural law), becomes to the teacher a credible medium of social communication with the student.

If the teacher, however, is not satisfied with the pedagogue's reply about the causal power of man's free will and enquiries further about the external causes of man's internal causality (cause of the cause), the pedagogue must emphasize again that *no one is born* with such power but can gain it through social mediation. Man is a personal, i.e. autonomous, being but by no means a self-contained one. To achieve his relative autonomy (a person's absolute self-sufficiency is ontologically impossible) one must proceed towards a subjective relationship with oneself through a relation of social superiority established by the teacher. Man depends on himself, because he becomes used to this relationship during his participation in culture in which he can experience and learn how to become a subject. This is because the teacher as the designer of the student's process of socialization considers the awareness of causality as the necessary *instrumentarium* in the development of the student's personality as a model cultural being. The student must be given causal autonomy by arousing the will of making himself by himself and by choosing the right values that would make the humanistic sense of his actions. Thus the student must choose an axiological perspective in which the moral value of man (among many other values) is accepted by him as the cardinal *principle* of his existence. The student must also understand – which is of particular importance to the teacher of sport – that the superior value of moral dignity of a person realized in the framework of social co-existence determines the value of human physicality, which is an inferior value.

Since values are components of human actions (as human beings cultivate values)<sup>7</sup>, it can also be stated that cultivation of corporeality is sensible, if it allows moral cultivation of oneself as a person (e.g. physical cultivation of health is most sensible when the cultivator uses his own vital powers in his acts of moral personalization of oneself in a real social framework of each cultural undertaking). One should improve one's health, if he or she can live for someone else, when one can love someone in each realm of cultural co-existence. There is always "someone" who we can show good to in a disinterested way, and for whom improvement of physical health is worth the effort in the most natural way. One can become stronger by doing moral good to another than by strengthening oneself in physical health. Generally, cultivation of the body becomes a noble act if the body cultivator acknowledges its axiological inferiority to the moral aspects of his existence. Only then is the cultivation of the body sensible, since the result of this improvement (external or internal transformation of the body) permits real or symbolic cultivation of moral values. On the other hand, the cult of the body (not to be confused with the cultivation of the body) aimed at the improvement of man's naturalness can become a morally evil act, if it is intrinsically evil (*intrinsece malum*), i.e. when the object of the action, despite the subject's intentions, contradicts a person's good as defined by the principles of natural law. What are then the intrinsically evil acts? These are all acts which threaten one's life, personal integrity and human dignity (see John Paul II's *Veritatis Splendor*, 1993, p. 123).

One might not perform acts aimed at transformation of one's body with regard to the ultimate subject of these activities – the absolute good of a person. One might also resort to using one's own intelligence against oneself by committing unworthy acts. Man is qualified to do everything, including cultivation of his body, with dignity, to express his prudence and wisdom of experience. However, man can also intentionally betray himself by committing acts degrading his humanity. It is absurd: one does live to become oneself, i.e. become like a person in humanity. Man should not do anything, also in the area of cultivation of one's own body, which is not

<sup>7</sup> See "Elements of Practical Reality" (1911) by Florian Znaniecki.

conducive to his moral distinguishment. By accepting the axiological assumption that a person's moral dignity is the absolute value the pedagogue authorizes himself to make judgments about the moral quality of acts regarded intentionally as extreme and performed with all powers of the body against the body itself, aimed at its biotic annihilation and ontic self-destruction, death ("let's play to death"), or at the best, deterioration of health.

In general, extreme corporeal and physical activities are morally evil if their subject performs them with regard to the object of:

- a) impersonal being of social utopia, which justifies these activities ideologically; this is a case of anti-humanism of the cult of the body and legitimization of totalitarian and authoritarian ideologies of socialism, communism and fascism;
- b) natural being characteristic of liberal social models, which are, in fact, *ahumanistic* through their praise of unlimited individual liberty as the ultimate good and arbitrariness of the cult of the body;
- c) cultural being, which is also impersonal, characteristic of social situations in which a person becomes a means to achieve some external end – in this case, material or symbolic culture as the ultimate good. In these apparently commendable situations forming cultural humanism (which is, in fact, *ahumanistic*) all manifestations of the cult of the body cannot be justified by some higher ethical reason of moral personal good either, because this reason is "excluded" by some other "non-humanistic" justifications of an extreme act.

Generally, acts aimed at cultivation of the body are "intrinsically evil" in the physical dimension of human existence, when their subject is not the moral good of a person. Someone who uses the body as a tool in his self-affirmation in a collectivist or individualist model of social life threatens his personal dignity. Although his corporeal construction may compel admiration, in the personalist ethical assessment he seems to be a traitor of his ideals. Whoever threatens his own ultimate good – the good of personal dignity – betrays the moral ideals of his own humanity.

By seeing man's body cultivation in two perspectives: theoretical and axiological, the pedagogue recognizes the reason and wisdom in acts of personal self-creation following the ethical

pattern of perfection. The pedagogue also observes – although he may not like it – with the aid of his ethical tools of axiological assessment, cases of murder on humanity. The pedagogue needs two measures of ethics which would make the moral value of man absolute: anthropological and axiological (in fact, they form a single measurement of humanity consisting of the pedagogue's expository statements and normative judgments) to assess *who is who* in acts of corporeal cultivation. I will use this axiological evaluation of extreme acts of *Homo physicus* to reveal their *ahumanistic* or even *anti-humanistic* contents.

The pedagogue comes to the teacher as an ethicist and anthropologist in one. He would never bother the teacher, if he were not able to prove (as an anthropologist-philosopher) that his postulated ideal of man as a person is valid.

One can imagine ideals and even make utopias out of them. But what is their value if we do not know whether they are empirically believable; if we are not sure whether achieving a transformation of man into a morally perfect person is causally possible. If the pedagogue is unable to convince the teacher of sport that this ideal is attainable, he must then explain to him his theoretical reasons (generalizations) for his normative judgments. This is how the biopedagogue enforces theoretical thinking about man: as an evaluating ethicist and a justifying anthropologist.

## CORPOREISM AS POSTMODERN AHUMANISM

I decided to include a wider philosophical perspective in the pedagogy of values of the body having observed absurdities of the liberal manifestations of postmodern individualism. Since at least the early 1990s postmodernity has been notorious for its irrational unbounded individualism. *Homo physicus* performs acts which elevate his greatness or degrade it; his performances are often on the verge of life and death.

When in 1996 I expressed my criticism about postmodern forms of corporeism, I drew my moral judgments from personalistic ethics – in which the ideal of moral personal dignity is absolute – and *implicite* from a philosophical theory in which man exists only integrated with his physicality. These two perspectives derived from the logic of cause (theoretical) and the logic of value (normative) are

accepted by each and every pedagogue since each pedagogical idea entails explanation of one's own anthropological, philosophical and ethical preferences to the participants in the educational discourse. Each pedagogy contains theoretical, philosophical and normative ideas of man. One may say that the wealth of pedagogies is expressed by their adherent anthropologists and ethicists. By finding a school of thought about man from which a given pedagogue takes his ideas and translates them into the language of anthropology and pedagogical ethics, one can establish how much of universal theoretical reasoning and commonly accepted humanistic wisdom there is in his own pedagogy. I use this wealth myself in my evaluation of other pedagogies and I assess myself the content of my *pedagogy of values of the body* as well. How do I arrive at the junction of normative judgments, explaining through what good man achieves his ideal in humanity, and statements explaining the causality of man's transformation? Why, as a pedagogue, must I consider both, while I realize that there is no logical transfer from normative judgments to theoretical generalizations? The answer to these questions is simple. If you praise an ideal by stating that *Man decides about his ideal, when he shows his personal moral dignity*, or in other words, when he implements the personal norm, then you must prove that one who is committed to the vision of perfection in humanity, has a potential of self-causality, i.e. self-determining his "ideal outlook". If you fail to prove it, then as a propagator of ideals, who gives the teacher judgments about the student's ideals (as the pedagogical usurper of the truth about the student's ideals or rather student's becoming an ideal in humanity) you would make a deluded dreamer of yourself. The teacher requires from you theoretical guarantees, for example, when you lead him to believe that a type of love called friendship between members of the Olympic family forms the greatness of these members and constitute their fulfillment of the ideal sport humanity. The teacher not only expects a justification of the ethical validity of this statement, unaware that moral judgments can manifest the truth about good and evil, and that they are classified as true or false<sup>8</sup>

<sup>8</sup> As discussed by Leszek Kołakowski in his mini-lectures in which he recalled the long-running and tedious dispute on whether evaluative judgments could be derived from descriptive statements; Kraków 2004, p. 188.

(incidentally, the teachers of sport I know stick to their own convictions anyway).

The aforementioned methodological principle put me once into the role of a pedagogical judge (2005)<sup>9</sup>. I use this principle each time I ask the author of a given pedagogy about anthropological explanations of causes of the student's transformation and axiological justifications of its sense. I discussed this issue in more detail with the aid of *the compass rose of pedagogical ideas* (2007)<sup>10</sup>. I should add that in my opinion this principle is universal. Whoever asks about the ethical value of any pedagogical thought submitted for consideration will find in this principle a useful navigation tool. The simultaneous use of two coordinates in any given pedagogy allows a description of the pedagogue's world and evaluation of the normative order the pedagogue propagates. Thanks to this useful instrument of axiological navigation the pedagogue can help the teacher of sport find the sense of each athlete's act and indirectly guide the teacher's student on his quest of right humanistic choices of values. The results of studies on moral reasoning of students from sports schools show how important this educational task is. Certainly, the students are aware of the rules of sport conduct, but they have no idea about their sense, and they are unable to say anything about the sense of their destiny. The same study results also point to something far more disturbing. The teachers of sport themselves are unable to name the rules of athlete's moral acts. To them the rule of fair play is about "clean playing" or "adhering to rules". They are not able to elaborate on this issue. It does not mean they do not understand it; however, they certainly do not know that their moral thinking about athlete's acts must follow the logic of ethical discourse. The teacher of sport could teach ethics, if he had attended academic normative ethics classes conducted by the pedagogue or ethicist; if he had studied sports humanities realizing their applicability in the process of humanization of athletes and personalization of social relations in sport and beyond.

<sup>9</sup> Pawłucki A., Myśl Jędrzeja Śniadeckiego o wychowaniu zdrowotnym w perspektywie współczesnego dyskursu pedagogów (Jędrzej Śniadecki's ideas about health education in the perspective of modern pedagogical discourse), *Kultura Fizyczna* 2006, 3-4.

<sup>10</sup> Pawłucki A., *Osoba w pedagogice ciała. Prawo pokoju olimpijskiego* (Person in Pedagogy of the Body. The Law of Olympic Truce), Olsztyn 2007, OSW.

## BIOPEDAGOGUE VERSUS BIOETHICIST

The pedagogue does not want to be an importunate moralist, constantly reminding the teacher about rebuking the student for his madness in extreme activities that can potentially destroy the integrity of his life. The pedagogue rather confines himself to reviewing extreme physical activities using a preferred ethical theory and recommending his reviews to the teacher, hoping he would then pass them onto his students. By way of consolation, the pedagogue can specify that the range of reviewed excesses includes also extreme acts of affirmation of life, and not only those on the verge of life and death or praising death. It is small consolation if it would lead to the old philosophers' wisdom that man does not live longer to become prisoner of his own innateness.

Thus the pedagogy of values of life does not use bioethical arguments in the discussion of life nor translate them into the language of teaching practice. It uses the logic of normative ethics but never copies the same *discourses about life and death*. It is a humanistic thought involving assessments of many different cases of encroachment on the border between life and death by persons with free will. The difference is that bioethics evaluates and establishes norms of border situations between life and death involving people subject to biomedical transformation of the human body; whereas biopedagogy "reviews" border situations created by *Homo physicus* when he interferes with life in a non-medical manner risking hazards to health or death. Secondly, the border situations in bioethics involve most often two subjects: *one towards one* (performing abortion or euthanasia or administering death penalty), while in biopedagogy they are concerned with one subject only – *one towards oneself*.

- a) interfering with life during training of the body;
- b) manipulating his trained physical body during performances on the verge of life and death (risking the loss of life).

The criterion of *subjectivity* (one subject or two subjects) in establishing differences between the two normative sciences is not sufficient. It can be used for didactic purposes, but it is inapplicable in the moral assessment of athlete's acts for which some *hidden perpetrator* is held responsible, e.g. a sport physician who administers a performance-enhancing drug in consultation with the trainer and with the athlete's permission, or a bio-engineer

changing the genome structure. A two-subject relationship with a hidden perpetrator results in: a) athlete's loss of health, and b) destruction of the moral good of a sport situation. It is a lie to the two subjects involved and to the sport opponent.

In general, all manifestations of biotechnological doping in sport are two-subject relations. As they result in the loss of health and life, not only in the destruction of the moral good of the sport act itself, they are subject to a more general ethical evaluation – *to the ethics of values of life*, i.e. *bioethics*.

Not all extreme excesses take place in sport or quasi-sport situations. Some of them have no relation to any sport activity at all and are connected with *Homo physicus* not *Pseudo-sportivus*. Therefore they are subject to a more general evaluation at the level of pedagogy of values of the body, and not only at the level of sport pedagogy. A subject who undertakes these extreme activities depersonalizes social relationships through his individual propagation of himself (selfishly affirming his ego), and at the same time degrades himself physically by organic destruction of his body through extreme training. In other words, he diminishes his good until he willingly and consciously loses it. Biopedagogy is then a normative reflection of extreme uses and abuses of one's physicality against oneself. It deals with cases of incidental murderers but it can also make a normative evaluation of extreme acts of affirmation of the values of life – indirectly resulting in the social death of the performer-pseudo athlete or narcissistic corporeal aesthetics leading to a lonely spiritual death.

## CONCLUSIONS

Each social change occurs in the nomothetic dimension as a trend or a tendency. Although it concerns many participants in social life, it always results in changes of individual human fates threatening the individual good of a person. There are, of course, changes which affirm and strengthen this good. Social changes in the late postmodern era manifested with the ethos of egoistic individualism supported by the ethics of customary liberalism result in destruction of the moral value of existence and degradation of man as a person. In fact, the late postmodern era appears to have established a society without communities or persons. This leads



to the disintegration of the social framework of the community into individual cultures and thus to the lack of recognition of persons by other persons. Under the circumstances, where a human individual belongs only to himself social life ceases to exist as mutual responsibility of individuals for one another. There are only alienated individuals who use themselves in selfish acts, i.e. use themselves against themselves. Who is unworthy of himself as a person, unconsciously betrays himself in his axiological blindness. He becomes his own subject by pandering to his own whims and by destroying the moral value and the ontological structure of life. He would use his own body as a tool in his activities degrading his physicality: body against body and body against health. In the end he will find death in accordance with his wishes. In a reproachful assessment of the ethicist-rigorist he will be named an *incidental murderer*.

Neither the bioethicist nor the biopedagogue, who considers the moral value of life of a person in a community ultimate, cannot ignore the fact that late postmodernity generates cultural corruption and brings misfortune upon man. When this corruption takes place, the pedagogue, who is a constant reviewer of cultural actions – in our case physical excesses – can report this case to the highest pedagogical authority. Although it is pointless, the pedagogue will do his pedeutological duty being responsible for the student's good. He will play a modest educational role behind the teacher of sport, and only in the educational relation of the second degree can the biopedagogue contribute to the social transformation which would restore personal dignity to a man.

The pedagogue who is concerned with the ideal of student as a person does not sleep relaxedly as human life is not relaxing. The pedagogue knows that once a new social change occurs he will be woken up and brought to the border of human error following the call of his conscience. He will then assess the error and remind the traitor of his obligation to achieve personal perfection. However, the pedagogue has no moral right to desire anything else.